The theory of rational decision and the foundations of ethics by Sowden, Lanning Patrick
 
THE THEORY OF RATIONAL DECISION AND THE 
FOUNDATIONS OF ETHICS 
 
Lanning Sowden 
 
A Thesis Submitted for the Degree of PhD 
at the 
University of St Andrews 
 
  
1983 
Full metadata for this item is available in                                                                           
St Andrews Research Repository 
at: 
http://research-repository.st-andrews.ac.uk/ 
 
 
 
Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: 
http://hdl.handle.net/10023/14814 
 
 
 
 
 
This item is protected by original copyright
 
THE THEORY OF RATIONAL DECISION
AND
THE FOUNDATIONS OF ETHICS
by
LANNING SOWDEN
B.A. (Hons), M.A,
A thesis submitted to the Faculty of Arts of the University
of St. Andrews in fulfilment of the requirements for the
degree of Doctor of Philosophy.
October 1982
ProQuest Number: 10166212
All rights reserved
INFORMATION TO ALL USERS 
The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted.
In the unlikely event that the author did not send a com p le te  manuscript 
and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed,
a note will indicate the deletion.
uest
ProQuest 10166212
Published by ProQuest LLC (2017). Copyright of the Dissertation is held by the Author.
All rights reserved.
This work is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States C ode
Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC.
ProQuest LLC.
789 East Eisenhower Parkway 
P.O. Box 1346 
Ann Arbor, Ml 48106- 1346

FOR S,S,
... morals are the work of woman.
Tocqueville, Democracy in America, Vol.II, III, 9
(i
CONTENTS
DECLARATIONS (iv)
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS (v)
ABSTRACT (vf)
CHAPTER 1 : 1
Rationality and.'!orals: Introductory Remarks,
CHAPTER 11 ; 10
The Deduction of Utilitarianism from Orthodox 
Decision Theory.
1. The Types and Attractions of Utilitarianism.
2. An Outline of Orthodox Decision Theory.
3. The Equiprobability Model and the Deduction of 
Utilitarianism.
4. Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility.
CHAPTER III: 38
Rule and Act Utiltiarianism, Decision Theory 
and Intuition,
1, The Conflict between Moral Intuitions and 
Utilitarianism.
2. The Attempt to resolve this Conflict by Introducing 
the Distinction between Rule and Act Utilitarianism.
3. The Equivalence Thesis for Rule and Act Utilitarianism.
4, A Decision Theoretic Approach which attempts to 
falsify the Equivalence Thesis.
(ii)
5. Other attempts to falsify the Equivalence Thesis.
6. Do Conflicts between our Moral Intuitions and 
Utilitarianism really matter?
CHAPTER IV: 129
The Inadequacy of Orthodox Decision Theory.
1. An Outline of the General Approach and the 
Underlying Assumptions taken to demonstrate the 
Inadequacy of Orthodox Theory.
2. Falsifying Orthodox Theory: The Tversky-Kahneman 
Experiment.
3. Orthodox Theory from the Normative Standpoint.
4. "Subjective", "Ethical" and "Overall" Preferences.
5. The First Argument for the Empirical Vacuity of 
Decision Theory: Decision Theory is "Soft-edged".
6. The Second Argument: The Holism of Reasons, Actions 
and Rationality.
INTERPOLATION: 190
Two Theses about Reasons and Actions.
CHAPTER V: 205
Unorthodox Decision Theory and The Defence 
of Contractarianism.
1. Alternative Conceptions of Justice and Rationality,
2. Unrestricted and Restricted Applications of Maximim 
Towards an Adequate Version of the Maximin Principle.
3. Maximin and the Original Position.
(iii)
5. h Reconsideration of the Objections to Maximin,
6. The Nature and Status of Preference 
Contractarianism.
SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY 265
(iv)
DECLARATIONS
I, banning Patrick Sowden, hereby certify that this thesis which 
is approximately 67,000 words in length has been written by me, 
that it is a record of work carried out by me and that it has 
not been submitted in any previous application foyf a higher degree.
date .   signed/
I was admitted as a research student under Ordinance No.12 on 
1 October 1979 and as a candidate for the degree of Doctor of 
Philosophy on 1 April 1980; the higher study for which this is 
a record was carried out in the University of St. Ai^drews between 
October 1979 and October 1982.
date ■., c W  [    signecY...............................
I hereby certify that the candidate has fulfilled the conditions 
of the Resolutions and Regulations appropriate to the degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy of the University of St. Andrews and that he 
is qualified to submit this thesis in application for that degree,
U p P . / i ldate .. rrv./. L)r. I . s igned
(v)
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I wish to express my sincere thanks to my supervisor 
Professor Bernard Mayo who patiently read and carefully 
commented on the material that has gone to make up this 
thesis. Of those not officially involved in the super­
vision of the thesis I would especially like to mention 
Professor Crispin Wright and Dr Peter Clark whose help 
and encouragement has been invaluable. From these three 
gentlemen I have learned a lot: they have been the best 
of teachers. The opportunities they gave me to inflict 
my inchoate ideas on innocent students in various under­
graduate courses was clear evidence (unfortunately for a 
central idea in my thesis) that here were individuals who 
did not value certainty as such: I can’t thank them
enough for their willingness to take a chance and let an 
untried post-graduate have a go. I would also like to 
thank the Oliversity of St. Andrews whose provision of a 
full St. Andrews Oiiversity Scholarship over the last 
three years has enabled me to undertake this work.
Finally, I am exceptionally grateful to M rs Eileen McRobbie 
for her expert and very efficient typing.
(vi)
ABSTRACT
The primary concern of this thesis is to investigate what light 
(if any) the theory of rational decision can throw on certain problems 
in first-order ethics. In particular, it examines whether given a 
coTveot theory of decision we can determine which of the two major 
rivals in the field of contemporary ethics, utilitarianism and 
contractarianism, is the more adequate moral theory. I begin by 
outlining what I call orthodox decision theory and note from this 
theory together with a minimal characterization of what it is to 
make a moral judgement we can deduce utilitarianism. The apparent 
conflict between utilitarianism and our moral intuitions is then 
examined. I criticize a common response made by utilitarians to 
this conflict, namely, their recourse to the distinction between rule 
and act utilitarianism. But I then ask the question of whether this 
conflict really matters? I conclude that in a sense it does not. I 
then turn from a consideration of the imptioations of utilitarianism 
to its foundationsf particularly, its foundations in orthodox 
decision theory. I attempt to establish that orthodox theory has 
empirical content and that it has been falsified. I also consider 
the theory from the normative standpoint and construct a prima facie 
case against it. I now consider the dispute between the contractarian 
and the utilitarian and note that it is essentially decision theoretic 
in character. From a consideration of what was found to be mistaken 
about orthodox theory I now argue for a defence of the selection rule 
for rational choice presupposed by contractarianism and thereby offer 
a (partial) defence of a contractarian theory of justice.
CHAPTER I
Ra t i o n a l i t y  a n d  M o r a l s  : In t r o d u c t o r y  R e m a r k s
In this thesis we investigate an old philosophical 
problem, viz ., the relationship between rationality and 
morals, but from a somewhat different perspective. We 
tackle the problem from the point of view of contemp­
orary decision theory: we will attempt to see what light, 
if any, this theory can throw on first-order ethics, in 
particular, the two major rivals in the field of contem­
porary first order ethics, utilitarianism and contract­
arianism.
There are two roles that will be played by the 
theory of decision in our argument. Its major role will 
be to see which of utilitarianism or contractarianism is 
the more adequate theory; its subsidiary role will be to 
see whether its modelling techniques and other analytical 
tools can throw further light on a famous distinction 
within utilitarianism.
It is important that we should have a motivation 
for employing decision theory in these two roles, espec­
ially in its role as arbiter between utilitarianism and 
contractarianism. For a very widespread view amongst
moral philosophers is that it is a rather simple matter 
to demonstrate the inadequacy of utilitarianism: we 
simply show that it can be brought into conflict with 
some of our most firmly held moral intuitiohs. This is 
a view also shared by many philosophers of utilitarian 
persuasion and hence they involve themselves in all 
manner of contortions to prevent their theory from 
coming into conflict with these intuitions. This raises 
an additional problem within the area subsumed under the 
foundations of ethics part of our title: we are not simply 
concerned to look at the foundation of ethical theories 
in the theory of rational behaviour, but we are also 
concerned with the foundational problem of whether we 
can decide between ethical theories on the basis of 
intuition, in particular, whether we can decide on the 
adequacy of utilitarianism on the basis of an appeal to 
our moral intuitions. I will argue that we cannot decide 
on the adequacy of utilitarianism by these means. And 
this provides us with the (additional) motivation to 
engage in an examination of the somewhat technical 
literature that surrounds the theory of decision and to 
look at the attempts to ground ethical theories in such 
a theory.
We begin in the next chapter by outlining what I 
will call orthodox decision theory. This is sometimes 
also known as Bayesian decision theory. This is a theory
of rational decision which deduces from four apparently 
innocuous assumptions or axioms the theorem that the 
utility of a "lottery” - a risky alternative - is simply 
equal to its mathematically expected utility. Orthodox 
theory then claims that a rational individual will choose 
(act) so as to maximize expected utility. If we then 
introduce an account of what it is, in some minimal 
sense to make a moral judgement, viz.^ that it be impar­
tial and impersonal, we can with a more formal definition 
of what this amounts to deduce that a rational individual, 
if he is to make a moral judgement, must do so as a 
utilitarian.
In the next chapter. Chapter III, we go on to 
consider whether utilitarianism has any unfavourable 
implications, i.e., whether it can be brought into con­
flict with our moral intuitions. We note that the normal 
response here is to distinguish between rule utilitarian­
ism and act utilitarianism. The former is advanced 
because it at least appears to not be able to be brought 
into conflict with our intuition. However, there is a 
well-known argument to the effect that in all important 
respects rule and act utilitarianism are equivalent.
That is, that both theories, when properly understood, 
prescribe the acts which we find morally objectionable.
I call this the equivalence thesis. But the equivalence 
thesis has not gone unchallenged. Most notably, John
Harsanyi, a well-known decision theorist, has claimed 
not only that the thesis has already been shown to be 
mistaken by people such as Gertrude Ezorsky, but that by 
employing the techniques of decision theory we can show 
that most definitely the equivalence thesis is false, I 
agree with Harsanyi that this approach certainly makes 
more perspicuous in what the distinction between rule and 
act utilitarianism consists, but I disagree that he has 
shown that rule utilitarianism is a significant improve­
ment on act utilitarianism. In other words, he has not 
shown that it is false that both theories prescribe the 
very acts which we find morally repugnant, i.e., the 
equivalence thesis still stands. Harsanyi, however, is 
not the only one to attempt to show that the equivalence 
thesis is mistaken. There are, for example, the argu­
ments advanced by Ezorsky and John Mackie. But I show 
that Ezorsky's argument is invalid and that Mackie’s 
argument reduces the status of the rules in rule utilit­
arianism to the status of the sorts of rules already 
countenanced by the act utilitarian. But has all this 
effort at an attempt to show that the theories are or 
are not equivalent really been worth it? We have 
presupposed that if utilitarianism can be brought into 
conflict with our moral intuitions then this demonstrates 
the inadequacy of utilitarianism. By considering the 
sorts of replies made by the utilitarian to the apparent
fact that his theory can be brought into conflict with 
our moral intuitions I attempt to show that the question 
of whether utilitarianism is shown to be inadequate via 
an appeal to our intuitions is irresolvable : we can 
provide no conclusive answer one way or the other. This 
sort of approach, the most common form of approach to 
the question of the adequacy of utilitarianism, is not 
a fruitful approach. I suggest, therefore, that we 
return to look at the attempts to ground utilitarianism 
in the theory of rational decision making.
Thus in Chapter IV we consider whether or not 
orthodox decision theory is an adequate theory of rational 
decision. By looking at an experiment performed by Amos 
Tversky and Daniel Kahneman I argue that it would appear 
that orthodox theory has been falsified, This experiment 
shows that individuals do not choose so as to maximize 
expected utility. However, some orthodox theorists, 
namely, those who present their theory as a normative 
theory need not apparently be concerned by the results 
of the Tversky-Kahneman experiment. Afterall, that 
individuals do not choose as their theory says they ought 
to choose is of no consequence. But I argue that we can 
at least construct a prima facie case against the ortho­
dox theorist if he presents his theory as a normative 
theory. And this for the reason that what the Tversky- 
Kahneman experiment makes clear is that individuals
whom we would normally regard as quite rational do value 
certainty as such (and this is why they do not choose so 
as to maximize expected utility) and that no argument 
has been offered (and no argument seems in the offing) 
which could show that they ought not to value certainty 
as such. Nonetheless we have not shown and I don’t 
think we ooutd show that the orthodox theorist is mis­
taken in claiming that an individual ought not to value 
certainty. I suggest that if we want a more definite 
conclusion as regards the adequacy of orthodox theory - 
which surely we do want as we are now attempting to 
decide between ethical theories on the basis of an appeal 
to what constitutes the correct theory of decision - then 
we would do better to adopt an empirical stance towards 
decision theory. However, it has been argued that 
decision theory lacks empirical content. I consider two 
arguments here ; one asserts that we must revise our 
ascription of belief and preference in the face of any 
apparently falsifying instance to the central hypothesis 
of decision theory; and the second asserts that if we 
are to ascribe beliefs and preferences to a person at all 
then we must presuppose the truth of the central hypoth­
esis of decision theory. I argue that neither argument 
successfully demonstrates the empirical vacuity of 
decision theory. But in arguing that decision theory 
does have empirical content two theses in the philosophy
of action have to be presupposed. In the Interpolation 
that follows Chapter IV I present an argument for these 
two theses.
In the final chapter we consider the differing 
conceptions of justice proposed by utilitarianism and 
contractarianism and the differing conceptions of ration­
ality that underlie them. According to utilitarianism 
rational individuals when choosing in a situation which 
will ensure that the choice is a moral choice will 
choose so as to maximize expected utility; according to 
contractarianism they will choose (assuming that choice 
situation has certain additional features) so as to 
maximin. The question arises, then, of whether it is 
ever rational to choose so as to maximin (i.e,, to choose 
that alternative with the maximum minimum utility)?
Looking back to what we found to be the error of orthodox 
decision theory, that it precludes individuals from
valuing certainty as such, we see that we can provide a 
rationale for maximim and its restriction to certain 
types of situations. We then note that according to 
John Rawls (a leading proponent of contractarianism) the 
Original Position (a hypothetical choice situation which 
ensures that the society chosen by rational individuals 
is a just society) is indeed a situation of the type 
where application of the maximin principle is appropriate. 
By way of clinching our argument we then go on to consider
the objections that have been raised by the orthodox 
theorist to the maximin principle; these are the 
objections, presented by means of counter-example, that 
maximin gives rise to decisions that are clearly 
irrational and to decisions that are clearly immoral,
I give arguments which, I believe successfully,defuse 
these counter-examples. I then go on to note in what 
respects the theory I have defended is similar to the 
theory advanced by the orthodox decision theorist and in 
what respects it is dissimilar and in accord with Rawl's 
theory. An appropriate name for the theory is, I suggest, 
preference contractarianism. Finally, I briefly consider 
the meta-level status of this theory, in particular, the 
status of the theory given its reliance on certain con­
tingent facts. This is a topic more properly dealt with 
in a thesis on meta-ethics, nonetheless, the problem is 
sufficiently pressing for it to be worthwhile to pass 
some comment, I note that I side with Rawls in believing 
that it is quite appropriate that our fundamental ethical 
principles should depend on certain contingent facts 
about men and society. To a very significant extent this 
belief is justified by challenging those who think other­
wise to come up with a theory that satisfies certain 
conditions of coherency and understandability, Thus, it 
is no weakness in our argument for preference contract­
arianism that both or either of the following is the
case: (a) that viewing decision theory from the normative
standpoint, when we establish the prima facie case 
against orthodox theory we do not establish that rational 
individuals ought to value certainty, but only that if 
they do (a contingent fact) then they ought to choose in 
an unorthodox manner; and (b) that viewing decision 
theory from the empirical viewpoint we only establish 
that the correct theory of actual human decision is 
unorthodox theory.
As a quick perusal of this thesis will make apparent 
I have had to touch on many problems which have assumed 
a considerable importance in this and other areas of 
philosophical enquiry, for example: the problem of when 
a theory has empirical content, the relationship between 
reasons and actions, the nature of rules of conduct, 
holism, the debate between rule and act utilitarianism, 
and so on, each of which could have had a thesis written 
on it in its own right. With respect to some of these 
problems I have adopted a position and offered consider­
able supporting argument. But with respect to some 
other of these problems I have adopted a position with 
the intention that the position I adopt is at least 
plausible and not overly controversial. To the extent 
that as regards these problems other positions certainly 
are possible and that I have offered little reason to 
suppose otherwise then there will be those who may fail 
to be totally convinced of my main argument: this, unfor­
tunately, is unavoidable.
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CHAPTER II
T h e  D e d u c t i o n  o f  Ut i l i t a r i a n i s m  f r o m  O r t h o d o x  D e c i s i o n  
T h e o r y
1. The Types and Attractions of Utilitarianism.
2. An Outline of Orthodox Decision Theory.
3. The Equiprobability Model and the Deduction of
Utilitarianism.
4. Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility.
1. The Types and Attvactio7ts of Utititaria?iism
It is possible to distinguish a number of different 
forms of utilitarianism. A traditional form of 
utilitarianism ~ hedonistic utilitarianism -- claims that 
what one morally ought to do is bring about the greatest 
amount of happiness* According to ideal utilitarianism 
what one ought to do is bring about the greatest intrinsic 
good. And in its most modern guise - preference 
utilitarianism - what one ought to do is maximize 
individual utilities. Now each of these statements of 
utilitarianism is ambiguous in at least two respects.
The first respect is this: it is not clear from the
11
above statements whether what we ought to do is bring 
about the greatest sum of happiness/intrinsic good/ 
individual utilities or whether v/e ought to maximize 
the mean.^ Depending on which approach we take we can 
distinguish two types of utilitatianism for each of the 
major forms, For example, consider hedonistic 
utilitarianism; we could have, considering each 
individual level of happiness, that we ought to either 
maximize the sum total of such levels or maximize the 
arithmetic mean of such levels. The proper resolution 
of this ambiguity will not be of any great concern in 
this thesis^ : the problems that we will be concerned 
with in our study of utilitarianism are not problems 
that a,rise because of this ambiguity nor are they 
effected by it. Indeed, the form of utilitarianism that 
will be the focus of attention in this thesis - 
preference utilitarianism - is generally put forward as 
a theory of the "average" type. Thus, according to 
John Harsanyi^, a utilitarian is required to maximize 
social utility and this is defined as the arithmetic 
mean of all individual utilities. As v/e shall see, that 
this form of utilitarianism should be of the average 
type follows from what (supposedly) it is to make a 
rational choice conjoined with a minimal characterization 
of what it is to make a moral judgement.
I mentioned that the three statements of the
12
general forms of utilitarianism were ambiguous in two 
respects. The second respect arises because however it 
is that we specify the maximand, i.e., what it is that 
the utilitarian is supposed to maximize, we have not 
thereby fully characterized the utilitarian's theory 
fop we have not specified the constraints (if any) of 
maximization. Here it is a commonplace to distinguish 
two types of utilitarianism known as act utilitarianism 
and rule utilitarianism. However, we put this distinct­
ion to one side for the moment; the motivation for and 
the specification and examination of the distinction 
will be the subject of Chapter III. It suffices to 
note here that whether we suppose that according to 
utilitarianism we ought to maximize the total or average 
of happiness or intrinsic good or individual utilities, 
we still have not ascertained what constraints the 
utilitarian is to place on that maximization, and what 
constraints are imposed may have important repercussions 
for any attempt to determine the adequacy or otherwise 
of utilitarianism.
Utilitarianism certainly has some attractions as a 
moral theory, particularly, I think, in its hedonistic 
and preference forms. It appears to offer a coherent 
theory of morality in the sense that all our moral views 
can be seen to flow from a single principle. In contrast, 
the deontological theories - theories that assert that
13
morality essentially concerns justice and rights- which 
are put up as rivals to utilitarianism often seem to be 
no more than an arbitary collection of principles that 
even on occasions conflict, and indeed often conflict 
with the precepts of commonsense morality unless some 
apparently ad hoc adjustments are made to the principles. 
Moreover, these latter theories generally do not seem to 
offer a meaningful account of how we come by these 
principles, whereas utilitarianism does offer an account 
of how we come by our moral principles. Utilitarianism 
seems to offer the prospect of more or less definitive 
conclusions as to what we ought or ought not to do, and 
the prospect of a means of deciding between the often 
conflicting precepts of commonsense morality and, indeed, 
of the deontological principles themselves. And finally, 
as regards hedonistic and preference utilitarianism, there 
certainly seems something right in the idea that morality 
should have something to do with happiness promotion or 
preference satisfaction: at least such an idea accords
well with the humanitarian spirit of our age. To be sure, 
the notions of "happiness" and "preference" have to be 
understood in a somewhat technical sense, and we will 
return to this problem in Chapter V when we touch on 
the question of what preferences are to be properly 
included in a moral calculus.
The above considerations give us some reason for
14
taking utilitarianism seriously. But the considerations 
are not conclusive. First, it may turn out that 
utilitarianism has implications which are in some way 
totally unsatisfactory. . I consider this possibility in 
Chapter III. In which case v/e might conclude that there 
is just no possibility of formulating a successful moral 
theory with utilitarianism’s apparent advantages of 
coherency, etc.. Second, it may turn out that there is 
another moral theory, completely at variance with 
utilitarianism, but which nonetheless shares all or 
nearly all of the advantages of coherency, etc.. I 
argue for such a theory, which I call preference contract­
arianism^ in Chapter V.
In this chapter I want to consider what more can be 
said in favour of utilitarianism by looking at its 
foundations. In particular, I want to consider the idea 
that utilitarianism is the only rational moral code.
That is, that if an individual is rational, and if he is 
to make a moral judgement, then he must do so as a utilit­
arian. I will look at this idea as it has been expounded 
by John Harsanyi^.
2. An Outline of Orthodox Decision Theory.
Orthodox (i.e., Bayesian) decision theory is advanced 
as a theory of rational behaviour or choice. Just in what sense
15
it is such a theory and whether it is an adequate theory 
are questions that I postpone until Chapter IV, The 
purpose of the present section is to simply present the 
theory in outline to facilitate an understanding of 
Harsanyi's deduction of utilitarianism from orthodox 
theory.
In decision theory decision situations are divided 
into three types: decisions under certainty, under risk, 
and under uncertainty. A decision maker is said to make 
a decision under certainty when he can predict the actual 
outcome of the action he chooses to perform. He makes a 
decision under risk when he knows the objective probability 
associated with each possible outcome. And finally, an 
individual makes a decision under uncertainty when he 
does not know some or even all of these probabilities.
It is assumed that in a situation of certainty an 
individual will choose that action with an outcome that 
has the highest utility. To say that one outcome has a 
higher utility to another is just to say that the 
individual prefers that outcome to the other. But for us 
to be able to claim that an individual will choose so as 
to maximize utility, we must make certain assumptions 
about the preference relation, in particular, the 
relation must be such that it orders the outcomes so that 
there will be a most preferred outcome (i.e., an outcome 
with the highest utility). This is ensured by supposing 
that the preference relation is complete and transitive.
16
That Is, for any three outcomes 0^ , (9^ , and where
0^ . dg means that individual i prefers 0^ to 0  ^or is
indifferent between them, we assume:
(1) Completeness
(Vt)(VO^)(^fOg) (O^  Og)v(Og 2% O^)
(.2). Transitivity
(Vf)(V0^)(V0p)(V0t) (Of °t) + (Or 2- Of)
This is sufficient to induce a weak ordering of the 
outcomes, i.e., an ordinal utility scale. These two 
conditions have some plausibility and are clearly 
required if we are to say that an individual chooses that 
action with an outcome that has the highest utility. 
Consider completeness: suppose this condition does not 
hold then we allow that there may be two outcomes 
between which the individual is not indifferent nor does 
he prefer one to the other. Obviously then an individual 
cannot choose between these two outcomes by choosing that 
with the highest utility (i.e., that which he most 
prefers). Consider transitivity: suppose this condition 
does not hold then we allow that there may be some set 
of outcomes such that there is no most preferred outcome 
because for any outcome there is another outcome preferred 
to it (i.e., without transitivity our preferences may be 
"cyclic”). Preferences that obey these two conditions
17
are said to be consistent,
But an ordinal utility scale while it may suffice 
for decisions under certainty will clearly be insufficient 
for decisions under risk or uncertainty. Suppose, for 
example, that I may choose between one action with an 
outcome that I value highly but which has a low 
probability and another action with an outcome that I 
value lowly but which has a high probability (and 
between all the other possible outcomes of those two 
actions I am indifferent), then we cannot say which action 
is to be chosen unless we have a quantitive measure of 
preference', i.e., unless we can say how much one outcome 
is preferred to another. In other words, at least some 
decisions under risk and uncertainty seem to require 
cardinal utility scales. To induce a cardinal utility 
scale we must impose further conditions on the preference 
relation. These conditions depend on the notion of a 
"lottery A lottery L is simply a probability 
distribution over the members of a set of possible 
outcomes. In making choices between actions under risk 
or uncertainty an individual can be regarded as choosing 
between lotteries where the "prizes" are the possible 
outcomes. For consider: in choosing between alternative 
actions under risk or uncertainty an individual chooses 
an action which has a set of possible outcomes associated 
with it, such that if he chooses a certain action then
18
certain outcomes will obtain given the occurence of 
certain events whose occurrence will be at certain 
probabilities. A lottery L can be described thus:
1> G2 f ••• 7 0^/e^ f f
indicating that the lottery L (the action) will yield 
outcome 0^ as "prize" if event e^ occurs (r = 1,...,R). 
The events {e^,...,e^} are regarded as mutually 
exclusive and exhaustive. f is a risky or uncertain 
lottery according to whether the decision maker does or 
does not know the probabilities associated with all the 
events e^. Note that a prize may itself be a lottery.
On Harsanyi's approach^, the following two further 
conditions are imposed on the preference relation.
They are:
(3) Probabilistic Equivalence 
Let
L = (0^/e^;...; Op/eR)and L*=(0^/e^;...;0%/e*)
and suppose that the decision maker knows the objective 
probabilities associated with each of the events 
{ej,...,e^} and {e^,...,e^ }, and that he knows
Prob (e^ ) = Prob(e^*) for r = 1,.,.,R
19
Then
L =. L* (where =• means "indifferent for t")
In other words, a decision maker is assumed to be 
indiffe7?ent between two risky lotteries provided the 
lotteries have the same prizes (outcomes) with the same 
probabilities - even though the events which bring about 
those outcomes are quite different. In particular, as 
Harsanyi notes, he will be indifferent between a one 
stage and a two stage lottery if they are probabilistic­
ally equivalent. For example; suppose an individual is 
offered a lottery which is such that if a certain event 
occurs (say, that a pointer lands on a certain segment 
of fairly spun disc divided into ten equal segments) 
which has a probability of of'occurring then he will 
receive a $1000 prize ( and nothing should the event 
not occur). And suppose that that individual is 
offered another lottery which is such that if a certain 
event occurs (say, that a pointer lands on a certain 
segment of a fairly spun disc divided into five equal 
parts) which has a probability of ^ of occurring then he 
will receive a lottery as a prize (and nothing otherwise) 
which is such that if an event occurs (say, that a fair 
coin lands up "heads") which has a probability of h of 
occurring then he will receive $1000 (and nothing other­
wise). According to (3) above the individual should be 
indifferent between the former simple lottery and the
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latter compound lottery; after all they offer the same 
prizes at the same probabilities - the events upon which 
the outcomes are conditional are different, but they are 
prohahitisticatty equivalent ^
(4) Suve-thing Principle,
Suppose
0* >. 0^ for r = 1,,...,R
then
(OfVei;,,.; 0^*/e^) (O^ /e^  ^; . . . ; 0^/e^)
That is, in Harsanyi's words "other things being equal, 
an individual will not prefer a lottery yielding less 
desirable prizes to a lottery yielding more desirable 
prizes", In particular, and for example, this condition 
requires the following (recall that a prize may itself 
be a lottery). Suppose an individual prefers the prize 
of receiving (for certain) $400 to a prize of receiving 
$1000 at probability \ (and $0 at probability \) . And 
further suppose that he is offered the following two 
lotteries. The first consists of his receiving $400 
should a certain event occur (and nothing otherwise).
The second consists of his receiving a h chance of $1000 
and a % of $0 should the same event occur(and nothing 
otherwise), Then according to (4) he will not prefer 
the second lottery to the first. Clearly, we must pre­
suppose here that two events are the same (type) only if
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they have the same probability of occurring,otherwise (4) 
might not hold®, For consider; it would be absurd to 
suppose that the first lottery is still preferred to the 
second when the probability of the event in the first was 
approaching zero, and the probability of the "same" event 
in the second was approaching one.' Thus the Sure-thing 
Principle requires that if an individual is offered a 
lottery consisting of a prize of $400 should a certain 
event occur with probability i (and nothing otherwise), 
and another lottery consisting of a prize of a % chance 
of $1000 and h chance of $0 should the same (type of) 
event occur - in particular, an event with probability 
-g of .occurring - (and nothing otherwise), then, given the 
original preference, he will not prefer the second lottery 
to the first.
The general thrust of these two conditions is clear. 
The Probabilistic Equivalence Postulate roughly says 
that if two lotteries are equivalent in terms of prizes 
and the probability of prizes(computed according to the 
ordinary probability calculus), then an individual will 
be indifferent between those two lotteries. The Sure- 
thing Principle roughly says that if an individual 
prefers or is indifferent between two prizes, then he 
will prefer or be indifferent between any two lotteries, 
one involving one of the prizes and the other involving 
the other prize, provided the lotteries are otherwise
22
equivalent, in particular, that the probability of 
receiving each prize in each lottery is equivalent. As 
such we can see that these two conditions are essentially 
von Neumann and Morgenstern’s "Reduction of Compound 
Lotteries Assumption" and the "Substitution Assumption" 
respectively.^
If an individual's preferences satisfy conditions 
(1) (4) we can deduce the expected utility i>heorem
which says, that the utility of any lottery L is 
equal to its expected utility, i.e.:
R
Here p^ is the probability associated with the event g . 
r = 1,...,R. This probability is deemed to be objective 
if L is a risky lottery, and subjective if L is an 
uncertain lottery. An individual who chooses so as to 
maximize expected utility chooses, according to orthodox 
theory, rationally, Given this theorem we are able to 
construct a cardinal utility function for any individual 
i over any set of possible outcomes.
Most importantly we should note here that according 
to orthodox theory the utility of a lottery is equal to 
its expected utility, i.e., it is equal to the sum of 
the products of the utility of each of the (mutually 
exclusive and exhaustive) outcomes times its probability.
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and that an individual who chooses - acts so as to 
maximize expected utility, chooses rationally. Let us 
now go on to consider what is required of such a 
rational individual if he is to choose morally, 
Harsanyi takes two approaches here®:- an axiomatic 
approach and an approach that involves what he calls 
"the Equiprobability Model for Moral Judgements", For 
heuristic purposes we will follow the latter approach.
3. The Equiprobability Model and the Déduction of 
Utilitarianism..
Harsanyi takes it that the hallmark of a moral 
judgement is that it is based on impartial and 
impersonal criteria. About this I think Harsanyi is 
right: at the very least what we require of a moral 
judgement is that it be impartial and impersonal, i.e., 
that in making a moral judgement we should not attempt 
to further our own interests, even if these interests 
are understood to be not simply selfish, at the expense 
of others,® In any case, that is the view that will be 
adopted in this thesis and as we shall see it is a view 
that is common to the moral theory being advanced here 
and the one that will be advanced in opposition to it 
in Chapter V, But even if we grant that it is a 
minimal requirement on moral judgements that they be
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impartial and impersonal we still have not got very far 
unless we have a more precise understanding of what that 
requirement amounts to. To this end Harsanyi advances 
the Equipvohahility Model,
Suppose that an individual j is to make a moral 
choice between bringing about one of two social situations 
or arrangements, e.g., a choice between two alternative 
arrangements of income distribution. Of course, not all 
our moral choices are choices between such social situations,but 
supposing that we do have such a choice here will enable 
us to irore easily, in Chapter V, draw the parallel between 
Harsanyi's Equiprobability Model and Rawl's Original 
Position. Moreover, as we shall see, the Equiprobability 
Model is readily extendable to other moral choices, e.g., 
the choice between whether I take Mr X 's property or not 
take it. Call the situations A and B. One way of ensuring
that j's choice between A and B is not unduly influenced
by his own self-interest is to require that he choose 
between A and B without knowing what his own position 
will be under either arrangement, i.e., without his 
knowing which individual he will be under either arrange­
ment. Now as j does not know what position he will
occupy or which individual he will be, then he seems
required by the Laplacean principle of insufficient
reason to assign an equiprohahility to his ending up in
any one of the n positions in society or being any one
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of the n individuals in society. That is, he must 
assignai probability to his ending up in any one of the 
n positions or of his ending up as any one of the n 
individuals. But if a rational individual is to make 
such a choice under these constraints, i.e., if the 
individual is to maximize expected utility under these 
constraints, then he will choose that particular 
situation which maximizes the average utility level in 
society. That is, an individual -who chooses under the 
Equiprobability Model so as to maximize expected utility 
will choose so as to maximize the social welfare function
1 ^W. (A) = i i: U . (A)
for some alternative A. That is, he will choose as an 
"average" utilitarian.
There are a number of points that are especially 
worthy of note here. First, as may be clear from the 
above equation, and as Harsanyi notes^°, when we say that 
in making a moral judgement an individual must do so on 
the assumption that he has an equiprobability of occupy­
ing any of the n positions in society we mean he must 
assume that
he had an equal chance of being "put in the 
place of" any individual member of the 
society, with regard not only to his objective
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social (and economic) conditions, but also 
to his subjective attitudes and tastes.
In other words, he ought to judge the utility 
of another individual's position not in terms 
of his own attitudes and tastes but rather in . 
terms of the attitudes and tastes of the 
individual actually holding this position.
This explains my vacillation in the previous paragraph 
between speaking of an individual assuming that he has 
an equiprobability of occupying any of the n social 
positions or of being any one of the n individuals in 
society. For in saying that the individual must assume 
when.making a moral judgement that he has an equiprob­
ability of occupying any one of the n social positions 
with the preferenoes of the individual in that position^ 
then to all intents and purposes he must assume that he 
has an equiprobability of being that individual. At 
least that is a handy short-hand expression for what we 
have in mind. The idea is a faifly common one in moral 
philosophy, particularly among those of utilitarian 
persuasion.^^ The second point I wish to make is that 
having said this it is easier to see how the Equiprob­
ability Model is extendable to moral judgements more 
generally, e.g., in choosing between whether I take 
Mr X's property or not take it. If lam to make a moral 
judgement here then I must assume that I have the same
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chance (50/50) of being in my position with my 
preferences, and being in Mv X^s position with Mr X's 
preferences. Finally, it is not necessary that we take 
the Equiprobability Model literally, For an individual 
to make a moral judgement it is not necessary that he 
literally not know which individual he will be; it will 
be enough that he should choose as if he did not know.
Of course in this attempt to arrive at a 
utilitarian theory of morality we have had to presuppose 
interpersonal comparisons of utility. And although this 
presupposition will not figure in our criticism of 
utilitarianism and, indeed, such comparisons will also 
be presupposed in the alternative moral theory advanced 
in Chapter V, nonetheless, interpersonal comparisons of 
utility have been regarded with some suspicion for some 
time. Hence it would be worthwhile to say something 
about interpersonal comparisons of utility no matter how 
briefly, even if in so doing we only succeed in 
indicating in what direction the argument would go for 
a full defence of such interpersonal comparisons..
4. Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility
Once again my argument draws heavily on the work of 
H a r s a n y i ^ H e  distinguished two problems that concern 
interpersonally comparable utility functions: the
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"psychologieal prohlem" and the "metaphysical problem", 
or, as we might call them, the practical and the 
theoretical problem. It is the latter in which, as 
philosophers, we are primarily interested and about 
which we are competent to judge.
The above problems arise when we come to consider 
how we are to estimate another person's present utility 
level. The way we attempt to do this in everyday life 
(e.g., when I attempt to estimate whether my wife would 
prefer to go to the movies or stay at home, and whether 
her preference to go to the movies sufficiently outweighs 
my parents desire for the letter that I could write if 
we stayed home) is based on what Harsanyi calls 
"imaginative empathy". This is the ability to imagine 
ourselves to be in the shoes of other people. Now 
imaginative empathy does not amount to my attempting to 
estimate another person’s utility level by supposing 
that I am in his position with my preferences: rather, 
it requires that I suppose that I am in his position 
with his preferences. (Note that this is just what we 
said was required of a moral agent under the equiprob­
ability model) . But how do I manage to do this? Well, 
what we normally do is to ask, "How much utility would 
I derive from that situation supposing that my person­
ality had been formed by those biological, psychological 
and sociological factors that have formed his personality?
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(Hence, in the rough and ready reckonings of everyday 
life I might say, "If I were a parent, with an elder 
son, etc. I would greatly appreciate a letter..,".)
To be sure, it is very difficult, in most cases, to work 
out what our psychological reactions would be to these 
determining factors and, indeed, to isolate those deter­
mining factors themselves. But the difficulties here 
seem to be of an empirical or factual nature and they 
seem settleable, at least in principle, by the normal 
methods of empirical science. These difficulties 
constitute the pvacticat or psychologic at problem in 
interpersonal utility comparisons.
• The theoretical or metaphysical problem arises 
because we have assumed in the previous paragraph that 
different people will have similar psychological reactions 
to the same situation given the same psychological 
background. This assumption Harsanyi thinks is 
justified by what he calls, the "similarity postulate",
Of this postulate Harsanyi says;
By this I mean the principle that, given 
the basic similarity in human nature (i.e., 
in the fundamental psychological laws 
governing human behaviour and human attitudes), 
it is reasonable to assume that different 
people will show very similar psychological 
reactions to any given objective situation,
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and derive much the scone utility or dis­
utility from it - once proper attowances 
IwiVe been made for any emptrically 
observed differences in their biological 
make-ups, in their social positions, in 
their educational and cultural backgrounds 
and, more generally, in their past life 
histories. In other words, in the absence 
of clear evidence to the contrary, the 
presumption must always be that people's 
behaviour and psychological reactions will 
be similar in similar situations.^®
Notice that just such a postulate or principle is at
work in other areas. It is used when we attempt to gauge 
the degree of another person's pain or, indeed, whether 
they are in pain at all. For example, I see you struck 
on the head with a mallet, and I say, "He is in great 
pain". And, if I'm asked, "How do you know that he is in 
great pain or even in pain?", the typical response is, 
"Well, wouldn't you be in considerable pain if you had 
just been struck on the head with a mallet?" But in so
saying we presuppose that in the absence of evidence to
the contrary people's psychological reactions will be 
similar in similar situations. Of course, my claim that 
you are in great pain may be wrong; maybe that wasn't a 
mallet but only a stage prop, maybe you have no nerves
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in your head, and so on. But the force of the similar­
ity postulate is that in the absence of such evidence 
we are entitled to presume that you are in great pain. 
Incidently, it. is of no consequence that in the case of 
other person pain ascriptions I have more to go on than < 
the mere observation that they were, for example, struck 
on the head with a mallet ^ there are their verbal 
utterances (e.g., you say, "I am in great pain"). We 
also have just such "evidence" in the case of other 
person utility level ascriptions. The problem is how 
can I know that you would utter these words just when 
I would utter those words (i.e., if I were in your 
situation) - is what you would count as being in great 
pain what I would count as being in great pain? And 
this remains a problem even when I determine that you 
are not play-acting, etc.. The purpose of the similar­
ity postulate is to bridge the gap between the evidence, 
e.g., that you were struck on the head with a mallet, 
that you have a similar physiology to other people (in 
particular, to me), that you uttered the words "I am in 
pain",and the claim that your psychological reaction is 
the same as other people (in particular, that it is the 
same as mine). In other words, the similarity postulate 
is advanced as a means of dissolving the age-old phil­
osophical problem of other minds, And hence the theor­
etical or metaphysical problem that arises with inter-
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personally comparable utility functions is just a special 
case of the general problem of other minds.
Thus Harsanyi remarks that those who reject the 
idea of interpersonal comparison of utility on the 
aforementioned theoretical or metaphysical grounds must, 
if they are consistent, also be skeptics about other minds.
But, says Harsanyi,"as common sense tells us, all 
normal humans are fully self-conscious human beings.
Hence we cannot reject the theoretical possibility of 
interpersonally comparable utility functions .1 However, 
this is not, I believe, a very felicitous mode of argument 
on Harsanyi's part. No matter how strong our common sense 
belief that other people are conscious beings, this in 
itself does not constitute a refutation of the skeptic.
The skeptic accepts that there is such a commonly held 
belief, but rejects the idea that we have any justific­
ation for it. In other words, he rejects the idea that 
the similarity postulate is justified, AS. a matter 
of strategy in philosophical argument the better approach 
for Harsanyi to take would be as follows. It is too 
much to expect that a philosopher in arguing for a moral 
theory should provide solutions to all the philosophical 
problems whose solution is presupposed in the advance­
ment of his moral theory. In particular, he need not 
be expected to provide a solution to a very general 
problem like that of other minds which is not simply endemic to
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moral philosophy. These considerations are all the more 
pressing when we notice the apparently intractable nature 
of the problem of other minds, Rather the moral phil­
osopher should proceed on the assumption that there is 
a solution, and after all,in the case of other minds, 
most of us hope there is a solution, and get on with the 
job of formulatihg his moral theory. If it turns out 
that the only objection to his moral theory centres on 
the problem of other minds then that is the time to 
return to a more thorough examination of that problem.
In the interim there is important and fruitful work to be 
done. My point in general is that I take it that we do 
not want our rejection of utilitarianism to depend only 
on an appeal to a general and apparently intractable 
problem like the problem of other minds.
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Footnotes ;
1. Indeed, our statements of the various forms of 
utilitarianism are so vague as to leave open other 
possibilities, e.g., that considering each distri­
bution of levels of happiness/intrinsic good/ 
individual utilities we ought (implausibly) to 
maximize the mode. The two possibilities I mention 
are the two most commonly cited possibilities.
2. And maybe it generally ought to be of no concern.
J J C Smart when discussing what he calls "total" 
and "average" utilitarianism claims; "In most cases 
the differences between the two types of utilitarian­
ism will not lead to disagreement in practice. For 
in most cases the most effective way to increase the 
total happiness is to increase the average happiness, 
and vice versa." (Smart (1973) p. 28). However, 
what is important here is that we stress the phrase 
"in most cases": there can be cases, admittedly we 
have to suppose that quite a number of assumptions 
obtain, where there will be an important difference 
between the two versions of utilitarianism. The 
total view requires that provided the average utility 
per person falls slowly enough when the number of 
individuals increases in some population, then the 
population ought to be increased in size no matter 
how low the average utility falls. In such a case
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the total utility will be increased by a sufficient 
amount to make up for the decline in average 
utility per person. Hence on the total view a very 
low average of utility may be required. As John 
Rawls more formally puts it:
Where y is the average utility per person, x is the 
population size, then if the curve y = F(x) is 
flatter than the rectangular hyperbola xy=c then 
total utilitarianism requires that x be increased 
indefinitely,
y
o X
For xy equals the total utility, and the area of 
the rectangle representing the increase in total 
utility increases as x increases just when y - F (x) 
is flatter than xy = c, (Rawls (1972) pp. 162^163)
Now provided we are in a world where it is not the 
case that the average utility per person falls 
slowly enough when there is an increase in popul^
36
ation size, then here is an instance where there 
will be a practical disagreement between the total 
and average utilitarianism. And such people as 
Rawls take it that we are on such a world and that 
it is preferable to bring about a greater average 
utility rather than a greater total utility. That 
is, the more plausible utilitarian theory is average 
utilitarianism.
3. See, for example, John Harsanyi (1978) especially
p. 228.
4. Harsanyi has written on this topic on many occasions., 
for example, see his (1955) and)(1978).
5. See Harsanyi (1978) pp. 224 - 225 and (1979) pp. 
290-291.
6. Of course we might not require this as a necessary
condition of sameness of events for events generatty^
but it does seem right for these events upon which 
outcomes are conditional and where we're trying to 
make a rational choice on the basis of those out­
comes, Whether two events which are of the same 
type must have the same probability of occurring 
will very much depend on what we take to be our 
criterion of same type.
7. See R D Luce and H Raiffa (1957) pp. 26-27.
8. See Harsanyi (1978) pp. 226-228 and (1979) pp. 292 -
295.
J I
9. As I also note in Chapter III this has been
disputed, see, for example, N Reseller (1975) 
especially pp. 70^J2, and for a reply see R M Hare 
(1981) pp, 135^140. I do not find this particular 
line of argument very convincing and this for the 
reason, examined in Chapter III, that attempts to 
determine the adequacy or inadequacy of utilitarian­
ism via an appeal to our moral intuitions are 
irresolvable.
10. Harsanyi (1955) p. 316 footnote 16.
11. For example, see Hare (1963 ) pp. 112-113 and (1981)
pp. 110-111.
12. For example, see Harsanyi (1955) pp. 316-321 and
(1979) pp. 300-302.
13. Harsanyi (1979) p. 301,
14. Harsanyi (1979) p. 302.
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CHAPTER III
R u l e  a n d  A c t  Ut i l i t a r i a n i s m , D e c i s i o n  T h e o r y  a n d  In t u i t i o n
1. The Conflict between our Moral Intuitions and 
Utilitarianism.
2. The Attempt to resolve this Conflict by introducing 
the Distinction between Rule and Act Utilitarianism.
3. The Equivalence Thesis for Rule and Act Utilitarianism,
4. A Decision Theoretic Approach which attempts to 
falsify the Equivalence Thesis.
5. Other attempts to falsify the Equivalence Thesis.
6. Do conflicts between our Moral Intuitions and 
Utilitarianism really matter?
1. The Confti-ct between our Moral Intu-it'tons and 
Ut'it'ttarian'ism
We have already mentioned in the previous chapter 
the apparent attractions of utilitarianism, namely, that 
it seems to offer the prospect of a coherent theory of 
morality, it seems to offer a meaningful account of how 
we come by our moral principles, and it seems to offer 
the prospect of definitive conclusions as to what we 
ought and ought not to do. As we said these 
considerations give us some reason for taking
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utilitarianism seriously. However, as we also noted, 
these considerations are not conclusive. The first 
possibility we mentioned was that utilitarianism might 
have implications that are totally unacceptable. The 
idea here is that utilitarianism is inadequate as a 
moral theory for it gives rise, if it is consistently 
followed, to the prescription of actions that are clearly 
immoral. Now if utilitarianism were the only theory that 
offered the aforementioned advantages then we would have 
to conclude (reluctantly) that there was no possibility 
of an adequate theory of morality that had these apparent 
advantages. But the idea that concerns us in this 
chapter is simply the thought that utilitarianism is 
inadequate because it has unsatisfactory implications.
And it is this form of attack which, I think it will be 
agreed, has constituted the main and most common form of 
attack on utilitarianism.
It has for a long time been commonly observed that 
utilitarianism appears to be in conflict with some of our 
most firmly embedded moral intuitions. W D.Ross, for 
example, criticised ideal utilitarianism on the grounds 
that it is mistaken to suppose that it is always right to 
break a promise whenever one can thereby bring about the 
greatest intrinsic good.^ More recently H J McCloskey has 
pointed out that utilitarianism conflicts with our 
fundamental beliefs about justice. McCloskey's argument 
proceeds by way of a well-know example. We are asked to
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consider a sheriff in some small town who can prevent the 
occurrence of riots which will kill and harm, let us say, 
ten people only if he frames an innocent man and sentences 
him to death. It seems that according to utilitarianism 
what the sheriff ought to do is sentence the innocent man, 
and yet this is counter-intuitive for surely such an act 
would be unjust and therefore ought not to be done. It is 
tempting to think that the utilitarian is not committed to 
saying that what the sheriff ought to do is sentence the 
innocent man, for if the sheriff were found out this 
would weaken people's respect for and confidence in the 
law. Such a consequence may well be worse than the death 
and harm resulting from the riots. McCloskey grants that 
this may be the case, but as the example is set up it is 
not the case: we can suppose that, ex hypothesir only the 
sheriff and the innocent party know or could know that the 
innocent man is in fact innocent. Similarly, we can 
suppose that ex hypothesi the sheriff knows (or,at least, 
can estimate to a sufficiently large degree of probability) 
that if he does not sentence the innocent man ten people 
will die in the riots. As McCloskey emphasises, it is at 
least logioatly possible that there should be such a 
situation even if v/e would never expect such a situation 
to arise in practice. And that, McCloskey thinks, is 
sufficient to undermine utilitarianism: "to expose the 
inadequacy of utilitarinism in dealing with the problem 
of justice, only the logical possibility of such an
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^unjust’ utilitarian system of punishment needs to be 
indicated."^
Now, by and large, examples such as these where 
utilitarianism is thrown into conflict with some of our 
most firmly held moral beliefs have been regarded as 
demonstrating that the utilitarian has to make some move 
to restore a semblance of cogency to his theory. And it 
was in response to these putative counter-examples that 
the distinction was made between act and rule 
utilitarianism.
2. The Attempt to resolve th-is Conftiot by ■intToduaing 
the D'istinot'Lon between Rule and Act Ut'Lt'itav'ian'Lsm.
As I mentioned in Chapter II there remains the 
possibility that even when we have specified the maximand 
of utilitarian theory, i.e., what it is that the 
utilitarian is supposed to maximise, we have not thereby fully 
characterised the nature of his theory, for we have not 
specified the constraints (or lack thereof) of maximization. 
In this respect it is a commonplace to distinguish two 
types of utilitarianism known as act utilitarianism (AU) 
and rule utilitarianism (RU).
J J C Smart, a leading proponent of AU, offers the 
following statement of AU (for ease of exposition Smart 
puts it forward in a broadly hedonistic form):
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Let us say, then, that the only reason for 
performing an action A rather than an 
alternative action B is that doing A will 
make mankind (or, perhaps, all sentient 
beings) happier that will doing B.**
Presumably, if two or more actions result in the same 
amount of happiness each of them is a right action. So, 
whether one defines the maximand of utilitarianism in 
terms of happiness, intrinsic good, or individual 
preferences, and whether one supposes that it is the 
sum or mean of these that is to be maximized, one can be 
classified as an AUian if one subscribes to the following 
idea: the utilitarian criterion is to be applied directly 
to the individual course of action available.
A classic statement of RB is given by J Austin:
according to that theory, our conduct would 
conform to rules inferred from the tendencies 
of actions, but would not be determined by a 
direct resort to the principle of general 
utility. Utility would be the test of our 
conduct, ultimately, but not immediately; 
the immediate test of the rules to which our 
conduct would conform, but not the immediate 
test of specific or individual actions. Our
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rules would be fashioned on utility; our 
conduct, on our rules
By the tendency of an act Austin emphasizes that he does
not mean the consequences of that specific act. For the
RUian
The probable specific consequences of 
doing that single act, of forebearing from 
that single act, or of omitting that
single act, are not the objects of the
inquiry. The question to be solved is 
this:- If acts of the class were generally 
done, or generally forborne or omitted, 
what would be the probable effect on the 
general happiness or good?^
So, the central idea of RU seems to be this. In order 
to determine whether some particular act ought or ought 
not to be done we must consider whether it is in 
accordance with some rule which enjoins or forbids acts 
of that type, Such a rule is justified on the grounds 
that if everyone acted in accordance with that rule then 
the consequences would be better than if everyone acted 
in accordance with some contrary r u l e S u p p o s e  that the 
rule forbids acts of a certain type, then that rule is 
justified if it is the case that should everyone act in
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accordance with that rule the consequences would be 
better than if everyone acted in accordance with a rule 
that did not forbid acts of that type. This central 
idea of RU has some initial plausibility. For consider: 
the performance of some individual act, say, the act of 
this sheriff sentencing this innocent man, may have 
consequences that are quite beneficial; but should acts 
of that type or class be generally done —  if it became 
the normal practice in cases of punishment to sentence 
the innocent then the consequences would be disastrous. 
All confidence in and respect for the law would evaporate. 
So it would appear that the RUian can say in response to 
McCloskey’s example that the sheriff ought not to 
sentence the innocent man for such an action is forbidden 
by a rule which is justified on utilitarian grounds: the 
consequences of everyone acting in accordance with a rule 
that forbade the sentencing of the innocent would be 
better than the consequences of everyone acting in 
accordance with a rule that did not forbid the
sentencing of the innocent. Thus RU seems impervious to
^dCloskey's counter-example: RU seems to be able to 
accommodate an intuition we have with respect to justice.
Before proceeding further with our major argument 
there are two important points that need to be made 
about my comments above. I have said, suppose that a
rule fovhi.ds acts of a certain type, then that rule is
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justified if it is the case that should everyone act in 
accordance with that rule the consequences would be better 
than if everyone acted in accordance with a rule that did 
not forbid acts of that type. There are two objections 
that can be made against that statement. First, to have 
a rule which did not forbid acts of that type, i.e., to 
have a rule which did not forbid acts of sentencing the 
innocent, is not to have a rule which enjoined or 
vequired acts of sentencing the innocent. Such a rule 
would merely permit the sentencing of the innocent. And 
to have a rule which permitted individuals to sentence 
the innocent is not to say that they must or will 
sentence the innocent. This point must be granted, but 
it is of no real consequence. For, in general, we are 
clearly presupposing that there is some point to having 
a rule which forbids acts of a certain type, namely, that 
without that rule (and without that rule appropriately 
enforced) we would expect at least some individuals to 
perform acts of that type, i.e., without a rule forbiding 
the sentencing of the innocent we would expect some 
individuals to sentence the innocent. Hence if we did 
not have a rule which forbade the sentencing of the 
innocent, i.e., if we had a rule that permitted the 
sentencing of the innocent, we would expect at least some 
people to sentence the innocent. This brings me to the 
second objection, and it is this: that to not have a rule
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which forbade the sentencing of the innocent is not to 
have a rule which permitted the sentencing of the 
innocent, for there are no permissive rules. Bernard 
Mayo has argued that there are no permissive rules on 
the grounds that "it is analytic that rules can be 
conformed to or infringed" but we cannot conform to or 
infringe a permission.® This point too may be granted 
and it indicates that we must sharpen up our expression.
I take it that it would not be denied that if there is 
no rule that forbids the sentencing of the innocent, 
then an individual may infer that the sentencing of the 
innocent is permitted. That is, it is imptioit in the 
body of rules in which there is no rule that forbids the 
sentencing of the innocent that the sentencing of the 
innocent is permitted. Thus our statement of the RUian 
justification of some rule should be put as follows: a 
rule that forbids acts of a certain type is justified if 
the consequences of having such a rule were better than 
were the consequences of not having such a rule, i.e., 
if the consequences of a rule that forbids acts of a 
certain type were better than the consequences where it 
could be inferred - where it was implicit in the body of 
rules - that acts of that type were permitted. And, as 
we have already said, we presuppose that if there was not 
a rule that forbade acts of that type then at least some 
individuals would perform acts of that type, i.e., if 
individuals were permitted to perform acts of that type
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they would, perform them. Conversely, a rule that enjoins 
acts of a certain type is justified under RU if the 
consequences of such a rule were better than the 
consequences where it could be inferred that not 
performing acts of that type was permitted.
But what we have said should not be taken to imply 
that AU has no place for rules of (moral) conduct. As 
Smart notes, we may well decided to choose according to 
certain rules, even if we subscribe to AU, but these 
rules will be merely "rules of thumb" or, as we shall 
call them, rules of convenience. For at least two 
reasons the AUian will maintain that we employ such 
rules. First, in many cases it will be extremely 
impractical to work out the consequences of an action. 
Indeed, the job of working out the consequences might be 
such that while the job was logically possible it might 
well outstrip human capacities.^ All a utilitarian can 
require of an agent if he is to perform the act he ought 
to perform is that, as regards the consequences of the 
act, he has considered the consequences that it is 
possible for him to predict. Thus, to use a common 
example, the doctor who saves a certain baby does the 
right thing, even when the baby grows into the mature 
Adolf Hitler. The second reason that the AUian may 
give for the employment of rules of convenience is that 
in many cases the effort expended in working out the 
consequences of an act may give rise to a disutility
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that outweighs the utility of those consequences. In 
short, the rules proposed by the AUian are necessary 
because qf our human weaknesses in knowledge acquisition 
and computational skills. Of course, not just any rules 
will be permitted to function as rules of convenience by 
the AUian; but only those rules which, in the light of 
our knowledge about the world and ourselves, are such 
that in performing actions in accordance with them it is 
most probable that we will perform an action that has 
better consequences than any other action available.
That is, according to AU we will adopt a rule as a rule 
of convenience if it is such that by acting in accordance 
with that rule we perform an act which is the act we most 
probably would have performed if, lacking our human 
weaknesses, we had been in a position to compute the 
consequences of that act. ^°Rules of convenience are not, 
however, inviolate; they are there to be broken. For 
should there be a situation where some act which was 
contrary to a rule of convenience had the best 
consequences, and it was practicable to work out that 
that was the case, then an individual ought to act 
contrary to the rule. As a consequence, if RU is to be 
a theory quite distinct from AU then the rules of RU 
cannot be merely rules of convenience. That is to say, 
the rules of RU cannot be rules such that if there is 
some individual act for which it is humanly feasible to 
work out that it has the best consequences and that this
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computation does not constitute a waste of effort, then 
that act ought to be performed even though it is 
contrary to one of those rules.
Now the reader might think that this last statement 
has an odd iring about it; why, as a utilitarian ^ would 
one not perform an act which maximized utility even 
though it was contrary to some rule? Indeed, here lie 
the seeds of destruction for RU. If RU is to be a 
genuine advance on AU then RU must be significantly 
different from AU. However, it has been claimed that 
if RU is put forward as a hona fide utilitarian theory 
then RU is not significantly different from AU.
3, The Equivalence Thesis for Rule and Act Utilitarianism.
It has been claimed that RU and AU are extensionally 
equivalent, i,e., that whatever action is prescribed by 
the former is also prescribed by the latter, and vice versa. 
The idea here is that if proper attention is paid to the 
two-stage procedure proposed by RU for the justification 
of actions, then it will be seen that this procedure 
prescribes just those acts prescribed by the one-stage 
procedure of AU, I call this "The Equivalence Thesis".
Now as we shall see (in section4) this claim must be 
false, However, this is not to say those who claim that 
RU is not a significant improvement over AU are bereft 
of an argument to that effect. All that has to be shown
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is that there are some acts prescribed by AU which also 
must be prescribed by RU and these acts are such that 
according to our moral intuitions no moral theory which 
prescribes these acts can be an adequate moral theory.
My eventual aim will be to demonstrate just such a 
limited equivalence between AU and RU; i.e., I will argue 
for a partial extensional between AU and RU over a class 
of actions such that if AU is shown to be inadequate 
because it prescribes these acts, then RU is also 
inadequate because RU likewise prescribes these acts. 
Briefly, I will try to show that if AU is inadequate 
because on occasion it prescribes the sentencing of the 
innocent, then RU is also inadequate because it too must 
on occasions prescribe the sentencing of the innocent.
The argument I shall give which appears to establish 
the full equivalence thesis is essentially due to 
J L Mackie^^and T L S Sprigge^^. It proceeds by way of 
reduQtio ad absurdum, Henceforth, we talk of the action 
that has the best consequences as that which maximizes 
utility and for simplicity we ignore - as we have done 
already in this chapter - that in general there will not 
be an action that maximizes utility but only one that 
maximizes expected utility. We suppose, contrary to what 
we want to prove, that there is some action A which 
maximizes utility (and hence is prescribed by AU) but 
which is forbidden by RU. RU forbids A because A is
contrary to some rule R which is supposedly justified on 
utilitarian grounds. In other words, RU forbids A 
because if everyone acts in accordance with R which 
forbids A then this will give rise to greater utility 
than if there were no such rule and everyone acted 
accordingly, i.e., if everyone were permitted to do A 
and did A,
The act A we will say is of type S, . Recall that 
the single performance of A maximizes utility whereas 
if everyone performs acts of that type, i.e., of type 
then this, supposedly-, would not maximise utility. 
Therefore, there must be some feature of A or its 
circumstances which brings about the difference in utility 
and which distinguishes it from other acts of type S,
Call this causally relevant feature D, Note that the 
feature might be no more than that the act is not 
performed by more than n individuals (where n may equal 
1): i.e., the feature may be that acts of type S are not 
performed by everyone. We can now pick out a new class 
of acts which we will call SD acts, i.e., acts of type S 
which also have the feature D, Clearly, A is an- element 
of that class. Let us formulate a new rule R' which 
enjoins acts of the class SD but not acts of the class 
S non-D (i.e., acts of type S without the feature D) .
In other words, we can think of our original rule R as 
saying, "Acts of type S ought not to be performed" and 
our new rule R ’ as saying, "Acts of type S ought not to
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be performed, except when they are also D ”. Now R' must 
maximize utility relative to /?, i.e., if everyone acted 
according to R ' rather than R this would give rise to 
greater utility. For consider; i? ' forbids all the acts 
that R forbids except those of the SD type which have a 
feature, viz,, D, which brings it about that they 
maximize utility. Hence, as a utilitarian the RUian 
should select i? ' over R, But, as we have seen R' enjoins 
A, and hence RU does not forbid A. Therefore, it cannot 
be the case that A maximizes utility and A is forbidden 
by RU.
Before going on to consider some objections to the 
equivalence thesis and thereby fleshing out the above 
argument, there is one point to which I wish to draw 
particular attention. The argument is addressed against 
those who regard RU as an improvement on AU. That is, 
it is addressed against those who regard RU as a theory 
of the same type as AU —  i.e., as a genuinely 
utilitarian theory —  and as a theory which is able to 
accommodate the putative counter-examples to AU. Our 
argument has the following structure: if in response to 
the putative counter-examples to AU the utilitarian 
advances RU then we can show, provided that the rules of 
RU are supposed to be justified on utilitarian grounds, 
that RU must also prescribe these acts which offend 
against our moral intuitions but which nonetheless
maximize utility. Now the supporter of RU could make 
recourse to either of the following two responses.
First, he could claim that his theory is a utilitarian 
theory distinct from AU but that it was not designed nor 
was it capable of accommodating the counter-examples to 
AU, This response is not very interesting in the present 
context, for the motivation for introducing RU was 
precisely that it was an attempt to formulate a 
utilitarian theory which did not have the unfortunate 
implications of AU. Second, the RUian could claim that 
the rules of RU were not, or were not simply, justified 
on utilitarian grounds. But then such a theory hardly 
seems to deserve to be called "utilitarian" at all: 
rather, it is, to use a common phrase, merely a form of 
"rule worship".
So, if the RUian is to provide a defence of his 
theory he has to keep two things in mind even supposing 
he can show that his theory is distinct from AU: (a) his
theory must be able to accommodate the counter-examples 
to AU, and (b) it must remain a recognizably utilitarian 
theory (it must not degenerate into mere rule worship).
As will become apparent from my examination of attacks 
by RUians on the equivalence thesis I do not think that 
the above two requirements can be met simultaneously.
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4, A Decision Theoretic Approach which attempts to 
falsify thé. Equivalence Thesis,
The argument against the equivalence thesis that I 
wish to consider here has been advanced by Harsanyi.  ^^ 
Harsanyi believes that the modelling techniques and other 
analytical tools of decision theory (and also game theory) 
can profitably be used to demonstrate the non-equivalence 
of AU and RU. About this I think Harsanyi is right. 
However, as I shall argue, I do not believe that Harsanyi 
has shown that RU is a significant improvement on AU: he 
has not shown that a limited version of the equivalence 
thesis is false. All the same Harsanyi's argument is a 
very important argument and it helps clarify our argument 
to the effect that RU is not a significant improvement on 
AU,
Harsanyi proposes a model of a moral decision problem 
which he then uses to determine the strategies of 
utilitarian agents. The notion of a strategy is a 
familiar one in decision theory and game theory: the 
actions of agents are determined by strategies which are 
conceived of as mathematical functions assigning one 
specific action to each possible decision situation, 
subject to the proviso that if two situations are of the 
same type they must have the same action assigned to them. 
In Harsanyi’s model it is supposed that society consists 
Qf (n + m) individuals of whom l,...,n are utilitarian
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agents, and of whom n + l,...,n + ra are non­
utilitarian agents. The choices of the non-utilitarian 
agents are determined by, say, self-interest or a non­
utilitarian moral code (e.g., conventional morality).
The strategies of these non-utilitarian agents are said 
to be given, i.e., constant. In other words, as regards 
these strategies any utilitarian agent must allow that 
they may not be the strategy he employs in some particular 
situation —  obviously, because what determines their 
strategy choice is quite distinct from what determines 
his strategy choice: all any utilitarian agent can do in 
any particular situation is to choose his strategy in 
the light of what he expects their strategy choice to be. 
Given this model we now ask, what do AU and RU require 
of the utilitarian agents in their choice of strategy?
Supposing that the maximand of utilitarianisim is social 
utility (i.e., the arithmetic mean of individual utilities)
AU requires that each utilitarian agent i d -  l,,,.,n) 
choose his strategy a . in such a way as to maximize 
social utility on the assumption that all non-utilitarian 
strategies are given and that all utilitarian strategies 
are given. In contrast, RU requires that each 
utilitarian agent i choose his strategy s^ in such a way 
as to maximize social utility, hut on the assumption that 
all other utilitarian agents will employ the same strategy, 
i.e., on the assumption that their strategies are not 
given, while all non-utilitarian strategies are given.
56
Letting S be the set of all strategies available to each 
agent (.assumed to be the same set for each agent) and y 
be social utility we have that a utilitarian agent under 
AU or under RU must solve one of the following two quite 
distinct mathematical problems,
(.A) Mathematical problem to be solved by i under AU: 
Maximize f/ — W(s  ^  ^ ^
subject to the constraints 
(A^ )
(A.) s. = p. = const, for j =  ^i~l ^ i+1 ^ . ^ n ^ <7 J
(Ag) 8. ~ ~ for k = n+lj...jn+m
(B) Mathematical problem to be solved by i under RU: 
Maximize W = ,,.,8^;
subject to the constraints 
(B^ ) 8^e2
(B„) S, - = 8. = ... ~ s1 1  t. n
(B3) 8. = = const, for k = n+lj,..jn+m
From this characterisation it is clear that AU and 
RU are certainly not logically equivalent and that they 
may lead to quite different moral decisions. But before 
proceeding further let me expand on what has already been 
said. Consider the mathematical problem (A): AU requires 
that a utilitarian agent i select his strategy so as to
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maximize social utility which is equal to the social 
utility (i.e., the arithmetic mean) of each of the 
strategies employed by all individuals in society.
However, he selects that strategy on the following 
assumptions, First, (A-^ ) , it must be a strategy in the 
available set. Second, (Ag), it must be a strategy 
chosen on the basis of what strategies he expects the 
other utilitarian agents to employ: we suppose that i 
expects the other utilitarian agents, viz., agents 
1 ^ . J i-1 y i+lj . . . to use strategies ^  ^^  i--2^  ^  i+1^
, respectively. Furthermore, this strategy will 
not necessarily be the strategy he employs; the strategies 
are constant. Third, (A^), it must be a strategy chosen 
on the basis of what strategies he expects the non­
utilitarian agents to employ; these likewise are constant, 
in contrast, under RU a utilitarian agent i must select 
his strategy so as to maximize social utility subject to 
a similar set of assumptions except that for (Ag) we have 
(B2) which says that he must assume that the strategy he 
employs is the strategy to be employed by all moral (or, 
at least, utilitarian) agents. The utilitarian agent i 
is then selecting his strategy as if he were selecting a 
strategy for all utilitarian agents providing it is the 
same strategy for each. This substitution of (Bg) for 
(Ag) simply reflects the idea that a utilitarian under 
RU must, when deciding what he ought to do, do so by 
considering what would be the consequences for social
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utility supposing that everyone (or, at least, everyone 
who is doing what they ought to do) were to perform that 
act. There is, of course, no such requirement on a 
Utilitarian under AU.
We can demonstrate that AU and RU will give rise to 
different decisions by considering the following simple 
decision situation presented by Harsanyi,
Example: consider a society of 1000 voters who are asked 
to vote on some socially important measure M, but voting 
involves some minor inconvenience. All voters are in 
favour of M and all are assumed to be utilitarians. 
Suppose M will pass only if uZ-Z voters actually vote.
The voting situation has the nature of a game with 1000 
players in which each player i tries to maximize W.
In the first instance, suppose each player i chooses 
under AU, Clearly, he will vote only if he is 
reasonably sure that all the other 999 voters will vote 
—  otherwise he will not vote. That is, which strategy 
i employs will depend on what he expects each of the 
other players to employ; if i expects all the other 999 
voters to vote, i will vote as this, given his 
expectation, will maximize Wj but if i expects at least 
one of the other 999 voters not to vote, i will not 
vote as this, given his expectation, will maximize W.
In the terminology of game theory, this game has Iwo
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Nash equilibrium points; one where everyonevotes and one 
where no-one votes, (A Nash equilibrium point can be 
understood informally as the case where no player finds 
it to his advantage to change to a different strategy 
given that he expects the other players not to change} * ) 
On the other hand, if each player i chooses under RU, 
there is only one Nash equilibrium point -- only one 
possible outcome —  namely, where everyone votes. For 
consider: ex hypothesi everyone favours M and there is 
only a minor inconvenience associated with voting, hence 
it would be better if everyone voted than if at least 
one person did not vote. That is, it would be better if 
there was a rule which enjoined voting than if there was 
no such rule.
Now given a plausible assumption about the subjective 
probability that a player i under AU will assign to all 
the other utilitarians voting it will be the case that 
in the above situation no-one votes. Thus, in this 
situation, RU is shown to be a superior theory to AU in 
the sense that utilitarians choosing under RU can be sure 
of a global maximization of social utility. That is, 
they can be sure that they will do better under RU than 
under AU, And it is not difficult to see why this 
should be so. Because RU requires that any player i 
select his strategy so as to maximize social utility on 
the assumption that all utilitarian agents will employ
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the same strategy, RU will be far more effective than 
AU in securing socially desirable co-operation, i.e., 
it will be far more effective in securing co-ordination 
of strategy choice when it is necessary that everyone 
.(or, at least, every moral person) employ the same 
strategy in order to maximize social utility. RU is 
superior to AU in respect of what Harsanyi calls "the 
coordination effect".
But now it is necessary that we recall my remarks 
at the end of the previous section. There I said that 
even supposing the RUian has shown that his theory is 
distinct from AU, he must also show that his theory is 
able to accommodate the putative counter-examples to AU 
without his theory degenerating into mere rule worship.
Now I think Harsanyi has certainly shown that RU is a 
distinct theory from AU —  he has shown that on occassions 
it determines a different choice of strategy —  and, 
indeed, that in certain situations RU is a superior 
theory to AU, But has he shown that RU is able to 
accommodate the counter-examples to AU?
To answer this question consider the fact that the 
sort of situation examined by Harsanyi is a situation 
where it is necessary if there is to be a global 
maximization of social utility that everyone employ the 
same strategy; it was a situation where it was socially 
desirable to co-ordinate strategy choice. But a moments
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thought will make apparent that not all situations where 
we are attempting to decide what we ought to do will 
require a co-ordination of strategy choice in order to 
maximize social utility. For example, take the case of 
McCloskey's sherriff; his problem is not to co-ordinate 
strategy choice with other agents; for him to maximize 
social utility it is not necessary that he co-ordinate 
his activities with others. Therefore, the obvious 
question to ask is whether an RUian will choose differently 
to an AUian in situations which do not require the co­
ordination of strategy choice to achieve a global maximiz­
ation of social utility? In other words, we are asking 
whether the RUian will choose differently to the AOian in 
situations like that of McCloskey's sherrif? Now unless 
we have a positive answer to that question we have not 
shown that RU can accommodate the counter-examples to AU. 
Harsanyi himself has already anticipated this objection 
(he puts the point in relation to promise keeping);
will the two versions of utilitarianism 
reach different conclusions about the 
conditions under which promises ought to 
be kept? Surely, if they are to reach 
different conclusions at all, this will 
have nothing to do with the co-ordination 
effect, Admittedly, we do sometimes make
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promises which can be fulfilled only by 
our undertaking co-ordinated efforts with 
other people, But the moral problem posed 
by promise making would not essentially 
change if we never made promises that 
could be fulfilled only by such co-ordinated 
activities, so that the possibility of a 
Qo-ovdination effect (i.e., of co-ordination 
with other people who have promises to 
fulfill) would not even arise,
For us to see that RU will prescribe different 
courses of action to those prescribed by AU as regards 
the sentencing of the innocent or the breaking of 
promises, Harsanyi believes that we must take cognizance 
of what he calls "the expectation and incentive effects". 
By the expectation effect he means the effect the adoption 
of any given strategy by the utilitarian decision maker 
will have on the expectations, the ability to form 
definite expectations, and the feelings of confidence 
and security of other agents in society. By the 
incentive effect he means the effect the adoption of 
any given strategy by the utilitarian decision maker 
will have on the other agents' incentive to engage in 
various types of socially beneficial behaviour. To 
illustrate the expectation and incentive effects Harsanyi
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concentrates on the example of promise keeping, I too 
will keep to this example for the moment, merel^y 
remarking here that the argument presented below is 
equally applicable to the question of punishment raised 
in McCloskey's sheriff example.
The crucial assumption from the point of view of 
the oo-ordination effect was that the decision maker 
would choose his strategy on the assumption that this 
was the strategy to be employed by all utilitarian 
agents; this assumption followed from the very definition 
of RU. The crucial assumption from the point of view of 
the expectation and incentive effects is that all agents, 
whether utilitarian or not, will know and will act on 
the knowledge, that the decision maker will use the 
strategy that is optimal under RU. This assumption 
follows from the fact that any agent can compute the 
optimal strategy under RU by solving the appropriate 
maximization p r o b l e m . Note then that the assumption 
that is crucial for the expectation and incentive effects 
does 7tot follow from the very definition of RU.
Harsanyi emphasises that this assumption
is not a casual postulate about physical 
transmission of information from some agents 
to some other agents, but rather is a quasi- 
logical postulate about the nature of
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optimal strategies, and about free access 
of information to all agents concerning
1 7the nature of these optimal strategies.
I will make further comment on this assumption in a 
moment. But for the present v/e simply point out that it 
is this assumption which gives rise to the expectation 
and incentive effects. Suppose that a utilitarian 
decision maker under RU has adopted a strategy which, 
say, permitted "many easy exceptions to promise keeping" 
then if the other agents knew that that strategy had 
been adopted
then they would have much less ability to 
form definite expectations about (the decision 
maker's) future behaviour, and in general would 
feel less confident and less secure about the 
future,
They would also have much less incentive 
to plan their future activities on the 
expectation that promises made to them would 
be kept (e.g., that their friends would actually 
turn up at the places and times they had promised 
to). Similarly, they would have much less 
incentive to perform useful services for other 
people on the mere basis of promised future
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rewards, without any immediate compensation, 
etc,^ 9
There are two respects in which I think Harsanyi's 
argument is mistaken, The first objection concerns the 
crucial assumption which was necessary to induce the 
expectation and incentive effects. Consider, as Harsanyi 
recognizes, that even under AU a decision maker must 
consider the unfavourable consequences of some individual 
act, say, some act of promise breaking. So, we might ask, 
how can there be any difference between RU and AU with 
respect to the expectation and incentive effects?
Harsanyi's answer is that
barring some very special situations, the 
causal consequences of one isolated act of 
promise breaking will be very, very small, 
because people will not infer —  and 
cannot rationally infer —  from one such act 
that promise breaking has suddenly become a 
general practice in their society.^®
In contrast, according to RU,
if this strategy were in fact the optimal 
rule utilitarian strategy, then all interested
6 6
parties would know that this strategy would 
represent the general practice in matters of 
promise keeping,  ^^
These comments make clear the essential role played in 
Harsanyi’s defence of RU by the assumption that alt agents^ 
whether utiZ'ttar-lan or not, wilt know and wilt aot on the 
knowledge, that the decision maker will use the strategy 
that is optimal under Rl), If this assumption did not 
hold there would obviously be no difference between AU 
and RU as regards the expectation and incentive effects. 
Now I do not dispute that this assumption is not a causal 
postulate about the physical transmission of information 
from some agents to some other agents, it is, rather, a 
quasi-logical postulate in that it will hold if it is the 
case that any agent can compute the optimal strategy under 
RU by solving the appropriate maximization problem. But 
we should now consider the following: suppose the decision 
maker —  a utilitarian agent acting according to RU —  
knows or has good reason to believe that it is not the 
case that any other agent (or that a sufficiently large 
number thereof) can compute the optimal strategy under RU 
by solving the appropriate maximization problem. The 
decision maker could know, for example, that no one else 
in society had the requisite computational skills to solve 
the appropriate maximization problem. And further suppose
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that the decision maker knows that the information as to 
what strategy he employs will not be physically transmitted 
to the other agents. Thus the other agents will not know 
what strategy the decision maker has decided to employ 
either by the quasi^logical means of solving the 
appropriate maximization problem nor by the normal 
causal/physical means. But if so, it will not be the 
case that all agents, whether utilitarian or not, will 
know and be able to act on the knowledge, that the 
decision maker will use the strategy that is optimal 
under\RÜ. That is, the essential assumption for the 
inducement of the expectation and incentive effects would 
not hold. And in that case a decision maker could adopt 
a strategy which permitted exceptions to promise keeping 
knowing that the adoption of such a strategy would not 
have disastrous effects on the expectations and 
incentives of other people in society. Now I am not saying 
that it must or even generatty will be the case that no- 
one else in society knows either by quasi-logical means 
or physical means what strategy the decision maker has 
adopted but only that it might be the case, and that in 
such a case a decision maker even choosing under RU should 
choose a strategy which permits of exceptions to promise 
keeping. But I take it that our intuition would be that 
whether we ought or ought not to keep a promise is not 
thus dependent on other people’s ability to solve certain
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computational problems or on "gaps" in the causal chain 
of information flow to those agents. In other words, I 
take it that we do not believe that I (say) morally 
ought to adopt a strategy which permits me to break 
promises just because I know that no one in society knows 
that that is the strategy I have adopted because 
everyone else in society lacks the intellectual capacity 
to solve the appropriate maximization problem and cannot 
find out what that strategy is by other means. To fix 
this idea, suppose that McCloskey’s sheriff is attempting 
to decide on what strategy to adopt in this situation 
which involves the sentencing of this innocent man.
Suppose that by solving the maximization problem appropriate 
for AU he determines that as an AUian in this situation 
he ought to sentence this innocent man. Now if as a 
RUian he is to adopt a different strategy in this 
situation then the assumption must hold that everyone 
else will know and will act on the knowledge that he will 
use the RUian optimal strategy. For it is from the fact 
that this assumption holds that the expectation and 
incentive effects are supposed to arise. But suppose 
this assumption does not hold —  which is, as I've said, 
surely logically possible —  then he will adopt exactly 
the same strategy as he would if he were choosing as an 
AUian, But such a strategy offends against our sense of 
justice; the RUian is committed to the view that on
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occasions it would be just to punish an innocent man, 
namely, on just those occasions where for various 
reasons no-one else in society knows what strategy it is 
that he will employ and where to sentence this innocent 
man maximizes utility.
But even supposing that the crucial assumption for 
the inducement of the expectation and incentive effects 
holds it is still possible to show that a utilitarian 
choosing under RU is committed to views which offend 
against our moral intuitions. Note that Harsanyi asks 
us to consider what would be the effects on people's 
expectations and incentives supposing that they knew that 
the decision maker had adopted a strategy which permitted 
"many easy exceptions to promise keeping"; that is, we are 
asked to consider what would be the effects supposing 
that a strategy which represented a general practice of 
promise breaking was in fact the optimal RUian strategy. 
Now if we grant that everyone in society will know and 
will act on the knowledge that that strategy has been 
adopted then the adoption of such a strategy will have 
disastrous expectation and incentive effects, and hence 
could not be the strategy required of a utilitarian 
decision maker under RU. But why suppose that the 
optimal RUian strategy permits of many easy exceptions 
to promise keeping or that the strategy adopted would 
represent a general practice of promise breaking? To
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revert to McCloskey’s sheriff example, why suppose that 
the strategy he adopts as a RUian permits of many easy 
exceptions to not sentencing the innocent or that he 
adopts a strategy which would represent a general 
practice of sentencing the innocent in matters of 
punishment? Consider the following two points.
First, it may be that those situations where to 
break a promise or to sentence an innocent man will 
maximize utility are situations which as a matter of 
contingent fact, are very rare because the feature or 
features of those situations which bring about the 
maximization of utility are as a matter of fact very 
rare,. Now if this were so then surely the strategy for 
the RUian to adopt would be one that permitted 
exceptions to promise keeping or not sentencing the 
innocent in just those very rare circumstances. (We 
may note that on McCloskey’s account we would hardly 
expect to actually come across a case where on 
Utilitarian grounds it would be just to sentence an 
innocent man —  such a case is thought only to be 
logically possible.) More fully the idea is as follows. 
Recall that a strategy is a mathematical function that 
assigns a specific action to a specific situation, with 
the proviso that if two situations are of the same type 
then they must have the same action assigned to them. 
(Harsanyi says two situations are of the same type when 
the decision maker cannot, with the information available
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to him, distinguish between the situations.) We will 
distinguish two different types of situation that fall 
under a general type. The general type of situation will 
involve sentencing or punishing people. The two 
distinguishable sub-r'types will be situations that (1) 
involve sentencing the innocent where to do so 
maximizes utility and (2) involve sentencing the innocent 
where to do so does not maximize utility, (Of course, 
these two sub-types are not exhaustive of the general 
type, for example, there are the sub-types that involve 
the sentencing of the guilty. However, as will become 
apparent, this fact has no bearing on the rest of my 
argument.) That is, we suppose that there is some 
feature, the feature D to which we have referred previously, 
that situations of type (1) have and which situations 
of type (2) do not have which brings it about that to 
sentence an innocent man maximizes utility. As 
situations which fall under type (1) are not of the same 
type as type (2) it is not required that the same 
(type of) action be assigned to them. Thus if a 
strategy assigns a certain action to the first type of 
situation it need not assign that (type of) action to 
the second type. Now we suppose that situations of type 
(1) are very rare because, as a matter of fact, situations 
with the featureDare very rare. And we further suppose 
that a decision maker under RU adopts a strategy which
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requires that in situations of type (1) he sentence the 
innocent. He is not, of course, required by the adoption 
of that strategy to sentence the innocent in situations 
of type (.2) and thus, more particularly, he is not 
thereby required to sentence the innocent in all 
situations of the general type which involve the 
sentencing, or punishing of people. That is, if he adopts 
a strategy which requires the sentencing of the innocent 
in situations of type (1) he is not required to sentence 
the innocent in all situations that involve sentencing 
or punishing people. We suppose, then, that a decision 
maker adopts a strategy which requires that he sentence 
the innocent an situations of type (1) only. Now even if 
we allow that all other individuals will know and will act 
on the knowledge that the decision maker has adopted just 
such a strategy, why should this knowledge have 
disastrous expectation and incentive effects? Afterall, 
they cannot infer that in matters- of punishment that it 
is at all probable that as innocent persons they will be 
sentenced. Ex hypothesi, the strategy adopted requires 
the sentencing of the innocent in only very rare 
circumstances, indeed, in circumstances which may never 
actually occur but which are merely logically possibly. 
That is, in knowing that such a strategy has been 
adopted the other individuals cannot infer that 
sentencing the innocent has become a general practice in
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matters of punishment< But is the RUian required to 
adopt such a strategy? Surely the answer is, "Yes".
For such a strategy will require that in situations of 
type (1) the innocent are to be sentenced where ex 
hypothesi to do so maximizes utility; such a strategy 
does not require that the innocent be sentenced in 
situations of type (2) for the situations are not of the 
same type; and as in situations of type (2) to sentence 
the innocent does not, ex hypothesi, maximize utility a 
utilitarian ought not to adopt a strategy which required 
thé sentencing of the innocent in situations of that 
type. Notice that even though the RUian by the very 
definition of RU, must make his strategy choice on the 
assumption that all individuals ought to adopt that 
strategy (i.e., on the assumption that all utilitarian 
agents wilt adopt that strategy) the knowledge that the 
above strategy is the optimal RUian strategy will still 
not have disastrous expectation and incentive effects.
We can illustrate this point by way of the following 
example. Suppose that those situations where to 
sentence the innocent v/ill maximize utility 
are so rare that as a matter of fact any sheriff can only 
be expected to come across such a situation in 1 out of 
100,000 cases of sentencing people. I have suggested 
that the optimal RUian strategy will be that which 
requires the sentencing of the innocent in just these
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rare circumstances. Consequently, even supposing that all 
other individuals in society know that all (utilitarian) 
sheriffs will adopt that strategy this would not have 
seriously detrimental effects on those individuals' 
expectations and incentives. And this because it is highly 
improbable that they will be sentenced when innocent.
If this argument is correct then it follows that RU 
can be brought into conflict with our moral intuitions 
even allowing that the crucial assumption for the 
inducement of the expectation and incentive effect holds.
For the RUian is committed to the view that we ought to 
adopt a strategy (rule) which requires the sentencing of 
the innocent just when situations where to sentence the 
innocent would maximize utility are very rare (and maybe 
only logically possible).
The second and, I think,more important point to be 
considered against Harsanyi arises from the fact that, as 
I mentioned in the argument for the equivalence thesis in 
section 3, the causally relevant feature Ü which brings 
about the maximization of utility might be no more that that 
the act A is not performed by more than n individuals 
(where n is some small number). So there we hypothesised 
a rule which said that an individual ought to perform 
the act A provided that no more than n individuals have 
or will perform that act. The idea here is that at 
least on occasions to break a promise or to sentence an
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innocent man will maximize utility although if such acts 
became a general practice, i.e., if in matters of 
promising or punishment, promise breaking or sentencing 
the innocent became common practice, this would not 
maximize utility. Hence, it would be desirable on 
utilitarian grounds to have a rule which permitted the 
breaking of promises or the sentencing of the innocent 
provided such a rule did not allow such acts to become 
the norm or to become common in matters of promising or 
punishing. Even if we now suppose that everyone else in 
society knows that the RUian decision maker has adopted 
such a rule we could not conclude that the adoption of 
such a rule would have detrimental expectation and 
incentive effects or, at least, the effects might be so 
minimal as to be outweighed by the utility gained by, 
e.g., the sentencing of the odd innocent person. The 
reason that the knowledge that such a rule had been 
adopted would not have detrimental expectation and 
incentive effects is much as before, viz., that the 
individuals could not infer that in, e.g., matters of 
punishment it was at all probable that they would be 
punished if innocent. But the adoption of such a rule 
is impossible on Harsanyi's account of RU, for it follows 
from the very definition of RU that a decision maker 
choosing under RU must adopt a strategy on the assumption 
that that is the strategy to be adopted by every person
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choosing as they ought to choose, i,e,, by every person 
choosing as a utilitarian, in that sort of decision 
situation. But this just goes to show that RU is 
inadequate as a utvtitar-ian theory —  the theory 
advanced is not genuinely a utilitarian theory at all.
For if a theory by definition will not permit some but 
not all individuals to adopt a certain strategy when 
ex hypothesi to do so would give rise to a greater 
utility than if no individuals were to adopt that 
Strategy then that theory should be rejected on 
utilitarian grounds ^ The supporter of RU is caught in 
the horns of a dilemma by the sort of criticism I have 
addressed against his theory in this paragraph: either 
in response to the criticism he can stick with his theory 
and thus claim that his theory does not commit him to 
the view that at least on occasions; what morally ought 
to be done is to sentence the innocent —  but then his 
theory is not a genuine utilitarian theory, or he can 
insist that his theory is a genuine utilitarian theory —  
but then his theory is seen to commit him to views which 
offend our moral intuitions, e.g., that at least on 
occasions what ought to be done is to sentence the 
innocent. And as I remarked at the conclusion of section 
3 even if the supporter of RU has shown that his theory 
is in some way distinct from AU he must also show (a) 
that it is able to accommodate the counter-examples to
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AU, i.e., it must not commit him to the view, e.g., that 
it would sometimes be right to sentence an innocent man, 
and at the same time he must show (b) that it remains a 
genuinely utilitarian theory. In response to the sort of 
criticism I have made in this paragraph it would seem 
that Harsanyi cannot meet both of these requirements.
That completes my criticism of Harsanyi's argument 
that RU is a significant improvement on AU. But before 
turning to other attempts to show that a supporter of 
RU is not committed to the morally objectionable views 
to which the supporter of AU is committed we must turn 
to the argument for the equivalence thesis as presented 
in section 3, At first blush that argument seemed to 
establish a complete extensional equivalence between RU 
and AU; i.e., whatever action was prescribed by AU would 
also be prescribed by RU and vice versa. But in this 
section when discussing the co-ordination effect we have 
seen that that claim must be false and more importantly 
that RU is a superior theory to AU in certain 
circumstances in that it ensures a global maximization of 
utility in those circumstances. It is important 
therefore for us to understand where our initial 
assessment of that argument went wrong. Such an 
understanding is not hard to come by. For clearly in 
that argument we presupposed that the individuals were 
not in a situation where in order to achieve a global 
maximization of utility all individuals must employ the
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same strategy. That is, we presupposed that the 
situation was not one where the co-ordination effect 
would be at all significant. In other words we 
presupposed that while RU forbids A it was not the case 
that a global maximization of utility could only be 
achieved if everyone did not do A. Hence we asserted 
that a maximization of utility would ensue if acts of 
type S (to whichd belongs) were performed, but not 
performed by everyone. But this presupposition, while 
important, does not seriously affect the argument which 
concludes that RU is not a significant improvement on AU. 
For all that argument attempts to establish is that RU 
prescribes acts in certain logically possible situations 
which offend against our firmly held moral intuitions.
The moral intuitions appealed to here to relate to matters 
that concern our common beliefs as regards, e.g., justice 
(e.g., our belief that the innocent ought not to be 
sentenced). Now as Harsanyi admits, and as we have seen, 
whether RU will result in different prescriptions to AU 
in matters of justice cannot have anything to do with 
the co-ordination effect. Hence even if it has been 
shown that RU is a distinct theory to AU and, indeed, is 
a superiar theory to AU in situations where the co­
ordination effect will be evident, this does not show 
what is of the main interest, namely, that RU is a 
significant improvement on AU in matters relating to
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justice. That is, it will not have been shown that RU 
does not, unlike AU which does, prescribe acts in certain 
logically possible situations which offend against our 
intuitions as regards justice. To establish this we 
need some other argument. And as we have seen Harsanyi 
employs an argument which involves an appeal to what he 
calls the expectation and incentive effects. But I have 
argued that this argument is mistaken on at least two 
counts and it is worthwhile here to briefly restate my 
arguments to make clear just precisely what is and is not 
established by each of them. First, I claimed that 
Harsanyi's argument rests on an assumption, viz,, that all 
individuals in society will know and will act on the 
knowledge that the decision maker adopts the optimal 
RHlian strategy, which may not hold. (We can grant that 
this assumption —  sometimes called "the assumption of 
mutually expected rationality" —  is commonly assumed to 
hold in decision theory and game theory. But it seems to 
be merely a matter of commonsense to realise that this 
assumption does not or, at least, need not hold in 
everyday life.) Of course, with this argument we have 
not established that whenever AU prescribes a particular 
act, RU prescribes that act: We have only established that 
RU prescribes the intuitively objectionable acts tnar aL 
prescribes given, as is certainly possible, that a certain 
assumption does .hot hold. But this is surely enough for those 
who claim
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that Ru is not a significant improvement on AU for, as 
we remarked, whether this assumption does or does not 
hold seems to be irrelevant for the moral assessment of 
those actions. Second, even if we allow that this 
assumption does hold —  i.e., even if we take a purely 
decision theoretic approach to the attempt to demonstrate 
the putatively importantdif f erence between AU and RU —  
we can show that Harsanyi's argument about the 
expectation and incentive effects will not suffice to 
show that RU is significantly different from AU. There 
are two points here: first, the situations where, e.g., 
to sentence an innocent man will maximize utility may, 
as a matter of fact, be extremely rare and hence a 
strategy which prescribed the sentencing of the innocent 
in just those rare circumstances would not have 
seriously detrimental expectation and incentive effects. 
Once again we have not established with this argument 
that whenever AU prescribes a particular act, RU prescribes 
that act: we have only established RU prescribes the 
intuitively objectionable acts that AU prescribes given, 
as is certainly possible, that where to perform these 
acts will maximize utility is extremely rare. And once 
again this seems sufficient for those who wish to claim 
that RU is not a significant improvement on AU: afterall 
RU is committed to the view that on occasions we ought 
to perform an injustice given that an apparently
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morally irrelevant assumption holds. The second point 
is that a policy as regards punishment which permitted 
some (possibly very few) individuals to sentence the 
innocent would conceivably maximize utility and would 
not have seriously detrimental expectation and incentive 
effects, and if a supposedly utilitarian theory rules 
out such policies by definition, then so much the worse, 
from the utilitarian point of view, for that theory.
Now with this argument we are able to claim that RU will 
prescribe (if it is a genuine utilitarian theory) the 
intuitively objectionable acts that AU prescribes 
without supposing that certain contingent facts hold, 
i.e., without supposing that the other individuals in 
society do not know what is the optimal RUian strategy 
or that the situations where to perform one of these acts 
will maximize utility are very rare. Our argument for 
the extensional equivalence of AU and RU over these 
class of acts only requires that the RUian present his 
theory as a genuinely utilitarian theory.
We can therefore conclude that Harsanyi's attempt 
to show that RU is a significant improvement on AU by 
using the modelling techniques and other analytical 
tools of decision theory is unsuccessful. But as I 
mentioned there have been other attempts to show that RU 
is a significantly different theory from AU and it is to 
these that I now turn.
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5, Other gtvemp t-s to falsify the Equivalence Thesis,
There are two arguments that I propose to focus 
upon in this section. The first has been advanced by 
Gertrude Ezorsky^^. In her defence of RU Ezorsky asks 
us to consider what it is about actions that interests 
the RUian. They are concerned with the consequences of 
social practices f i.e., they are interested in "what 
would happen if certain kinds of actions were performed 
by everyone in a social group" And as we have noted
there are certain types of actions such that if they 
became a general practice the consequences would be 
disastrous, Now with respect to these kinds of actions 
we suppose that there is a tendency for people to 
perform these type of actions unless there were an 
(enforcable) rule which forbade such actions. This, as 
we have already noted, was the central idea that underlay 
the introduction of the rules of RU. But, then, Ezorsky 
claims, if some action is to be the subject of a rule 
under RU, i.e., if it is to be an action that is 
forbidden by a rule of RU, then it must be possible for 
the action to be "contagious, or universalizable".^  ^
Ezorsky puts the point in terms of the properties of 
actions, and, in particular, the property of an action 
(or its circumstances) which brings about the 
maximization of utility —  these she calls "consequential 
properties". Thus she says, the RUian
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has a right to demand that a consequential 
property pass a test for being possibly 
contagious, or universalizable. Otherwise 
it isn't the sort of property he is 
interested in.^®
Properties which do not admit of being possible contagious 
or universalizable Ezorsky calls "discriminatory". A 
property of an act is discriminatory if and only if one 
or both of the following suppositions is self-contradictory
(1) All members of the group perform acts 
exemplifying that property.
(2) All acts of the general kind which is 
further specified by the property, 
exemplify the property.
Let us nov7 consider the act of sentencing an innocent 
man which has the property which brings about the 
maximization of utility —  the property or feature which 
we earlier referred to as the property or feature Z?.
Now it is not, as Ezorsky notesself-contradictory to 
suppose that all members of a social group should perform 
such acts. For we could suppose that everyone in a 
social group performed just one such act out of (say) 
100,000 acts of sentencing each, and such a practice
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would not have detrimental effects —  in Harsanyi’s 
terminology, such a practice would not have disastrous 
expectation and incentive effects, (This is just the 
idea we introduced in the previous section, viz. , that 
from the utilitarian point of view a practice or policy as 
regards punishment should permit of exceptions to not 
sentencing the innocent providing such exceptions were 
relatively few and far between. This will insure that 
individuals cannot infer from such a practice or policy 
that it is at all likely that as innocent persons they will 
be sentenced. For if they cannot infer this then such a 
practice or policy cannot have (seriously) detrimental 
expectation and incentive effects.) However, it -is self- 
contradictory to suppose that all acts of sentencing 
should be acts of sentencing the. innocent with the feature 
D, For if all acts of sentencing were acts of sentencing 
the innocent this would have disastrous effects.
Therefore the feature D is discriminatory, and hence it 
is impossible that acts of the type "sentencing the 
innocent with the feature D " should ever become a 
social practice. This, according to Ezorsky, "enables 
the RUian to snip off the irrelevant maximizing 
circumstance" and specify what the sheriff did as simply 
a case of sentencing the innocent and "the generalized 
consequences of doing that are disastrous". Hence, the 
RUian will adopt a rule which forbids what the sheriff 
is doing, namely, sentencing the innocent. Ezorsky
concludes by saying that her argument
frees RU from coextension with AU, The 
RUian's moral disquisitions can be different 
from (and better than) those of his AUian 
predecessor f ®
Now the reader may have, as I have, some difficulty 
in following this argument for the argument seems to 
establish precisely the opposite of what Ezorsky wants 
it to establish. Let us grant that Ezorsky has correctly 
specified the necessary and sufficient conditions for a 
property of an act being discriminatory, i.e., for it 
being possible that an act should become a social practice 
(It may be disputed that Ezorsky has specified the 
necessary and sufficient conditions for a property of an 
act being discriminatory, but to investigate this further 
would take us too far afield into an investigation of 
what constitutes a social practice.) Now we noted, at 
the beginning of this section, that if it is the case 
that an action is forbidden by a rule of RU, then it must 
be possible for the action to be contagious or universal­
izable, i.e., it must be possible for the action to 
become a social practice, i.e., it must not have a 
property or properties that are discriminatory,
Ezorsky has shown that the property D is discriminatory.
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Hence the plain philosopher might have thought that by 
a simple application of rnodus tollens we can conclude 
that it is not the case that an action with that 
property is forbidden by a rule of RU, Which seems to 
be precisely the conclusion that those who argue that 
RU is not a significant improvement on AU would want to 
arrive at. That is, from Ezorsky's argument we seem to 
be able to conclude that an action such as sentencing an 
innocent man where such an action has the property which 
brings about a maximization of utility is not forbidden 
by a rule of RU. In other words, we seem able to 
conclude that such an action is permitted by the rules 
of RU.
However, it might be thought that Ezorsky could 
reply as follows. We note that if an action maximizes 
utility, e.g., if this act of sentencing an innocent 
ma,n has the feature D, then that act ought to be 
performed according to AU, i.e., that act is prescribed 
by AU. But the conclusion of our argument above is 
merely that such an act is permitted by RU —  there is 
no positive prescription to the effect that the act 
ought to be performed. So here, it might be thought, 
is a difference between AU and RU: according to AU the 
act (which has the feature D) of sentencing this innocent 
man is prescribed, whereas that act is merely permitted 
by RU. There are two points to be made in reply to 
this argument. ^
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First, it is surely cold comfort to the supporter 
of R,U that he should find that his theory does not 
prescribe acts like the sentencing of the innocent and 
does not forbid them, but actually permits such acts. I 
take it that our intuition is that we ought not to 
prescribe such acts and hence any theory which does 
prescribe them is inadequate; and that we ought not to 
permit such acts and hence any theory which does 
permit them is likewise inadequate. Second, if our 
argument above is correct then the supporter of RU must 
admit that there is no rule in his theory which will 
forbid such acts, and as such an act ex hypothesi 
maximizes utility then as a utilitarian he ought to 
prescribe such acts. This brings me to the final reply 
that I think that Ezorsky might make by way of defence 
of her argument.
Consider the following statement of Austin's which 
we have quoted previously: according to RU "The question 
to be solved is this;- If acts of the class were 
generally done ... what would be the probable effect on 
the general happiness or good?" This suggests the 
following idea; if, according to RU, an act ought to be 
done, i.e., if there is to be a rule that prescribes 
such acts, then the consequences of that act's becoming 
a social practice must be maximally beneficial. Thus, 
if RU is to prescribe a certain act then it must be
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possible for that act to become a social practice. Now 
as it is not possible that an act of sentencing an 
innocent man which has the feature D should become a 
social practice, it follows that a RUian is not 
committed to prescribing such acts. Hence it is not 
correct to assert, as we seemed to assert in the previous 
paragraph, that an RUian is committed to prescribing 
such acts. But this reply is problematic in a number 
of respects.
Note that this reply rests on the idea that if RU 
is to presovibe certain acts then it must be possible for 
such acts to become a social practice. This is in 
contrast to the idea that informed our discussion of 
Ezorsky, namely, that if RU is to forbid certain acts 
then it must be possible for such acts to become a social 
practice. And it is worth remarking that as Ezorsky 
actually states her argument it would appear that she is 
actually interested in what acts RU can forbid, not what 
acts RU can prescribe^ she is concerned to argue that a 
RUian can claim than an innocent man ought not to be 
punished (even when to do so maximizes utility). Now 
this might prove to be no problem for Ezorsky if it 
could be argued that given that a theory does not 
prescribe an act it follows that it forbids that act.
For then it could be argued that as RU does not prescribe 
the sentencing of the innocent, it must forbid the
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sentencing of the innocent. Such an argument has a 
conclusion which is reminiscent of the Aristotelian 
dictum "what the law does not prescribe, it forbids*' 
and it has long been recognized that such a view is, to 
say the least, problematic. We would have to suppose 
tha,t RU is capable of generating a set of rules which 
would exhaustively divide actions into those that were 
prescribed and those that were forbidden: that is, the 
rules of RU would have to be supposed to not admit of a 
class of actions that were merely permitted. This is 
not the place to enter into this debate except to 
notice that Bernard Mayo has argued, to my mind 
convincingly, that there can be no body of rules which 
can prescribe or prohibit every action  ^ It is enough 
for our purposes to simply note the following: if we 
allow that the rules of RU do not admit of a class of 
actions that are merely permitted, then given our 
previous argument that RU does not forbid certain actions 
and given the symmetrioat argument presented in this 
paragraph that RU does not prescribe these actions, we 
have a contradiction, namely, that RU forbids and 
prescribes these actions. Hence Ezorsky must conclude 
that such actions are merely permitted by RU. And this 
still leaves it open for me to make the point that I 
made previously. If certain acts are permitted by RU 
and these acts maximize utility then as utilitarians
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we should prescribe such acts. That is, even granting 
the insights of RU, namely, that we should always bear 
in mind the consequences of an act should it become a 
social practice, if there is nothing in the theory of RU 
to forbid certain acts (because it is impossible that 
they should become a social practice) and these acts 
maximize utility, then on simple utilitarian 
considerations we should prescribe such acts. Maybe as 
an RUian simptiaiter the supporter of RU is not 
committed to prescribing such acts, but as a utilitarian 
he seems to be so committed,
I said at the beginning of this section that there 
were two arguments addressed against the equivalence 
thesis that I was going to consider: the second argument 
is due to Mackie^i. Mackie argues that the argument we 
gave in section 3 for the equivalence thesis is only 
decisive if the rules in RU are treated as "purely 
abstract entities" rather than as "social realities".
For a rule to be a social reality —  a rule that is 
taught and passed on from one generation to another, a 
rule that is more or less consciously accepted and 
followed, appealed to in criticisms of violations, etc. 
—  "there are limits to the complexities and 
qualifications it can incorporate". Now the rule R may 
be such a rule, but there is no guarantee that the rule 
R ’ required to instantiate the equivalence thesis will
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meet these requirements. Hence, if the RUian insists 
that the rules of his theory be social realities then, 
as Hackie concludes, "Rule utilitarianism, thus 
understood, can therefore resist the threatened collapse 
into act utilitarianism."
However, this initially attractive argument fails 
because Mackie's argument has the consequence that the 
logical status of the rules of RU is reduced to that of 
the rules of AU; i.e., they become merely rules of 
convenience (see section 2). To see this note that the 
reason Mackie cites for the rule R rather than the rule 
R' being adopted is essentially that the second may be 
too complex and include too many qualifications for it 
to be a rule that could function as a social reality.
That is, its complexity may well outstrip human capacities 
for it to be the sort of thing that can be taught and 
passed on from one generation to another, etc. Nonetheless, 
it is granted that if the rule R ' rather than R were 
adopted this would give rise to greater utility. The 
reason R rather than R ’ is adopted is just that, due to 
human weaknesses, the latter would outstrip our 
capacities for assimilation and manipulation: there is 
no logical necessity that R should be adopted rather 
R '. But recall that we noted that it was not the case 
that AU had no place for rules of moral conduct -- we 
called these "rules of convenience". We further noted 
that if RU was to be a theory quite distinct from AU
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then the rules of RU could not be merely rules of 
convenience, - Now the reason that an AUian would give 
for the adoption of a certain rule, say, R is just that, 
due to human weaknesses, it would be beyond our 
capacities to work out the consequences of individual 
actsi-r it may not be humanly feasible to work out those 
consequences or to work out the consequences may 
constitute a waste of effort (given our computational 
skills). However, there is no logical necessity that R 
should be adopted rather than that individuals should work 
out the consequences of each individual act —  indeed, to 
do so, if it were possible, may well give rise to greater 
utility. But now it seems that the logical status of 
the rules of RU, aocording to Mackie account of those 
vulesy is identical to their status under AU: they are 
both merely rules of convenience. For under AU the rule 
R, for example, is adopted because of human weaknesses —  
but for limited human capacitites we could bring about 
greater utility by working out the consequences of each 
individual act. Similarly, according to Mackie, the 
rule R is adopted because of human weaknesses —  but for 
limited human capacities we could bring about greater 
utility by adopting the rule R'.
We seem entitled to conclude, therefore, that the 
argument to the effect that RU is not a significant 
improvement over AU still stands. Hence the utilitarian
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cannot avoid the putative counter-examples to AU by 
introducing the distinction between RU and AU. But note 
that I have called these '^ -putative counter-examples".
It remains an open question as to whether we have 
demonstrated the inadequacy of utilitarianism by showing 
that it can be brought into conflict with some of our 
most firmly held moral intuitions. It is to this 
question that I now turn.
6. Do Conflicts between our Moral Intuitions and 
Utilitarianism really matter?
There are, it seems to me, two responses that the 
utilitarian can make to the above question. Each admits 
that utilitarianism can be brought into conflict with 
some of our moral intuitions but there are important 
differences in how they deal with this conflict. The 
first can be summarised by saying, "If utilitarianism 
can be brought into conflict with our moral intuitions, 
then so much the worse for those intuitions". Such a 
response is suggested by some of the remarks made by Smart 
The second can be summarised by saying, "The conflict 
between our intuitions and utilitarianism is more 
apparent than real - the intuitions appealed to by the 
anti-utilitarian have a limited legitimate application 
and their application in the the attempt to demonstrate
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the inadequacy of utilitarianism is illegitimate".
This response has been made by Sprigge^^ and R M Eare^^.
I will examine each of these responses in turn.
The first response has two related ideas underlying 
it. First, that it is clear that many of our intuitions, 
not just in the field of morality, have been found to be 
mistaken. Beliefs which were commonly held and even 
strongly held have later been abandoned. The second 
idea is that the intuitions in the moral sphere are even 
more shaky for we can observe many things that were 
thought right at one time or place are regarded as wrong 
at another time or place, and vice versa. This diversity 
of moral opinion should give us pause in thinking that 
our own commonly held opinions are the touchstone of 
what is right or wrong. Now I have some sympathy with 
this view: it is always dangerous to base some thesis on 
our intuitions. Of course, this is commonly done in 
philosophy, and no more so in moral philosophy than in 
other areas of philosophical inquiry. And maybe such a 
practice is unavoidable in the advancement and defence 
of philosophical theses (in the final analysis, when 
we are questioning the foundations of our views about 
ourselves and the world, what else is there to appeal 
to?). But it is singularly unedifying for a theorist 
to respond to a criticism of his theory to the effect 
that it has consequences which are counter-intuitive by
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saying that as the intuitions are counter to the theory 
then this just goes to show that the intuitions are 
mistaken. This is not an argument to the effect that 
the intuitions are mistaken: we want some independent 
grounds for thinking that they are mistaken. That is, 
the utilitarian would have an argument for the claim that 
the intuitions are mistaken if he had an argument that 
did not simply presuppose the adequacy of the theory 
under test, namely, utilitarianism. However, while the 
utilitarian may not have shown that the intuitions are 
mistaken, nonetheless he may just be right in that claim. 
This is not an outrageous suggestion —  afterall, our 
intuitions have been mistaken before. In which case, 
while we can say that the utilitarian has in this 
response no argument to the effect that the intuitions 
that are being used to test the adequacy of his theory 
are mistaken, equally we must admit that we have not 
shown that they are correct. In short, if the 
utilitarian makes this sort of response he forces the 
present debate as to the adequacy of utilitarianism 
into a stand-off situation. Any attempt to argue for 
the adequacy or inadequacy of utilitarianism via an 
appeal to our moral intuitions is reduced to a non­
starter .
However, it might be thought that the situation is 
not quite as bleak as all that and I develop the
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following argument from a paper by J W N Watkins’ 
concerning the rational appraisability of moral theories 
and principles'^. Watkins’ central idea is the 
supposition, which he takes to be uncontroversial, that 
"it would be unreasonable to demand more rational 
appraisability in morals than in science." And yet a 
commonly held view of contemporary moral philosophers 
has just this consequence and makes the problem of 
rational argument over conflicting moral principles 
particularly acute. This view Watkins calls "justificat- 
ionism". It is the view that to rationally accept a 
moral principle or opinion consists in showing that the 
principle deductively follows from certain higher level 
(moral) principles (with or without the aid of factual 
minor premises). Now justificationism in itself does 
not present a problem for rational argument in morals: 
the problem arises when this view is conjoined with two 
other commonly accepted philosophical theses. These 
are, "non a priorism" and "autonomism". Non a priorism 
is the view that there are no self-evident and necessary 
moral principles and autonomism is the view that there 
are no "external" factors which require certain moral 
principles rather than others to be adopted (the 
autonomist would reject, e.g., an objectivist natural­
istic theory of ethics). Thus if one accepts autonomism 
(as Watkins thinks we should) then moral principles
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cannot be appraised by external evidence; and if one 
accepte non a priorism (as Watkins thinks we should) 
then moral principles are not self-evident; and if one 
accepts justificationism then the only way that some 
principle ooutd be justified is by showing that it 
follows from certain higher level principles, but by 
autonomism and non a priorism these principles too are 
neither self-evident nor supported by external evidence 
they are just as much in need of justification.
Justificationism renders justification in morals illusory, 
Watkins now notes^^ that an influential view in the 
philosophy of science —^  the Popperian view —  maintains 
that scientific theories or hypotheses are not positively 
justified; they are not verified or "confirmed" in any 
verificationist sense. Rather they may be falsified 
and their "justification" consists in their having 
successfully weathered attempts to falsify them. In the 
appraising of scientific hypotheses a crucial role is 
played by so-called "basic statements". These describe 
events or situations (like the position of a pointer on 
a measuring instrument) and are not themselves verifiable 
by (perceptual) experience. An hypothesis is rejected 
if it clashes with, i.e., if it implies the negation of, 
accepted basic statements. However, if a hypothesis is 
found to clash with a basic statement or statements it is 
not thereby automatically rejected. For the unverified
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basic statemtents are themselves only accepted 
provisionally a,nd the defender of the hypothesis may 
attempt to test them. These tests may overthrow the 
basic statements and thus the hypothesis survives. But, 
as Watkins notes, scientific rationality does not allow 
that accepted basic statements are rejected merely 
because they conflict with a favourite theory.
Now bearing in mind that we should not make greater 
demands on rational appraisability in morals than in 
science, we should not expect our moral principles to be 
justified (in the sense persupposed by justificationism). 
That is, we should not be looking for a justification of 
our moral principles from abovef as it were, i.e., by 
showing that they are deducible from higher level 
principles; rather we should be looking for a 
"justification" from below, i.e., by shov/ing that they 
do not have unsatisfactory implications. A scientific 
hypothesis has unsatisfactory implications when it can be 
shown that it clashes with accepted basic statements. 
Clearly, if there is to be an analogy between rational 
appraisability in science and rational appraisability 
in morals we will have to show that there is in the 
moral sphere a class of statements analogous to the 
basic statements in science. For the moment we proceed 
on the assumption that there is a class of such 
statements and we temporarily leave unanalysed the notion
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of "unsatisfactory Implication" as this applies in 
morals; we will return to the notion later.
An accepted scientific hypothesis should not be 
rejected without reason,, By analogy an accepted moral 
principle should not be rejected without reason. The 
onus is on the critic and reformer to give us reasons 
for rejecting some commonly accepted principle . The 
reasons will consist in the critic showing that the 
principle has unsatisfactory implications.
Let us return now to ray claim that if the utilitarian 
responds to the charge that his theory can be brought into 
conflict with our moral intuitions by saying, "Then so 
much the worse for those intuitions", then the debate as 
to the adequacy or inadequacy of utilitarianism via an 
appeal to moral intuitions is rendered irresolvable. We 
might now argue against my claim, using Watkins' account 
of rational appraisability in morals, in the following 
way. The principle (intuition) that we ought never to 
sentence the innocent is a commonly accepted principle.
As such it ought not to be rejected without reason. Such 
a reason would be that it has unsatisfactory implications. 
But this has not been demonstrated by the utilitarian, 
and certainly he has not demonstrated this by saying 
that the principle must have unsatisfactory implications 
because it is in conflict with his theory. The principle, 
then, remains "justified" in the sense in which we could
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reasonably expect it to be justified. My argument, it 
will be claimed, presupposed that a principle was not 
justified unless there were a deductive proof of that 
principle. But this is to demand too much for the 
rational appraisability of moral principles; I have 
presupposed justificationism. Hence we can conclude that 
a theory, viz., utilitarianism which clashes with the 
principle that we ought never to sentence the innocent 
is an inadequate theory.
Now I take this objection seriously and I certainly 
do not want to take on all the presuppositions that 
underlie it in the philosophy of science and meta-ethics: 
that would be to take on too much. But it is not 
necessary to do this in order to resurrect the essential 
part of my original claim, namely, that attempts to 
determine the adequacy or inadequacy of utilitarianism 
via an appeal to moral intuition are irresolvable. To 
see this it is necessary to return to the notion of an 
unsatisfactory implication in morals.
As Watkins remarks, "There is sometimes a lingering 
feeling that there can be rational appraisal only where 
there is truth or falsity."^? However, as he notes, the 
account of rational appraisability in science given by 
Popper before he was acquainted with Tarski's theory of 
truth did not presuppose anything of the sort, Popper 
thought it was possible to avoid using the concepts
loi
"true" and "false" and instead talk of logical 
considerations of derivability, There is no need to 
talk of a theory being "false", rather we can say that 
it is contradicted by a certain set of accepted 
basic statements. And these basic statements need not 
be said to be "true" or "false" because "we may interpret 
their acceptance as the result of a conventional 
decision"^®. Now whether we can build up a correct 
account of rational appraisability in science by 
eschewing talk of truth and falsity is not the main 
question at issue here: rather the point is that it does 
not seem that we need truth and falsity for there to be 
the possibility of rational appraisal, That is, for 
there to be a rational method for us to arrive at a 
conclusion on some matter (note, not necessarily a 
conclusion that can be said to be true) does not require 
that there be truth and falsity. To be sure, what does 
seem clear is that if there is no possibility of truth 
and falsity (which is commonly thought to be the case 
in morals) then for there to be the possibility of 
rational appraisal we need some fair measure of inter- 
subjective agreement, More particularly, we will need 
in morals some fair measure of inter-subjective 
agreement as regards the analogues to the basic statements 
in science.
Now it is here, as Watkins realises, that the
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parallel he has drawn between morals and science is 
likely to break down. He says;
It will be objected that I have done 
nothing towards reinstating inter-personat 
rationality ,., According to justificationism, 
differences between different people's top- 
level principles are unarguable; and it will 
be said that unarguable differences will re­
appear, in our inverted scheme, unchanged 
except that they are now at the bottom: at 
the basic statement level the factual/moral 
parallelism completely breaks down, surely; 
for whereas people usually reach agreement 
about easily observed situations, what one 
person finds morally unsatisfactory another 
may find indifferent or even good; and there 
may be no hope of reconciliation.^^
However, Watkins points out that what is crucial 
in his account of the rational appraisability of moral 
principles is that there be agreement as to what counts 
as bad or wrong —  not about what is good or right. For 
on Watkins' account a principle is not rejected unless 
it is shown to have unsatisfactory consequences.
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Now I believe it is a plain fact that 
people's judgements about what is wrong 
or bad are far more confident, and display 
oonsideTabty less personal variation, than 
their judgements about what is right and 
good.4 °
Watkins demonstrates this point by way of example: he 
cites a particular situation where almost all people will 
surely say that what is being done is wrong. Of course, 
we are logically free not to appraise the situation in 
that way, but equally we are logically free not to 
appraise some factual situation in the way that it is 
normally appraised. There is no deductive proof 
available which can prove that a person is mistaken who 
refuses to appraise as wrong the actions performed in the 
situation described by Watkins. But similarly there is 
no deductive proof available which can prove that a 
person who insists that there is an elephant in my living 
room at the moment is mistaken. In either case that there 
is a large measure of agreement is a contingent fact.  ^
Now the point I wish to make against Watkins is 
simply this: I think that he is far too sanguine in his 
belief that his example will generalize to others, and 
that, coming to our own case there will be a large measure 
of agreement as to whether the implications of the
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principle "Never sentence the innocent" are or are not 
unsatisfactory. Note that the application of Watkins' 
idea in this case would be as follows: the principle 
"Never sentence the innocent" is commonly accepted and 
as such should not be rejected unless it has unsatis­
factory implications, i.e., that its application in some 
particular case gives rise to a situation whereby there 
is agreement that the actions performed ought not to be 
performed. The particular case we have in mind is that 
involving McCloskey's sheriff. Here application of the 
principle would give rise to harm being done to ten 
rather than one person. Are our judgements about this 
particular case going to be in agreement? I want to 
suggest that this may not be so. Indeed, even a 
utilitarian may be in two minds; consider the following 
remarks by Smart :
Surely, if it is shown that, in certain 
circumstances ... a utilitarian ought, on 
his own principles, to commit a serious 
injustice, such as punishing an innocent 
man, then it seems that this does and 
should weaken the appeal of utilitarianism.
And yet one can be made to vacillate back 
again. We also reflect that the serious 
injustice would ex hypothesi be the only
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possible alternative to an even greater
total misery than would be caused by the
. . ^ . 4 2injustice.
Or again:
I am not happy to draw the conclusion that 
McCloskey says the utilitarian must draw.
But neither am I happy with the anti­
utilitarian conclusion. For if a case really
did arise in which injustice was the lesser of
two evils (in terms of human happiness and
misery, that is) the anti-utilitarian 
conclusion is a very unpalatable one too, 
namely that in some circumstances one should 
choose the greater total misery.*^
This, I think, is a vacillation that most people would 
be subject to if they seriously considered the implications 
of the principle "Never sentence the innocent". I assert
this as a matter of fact and put forward as some evidence
for this assertion the quotations from Smart above, I 
also think that the vacillation is perfectly understandable. 
For there is a duality in our moral thinking which informs 
our judgements in particular cases about what is bad or 
wrong. On the one hand v/e often take a teleologiaat
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view and this inclines us to say that if to perform an 
injustice will le^d to less misery then we ought to 
perform an injustice. On the other hand we often take 
a deontological view and this inclines us to say that 
it ca,nnot be right to perform an injustice no matter what 
the consequences. To be sure it is then clear that our 
particular judgements about what is wrong is informed 
by our theory. But this in itself does not break down 
the analogy between science and morals at the basic 
statement level. For we can point to what is now a 
common place in the philosophy of science, namely, that 
basic statements are theory laden. As Watkins says:
All judgements about badness or wrongness 
involve some ideology, imply that some 
standard, however commonplace, has been 
departed from, just as all statements in 
science are theory impregnated. ^
But whereas in science we may be able to ensure that the 
theory does not inform our interpretation of the situation 
currently being used to test that theory, and may be we 
can appeal to basic statements "thinner" in theory 
content than others, neither of these options seems to 
be available in the present case. Consider Watkins’ idea 
that moral rationality requires an analogous descending
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criticism to that found in science so that as the 
"critical investigation proceeds, objections will become 
mojre earthy and less ideological" and eventually 
objections to a principle "come down to this, that it 
would cause so much pain, unhappiness, or death". ^
Now if our disputants were teleologists we could expect 
some agreement as the criticism of the principle 
descended, but a deontologist, or even a teleologist in 
his deontological moments, will not be impressed by the 
fact that the consequences of failing to act according 
to a certain principle would cause less pain or 
unhappiness if to so act is to commit an injustice.
That is, for a deontologist appeal to pain or unhappiness 
caused by the adoption of the principle will be irrelevant: 
to perform an act will be wrong if it is to commit an 
injustice no matter that to choose otherwise is to choose 
a lesser misery.
So we have reached a similar conclusion as previously 
albeit by a different route and certainly without pre­
supposing justificationism. An attempt to determine the 
adequacy or inadequacy of utilitarianism by an appeal to 
our commonly held intuitions (principles) will not succeed 
For the attempt to"justify" those principles by making 
judgements about their application in particular 
circumstances will require that we make a judgement about 
the wrongness of particular acts which is informed by our
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deontological or teleological views, the very views which 
we were trying to choose between by making appeal to the 
original intuitions (principles) currently under test.
Now any attempt to judge tire wrongness of an action in 
5ome particular case without that judgement being 
informed by our general deontological or teleological 
views (note: not the principle currently under test) 
seems doomed to failure, unless we think that at some 
level in the descending criticism either of two things 
will happen. Either, that at some level we will reach a 
judgement which, while it presupposes some standard, 
this standard is common to the deontologist and 
teleologist. This may happen with respect to some 
particular principle, but where it does happen is of no 
interest in the present context. For the problem we are 
considering concerns those cases where we have a dispute 
as to the wrongness of an act precisely because one 
disputant focuses on the justness of the act and the 
other on its bad consequences. The second alternative 
is this; we think that at some level in the descending 
criticism we can appeal to naive intuition, i.e., that 
we think that at some level we will just see or in some 
fashion straightway apprehend the wrongness of an act.
But this is as vain a hope as those who think that in 
science there is a level at the corresponding point 
where judgements will be based on pure sense data.
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I must emphasise that nothing 1 have said should be 
taken to imply that I think that rational appraisability 
in morals is generally impossible. Quite the contrary:
I think that Watkins has indicated how we can have 
rational argument about many, maybe even most, of our 
moral principles and policies; as a matter of fact I 
think it would work in many instances. But in respect 
of the debate about utilitarianism Watkins* method offers 
no way out.
Let us turn now to the second response I mentioned:
I will concentrate on the argument as it is presented 
by Hare. Hare notes that the normal ploy of those who 
attempt to argue that utilitarianism is mistaken as a 
moral theory is to show that the utilitarian is committed 
to views that everyone, or nearly everyone, finds 
counter-intuitive. We have already mentioned McCloskey's 
argument ad nauseam. Hare's answer to this sort of 
argument involves his major distinction between what he 
calls "two levels of moral thinking": the "intuitive 
level" and the "critical level". The intuitive level of 
moral thinking is the product of one's moral education 
and upbringing. This level of thinking contains "a set 
of dispositions, motivations, intuitions, prima facie 
principles (call them what we will) which we try to 
inculcate in ourselves and others. But why do we attempt 
to inculcate just those intuitions or principles rather
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than some others? No doubt we do so because we think 
they are correct, that they are the best set of such 
intuitions. But what constitutes the best set?
According to Hare, "The best set is that whose accept­
ance yields actions, dispositions, etc. most nearly 
approximating to those that would be chosen if we were 
able to use critical thinking all the time."  ^ The 
obvious question now then is, what is critical thinking? 
According to Hare it "consists in making a choice under 
the constraints imposed by the logical properties of the 
moral concepts and by the non-moral facts and by nothing 
else."**^ Hare’s analysis of the moral concepts, in 
particular their alleged universalizability and prescrip- 
tiyity, has the consequence that to choose at the 
critical level is to choose as a utilitarian. *^9 Now it 
is not possible for we ordinary human beings to choose 
on every occasion between alternative courses of action 
at the critical level, this is only possible for an 
individual whom Hare calls "the archangel". This is a 
hypothetical individual with superhuman powers of thought, 
superhuman knowledge, and who is generally free from all 
human weaknesses. The archangel has no need for the 
intuitions or prima facie principles that guide the rest 
of us. Just because we do not have superhuman powers, 
etc. we cannot judge every action at the critical level. 
Instead we judge between actions at the intuitive level.
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i.e., we employ the intuitions or prima facie principles 
that we have absorbed in our moral education. Now as we 
^aid, in judging between various intuitions —  in 
attempting to select the best set -- we choose those 
whose acceptance would yield actions that most nearly 
approximate those that would be chosen on the basis of 
critical thinking, i.e., those that would be chosen by an 
archangel. This means that in choosing amongst 
intuitions "we have to look at the consequences of 
inculcating them in ourselves and others; and, in 
examining these consequences, we have to balance the 
size of the good and bad effects in cases which we 
consider against the probability or improbability of such 
cases occurring in our actual experience^^ In other 
words, some intuition will be included in our set of 
best intuitions if it prescribes acts which have good 
consequences in situations we are likely to encounter, 
and bad consequences only in situations we are unlikely 
to encounter. In this way the acceptance of the intuition 
its inculcation in ourselves and others —  will yield 
actions most nearly approximating those that would be 
chosen at the critical level by an archangel.
We return now to the argument which uses examples 
&uch as McCloskey's to demonstrate the inadequacy of 
utilitarianism. When presented with such an argument 
Hare suggests that we ask, at what level is the argument 
taking place? If it is at the ovitioal level then the
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anti-utilitarian can advance any example he wishes, no 
iT)atter how unlikely it may be or how outside our actual 
experience. But then our intuitions cannot be appealed 
to. On the other hand, if the argument is at the 
intuitive level then the anti-utilitarian cannot 
advance just any example no matter how unlikely. We 
must remember that our moral intuitions were inculcated 
in us to enable us to deal with situations that it was 
likely we would come across —  they were not designed to 
enable us to deal with highly improbable situations.
McCloskey claimed that in order to demonstrate the 
inadequacy of utilitarianism all that was necessary was 
that we show that in some logically possible situation a 
utilitarian is committed to the view that what we ought 
to do is sentence an innocent man. It is easy enough to 
see why McCloskey makes this move: that all the conditions 
should obtain that are necessary for it to be the case that 
that the utilitarian is committed to such a view is 
extremely unlikely. (Just how likely is it that a 
sheriff should know or be able to estimate to a 
sufficiently high degree of probability that if he does 
not sentence this innocent man then ten people will die; 
just how likely is it that he can know that the innocent 
ma,n will not make a greater contribution to social 
utility than the ten who will die —  maybe the innocent 
man is a,n expert on cancer about to bring about a cure
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whereas the other ten people are merely drunk hoboes;
Und so on.) But Hare will respond to such an example
by saying 52; McCloskey's example does not represent a
Situation that we are at all likely to come across and
hence to say that it is counter-intuitive that we ought
to do what the utilitarian says we ought to do is to
misapply our intuitions —  they cannot be appealed to
in such wayout, improbable situations. Of course. Hare
must grant that there may be veal life, if very rare,
situations where utilitarianism can be brought into
apparent conflict with our intuitions. But it suffices
to point out that the anti-utilitarian has not as yet presorted
such- an example and in any case such a situation ought 
not to be treated at the intuitive level: such 
situations are, if there are any, very rare, and as such 
are properly treated at the critical level. In short, 
arguments that employ examples like McCloskey's in an 
attempt to demonstrate the inadequacy of utilitarianism 
are unsuccessful because their appeal to intuition is 
inappropriate.
However, there is a crucial flaw in Hare's argument.
Note that Hare gives the following rationale or just­
ification for our moral intuitions. We mere mortals suffer from 
weaknesses which make it impossible for us to choose as 
an archangel. Nonetheless, by employing the above 
mentioned intuitions we will choose, given the sorts of 
situations we are likely to come across, in a way that
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most nearly approximates the choices of an archangel. 
That is, by adopting these intuitions or principles we 
will choose in a way that most nearly approximates how 
we would have chosen had we not suffered from the normal 
human weaknesses, i.e., how we would have chosen as a 
utilitarian with super-human knowledge, computational 
skills, and so forth. Just these intuitions or 
principles constitute the best set of intuitions or 
principles, Given this justification Hare is able to 
restrict the application of our moral intuitions to 
situations that we are likely to come across and not to 
situations which are highly improbable or merely 
logically possible. But while the anti-utilitarian 
will no doubt accept that our moral intuitions are a 
product of our moral education he will reject a 
utilitarian justification of those intuitions. He will 
agree that we attempt to inculcate certain intuitions 
in ourselves and others because we think they are the 
best set of such intuitions, but he will reject a 
utilitarian analysis of the term"best" in "best set of 
intuitions". The intuition that we have that we ought 
never to sentence the innocent is one that we have 
absorbed in our moral education, but such an intuition 
is included in our best set because actions in 
accordance with that intuition will be actions that 
properly respect the rights of other people and actions
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that are just. But if the anti-utilitarian rejects a 
utilitarian justification of our moral intuitions, as 
surely he will, then there Is no need for him to accept 
Hare's claim that such intuitions are restricted in 
their application to situations that it is likely we 
will encounter.
The point can be put in another and possibly clearer 
way. Hare identifies our intuitions with what we have 
ca,lled "rules of convenience" ; this, I take it, is 
obyious from what I have said previously. Now if the 
intuition which we have that we ought never to sentence 
the innocent were merely a rule of convenience, then it 
would follow that there are certain logically possible 
situations, like those of McCloskey's sheriff, where we 
ought to act contrary to that rule/intuition. But this 
is precisely what McCloskey and other anti-utilitarians 
would deny, and they hope that this is a view shared by 
most of us. For if we acted contrary to that rule/ 
intuition —  as the utilitarian says on occasion we 
ought —  then we would perform an injustice: we would 
sentence an innocent man. But McCloskey and other 
people of deontological persuasion take it as obvious 
that we ought never to perform an injustice, and it is 
precisely this which they take to underlie the rule/ 
intuition that we ought never to sentence the innocent. 
Buch a rule/intuition is not simply a "rule of con­
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venience’’,- it is not subject to utilitarian justification.
Clearly then, Hare'.s argument is inconclusive against 
the hatd-nosed deontologist but equally clearly the 
argument of Hare’s opponents is not very successful.
First, the reason why the argument of Hare's opponents
is not very successful; no doubt most of us, or at least
most of us in our deontological moments, strongly 
believe that we ought never to perform an injustice, 
but this is not a view shared by Hare, and it would not 
be one shared by us in our teleological moments. If 
there really was a case where sentencing an innocent man 
was justified on utilitarian grounds then given a 
teleological view such an act could not be described as 
the performance of a wrong even though it was an injustice 
As Hare says, supposing an opponent to utilitarianism 
came up with an actual case where on utilitarian 
grounds murder was justified:
if he really did find one, we should have to 
do some critical thinking on it because it 
would be clearly so unusual as to be beyond
the range of our intuition. ...if he did
actually have sufficient evidence (a very
unlikely contingency), murder would in that 
case be justified . . . ^
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But Hare’s argument against his opponents is likewise 
not very successful because it is not a good argument 
on Hare’s part when attempting to rebut the argument of 
his opponents to presuppose that the intuitions which 
his opponent take to be obviously not susceptible to 
utilitarian justification are so susceptible. Hare’s 
opponents claim that his theory, utilitarianism, must 
be inadequate as a moral theory because it can be 
brought into conflict with our intuition that we ought 
never to sentence the innocent, i.e.. Hare’s theory 
would require us on occasions to perform an injustice. 
Hare’s reply is to say that if there really were a case 
where to sentence an innocent man would maximize utility 
then such an act could not realty be a wrong even though 
it was an injustice, ex hypothesi the action would 
maximize utility. Now clearly Hare’s view as to what 
is right or wrong is informed by his theory. But so 
too is his opponents view that it can never be the case 
that we ought to sentence an innocent man, no matter how 
good the consequences. We have here precisely the 
problem to which I alluded when discussing Watkins’ 
argument; our intuitions as to what is right or wrong, 
just or unjust, are not independent of our deontological 
QX teleological theories or views that are currently 
under test by reference to those intuitions.
What, then, is the proper response to make to the
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question posed at the head of this section? The proper 
response, X think, is to say, "No", provided we interpret 
the question to be, "Can we, by making appeal to our 
rt)oral intuitions, come to a conclusion as to the 
adequacy or inadequacy of utilitarianism?". I have 
argued in this section that the question as to the 
adequacy or inadeqacy of utilitarianism via an appeal to 
our moral intuitions is irresolvable. And hence that 
what has constituted the main and most common form of 
debate as to the adequacy of utilitarianism is irresolv­
able.
Should we conclude from this that the question as 
to the adequacy of utilitarianism is in general irresolv­
able? Clearly not; for there may be other ways to 
demonstrate the adequacy or inadequacy of utilitarian­
ism. Indeed, some such attempts are to be found already 
in the literature. For example, some philosophers have 
argued that utilitarianism’s insistence on the 
i'mpartiatity of moral judgements conflicts with our 
duties to particular persons and the moral praiseworth­
iness of affection and l o y a l t y ^ O t h e r s  have argued 
that utilitarianism is, in some sense, self-defeating^^.
I will not examine these approaches here as I do not 
find any of them particularly convincing. A far more 
promising approach in my view is to take an approach 
which is, as it were, in the opposite direction. Instead
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of looking at the consequences the implications —  
of utilitarianism we should look at its foundations ^
And here I believe one of the most interesting 
approaches is to look at the claim expounded in Chapter II 
that utilitarianism can be deduced from the correct 
theory of decision, Suppose that we could show that 
this claimed correct theory of decision was not correct.
We would have to be careful here for we could not then 
straightaway conclude that utilitarianism was inadequate: 
for if we did, we would be guilty of the fallacy of 
denying the antecedent. But at least we could say that 
the grounds for utilitarianism were mistaken grounds.
And if we could then go on to show that from what is 
actually the correct theory of decision we can deduce a 
theory quite at variance with utilitarianism one 
that required the denial of utilitarianism —  we could 
conclude that utilitarianism is inadequate. I believe 
that this approach is viable and it is this approach 
which we shall examine in the remaining chapters.
Before moving on, however, what can v/e say in summary 
that we have learnt from the present chapter? We noted 
that the common form of attack on utilitarianism consisted 
in showing that it can be brought into conflict with our 
moral intuitions. We then argued that a common form of 
defence to this attack, namely, the defence that consists 
in drawing a distinction between RU and AU does not
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suffice, for a significant distinction between RU and AU 
ca,nnot be maintained. But then we considered whether 
the fact that utilitarianism can be brought into 
conflict with our moral intuitions really mattered. We 
concluded that it did not, not because the utilitarian 
has an adequate defence, but because the question as to 
the adequacy or inadequacy of utilitarianism via an 
appeal to our moral intuitions was irresolvable. And 
finally, we suggested that this provided a motivation 
for ignoring the common approach which is to look at the 
implications of utilitarianism and that we should 
instead take the approach which is to look at utilit­
arianism’s foundations.
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There is a point that I should note here. For ease 
of exposition I have spoken of the "decision maker" 
whereas Harsanyi makes his point about the expect­
ation and incentive effects in terms of what he calls 
"primary agents". A particular moral agent (i.e., 
utilitarian)  ^ in a given class C of possible 
decision situations is known as the decision maker. 
The agent A as well as all other moral agents who are 
or will be in a situation belonging to class C are 
known as primary agents - All moral agents whose 
interests are directly or indirectly effected by 
what the primary agents do in situations of class C 
are known as the secondary agents . With this 
terminology we can now say that any utilitarian 
decision maker under BU must choose his strategy 
on the assumptions that alt primary agents will 
employ the same strategy. Of course, the classes 
of primary and secondary agents are not necessarily 
disjoint. However, there is a heuristic advantage 
in Harsanyi's talk of primary agents. For now it is
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very clear that any decision maker must not only 
consider what would be the effects on the expect­
ations and incentives of other people in society 
supposing that they knew that he had adopted a 
certain strategy (which could give rise to effects 
which were quite trivial) but rather he must 
consider what would be the effects supposing that 
they knew that all decision makers in that class 
of situation (i.e., all primary agents) adopted 
that strategy (which would have far from trivial 
effects). For example, to revert to McCloskey*s 
sheriff: under RU he must not only consider what 
would be the effects on the other individuals in 
society supposing that they knew that he had adopted 
a strategy which permitted the sentencing of the 
innocent, but he must also consider what would be 
the effects given that they knew that all other sherrifs 
(or law officers) had adopted that strategy —  
supposing that there is more than one sheriff in 
society (in the small town). Clearly, in McCloskey's 
example we are supposing that the small town is an 
isolated community with only one sheriff. Hence 
for the purposes of that example the distinction 
between the decision maker and primary agents is 
one of no consequence; we suppose that there is and 
will be only one individual who can make a decision 
in the sort of decision situation that the sheriff
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CHAPTER IV
T h e  In a d e q u a c y  o f  O r t h o d o x  D e c i s i o n  T h e o r y
1. An Outline of the General Approach and the Under­
lying, Assumptions taken to demonstrate the 
Inadequacy of Orthodox Theory.
2. Falsifying Orthodox Theory; The Tversky-Kahneman
Experiment,
3. Orthodox Theory from the Normative Standpoint.
4. "Subjective", "Ethical" and "Overall" Preferences.
5. The First Argument for the Empirical Vacuity of 
Decision Theory: Decision Theory is "Soft-edged".
6. The Second Argument: The Holism of Reasons, Actions 
and Rationality.
I, An Outline of the General Approach and the under- 
lying Assumptions taken to demonstrate the Inad­
equacy of Orthodox Theory
As we saw in Chapter II it is possible, given 
orthodox decision theory and a minimal characterization 
of what it is to make a moral judgement, to deduce 
utilitarianism as a moral theory. The purpose of this
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chapter will be to show that orthodox decision theory 
is inadequate as a, theory of rational decision. But 
the question that arises is, "In what sense is orthodox 
theory an inadequate theory?". The response we give to 
this question very much depends on what meta-level status 
we ascribe to orthodox theory, I mention three possibil­
ities here.^ We could regard orthodox theory as a 
purely formal theory, i.e., as a theory which simply 
offers a stipulative definition of "rationality" in its 
axioms (i.e., the rationality postulates (1) to (4) 
mentioned in Chapter II section 2) and what is deduced 
from those axions (in particular, the expected utility 
theorem) are simply the logical implications of those 
axions.2 The only question of adequacy that can arise 
with respect to such a theory concerns, whether the 
deductions have been properly carried out. I don't 
doubt the logical abilities of orthodox theorists and I 
grant that orthodox theory is perfectly adequate from 
the formal point of view. But to take this stance 
towards orthodox theory renders it inadequate for the 
deduction of a moral theory. For if the theory does 
not tell us how we ought as rational individuals to act, 
or how we do as rational individuals act, then the theory 
is powerless to tell us how as rational individuals we 
ought or would act in situations like that envisaged 
under the equiprobability model. These remarks suggest
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that the appropriate meta-level stances for our 
purposes ate the normative and empirical stances. As a 
normative theory, orthodox theory would be regarded as 
a system which yields prescriptions for rational choice,
i.e., it would tell us how, as rational individuals, we 
ought to act even if in fact we do not act that way; in 
particular, it would tell us that we ought to choose or 
act so as to maximize expected utility. As an empirical 
theory orthodox theory would be regarded as a system 
which yields empirical hypotheses about actual human 
behaviour; in particular, it would tell us that 
individuals actually do choose or act so as to maximize 
expected utility. It will be my intention in this paper 
to show that it is at iBas-t problematic that orthodox 
theory is adequate from the normative standpoint, 
although I believe we cannot come to any definite 
conclusions as to the adequacy of orthodox theory con­
ceived of as a normative theory, and I will also show 
that orthodox theory is definitely inadequate as an 
empirical theory. It is the question of the adequacy 
of orthodox theory conceived of as an empirical theory 
that will be of prime concern in this chapter for it is 
this question, I believe, which has a definite answer.
To show that orthodox theory is inadequate as an 
empirical theory we have to do two things. We not only 
have to indicate what empirical data apparently shows
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orthodox theory is inadequate, we also have to show that 
orthodox theory or decision theory generally is capable 
of being shown to be inadequate by such data, i.e., that 
it has empirical content, As we shall see it has been 
denied that decision theory has empirical content. So 
what we need here is some characterization of when a 
theory does or does not have empirical content. I will 
assume that a theory has empirical content if and only 
if there are specifiable empirical conditions such that 
if they obtain then this falsifies the central hypotheses 
of the theory. As we shall see, however, we do not 
require of every hypothesis that should these conditions 
apparently obtain then the hypothesis must be abandoned. 
For we allow that there may be very good reasons - even 
reasons that are consistent with a falsificationist point 
of view - for clinging to a hypothesis in the face of 
apparently conflicting evidence, and in such cases we 
simply revise our estimate of that evidence.^ The 
assumption that a theory has empirical content if and 
only if it is falsifiable is, I realize, a very large 
assumption but it would take us too far afield to 
establish it in this thesis. In any case, as will become 
apparent, it appears to be an assumption shared by our 
opponents.
Our argument will also require two theses which are of 
crucial importance and which will be argued for more
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fully in the following interpolation. Until then I ask 
the reader to merely assume their truth. Each thesis 
requires the rebuttal of a distinct version of a vener­
able argument that has become generally known as the 
"Logical Connection Argument", This argument, usually 
addressed against the causal theorist of action, asserts 
that the relation between a reason and its action is of 
a "logical" or "conceptual" nature. The first of the 
two theses required is that we may have independent 
aacess to a person's reason for acting. A reason we will 
understand in the usual way to consist of a belief and 
a preference (or a desire or a want). To say that we 
have•independent access to a person's reasons is to say 
that we may positively identify a person’s beliefs and 
preferences without inferring them from the performance 
of the action for which those beliefs and preferences are 
the reason. This thesis of independent access should not 
be confused with another quite distinct thesis. Our 
thesis does not deny, what is no doubt true, that by and 
large we identify a person's beliefs and preferences via 
their actions (where we understand verbal behaviour to be 
In the category of action). The thesis of independent 
access merely denies that our only way of knowing a 
person's beliefs and preferences is to infer them from 
the performance of the action which those beliefs and 
preferences predict or explain (i.e., for which they are
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the reason). Now as we will be claiming that we may 
genuinely explain or predict human action on the basis 
of a person’s beliefs and preferences we clearly require 
the thesis of independent access, otherwise such explan­
ations or predictions are, as we shall later say (section 
5) , epistemicaHy civcutav,
The second thesis required is that the relation 
between a person's reason and his action is in some sense 
contingent. More specifically we require that where R 
is the reason for the action A, then the conditional "If 
R occurs then A occurs" may be false, i.e., the ante­
cedent be true and the consequent false. We require 
that'such a conditional may be false even when there is 
no CQuntervailing reason /? ’ that occurs: i? ’ is a 
countervailing reason to R just when R ' is the reason for 
A ' and in performing A ’ the agent cannot perform A .
That is, we require that the conditional "If R occurs 
then A occurs" may be false and not only when it is true 
that the individual had the reason R but fails to perform 
the action A because he changed his mind. We will also 
require that such a conditional may be false even when 
R occurs under optimal conditions, We may not be able 
to fully specify these conditions but we have in mind 
that the individual does not suffer a sudden attack of 
paralysis, a sudden attack of amnesia, does not suffer a 
sudden death, and so on. This second thesis I will refer
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tp, for short, as the thesis of contingent reason— 
action conditionals, This thesis should not be 
confused with another quite distinct thesis - its 
converse - which we can call the thesis of contingent 
action - reason conditionals. The thesis of contingent 
action - reason conditionals would assert that the 
conditional "If A occurs then i? occurs" is contingent. 
We will allow that such a thesis may be false because 
the sentence "A occurs" entails the sentence "i? occurs". 
But, as we shall see, the truth of this thesis is not 
required by our argument, and even if it is false that 
does not show that the thesis required by our argument • 
the thesis of contingent reason ~ action conditionals - 
is false. To be sure, if the thesis of contingent 
action - reason conditionals is false then that may be 
sufficient to show that reasons cannot be the causes of 
actions. But our argument that decision theory has 
empirical content does not require that reasons be the 
causes of actions. For while we will say that some 
appropriately modified and universalized conditional 
like "If R occurs then A occurs" may function as a law­
like statement in the explanation and prediction of 
human action, as Carl Hampel has argued there are true 
laws employed in scientific explanations and predict­
ions which are not causal in character^. Our only 
concern in attempting to determine whether decision
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theory has empirical content is whether such a conditional 
is falsifiable, not with whether .it expresses a causal 
connection.
Moreover, even if the thesis of contingent action - 
reason conditionals is false, i.e., that the conditional 
"If A occurs then R oc-curs" cannot be false, this does 
not require that we abandon the thesis of independent 
access. The thought that this may be otherwise is 
prompted by the following idea. Suppose we establish by 
independent means that for some person R occurs. And 
also suppose that we observe his behaviour and assert 
that A ’ occurs. If we grant that "A' occurs" entails 
"i? ’ occurs", and i? ’ is a countervailing reason to R , 
then we must revise our original reason ascription based 
on independent means; we must say that his reason was 
not really i? but i? '. However, note that for it to be 
the case that we must revise our original reason 
ascription it must be the case that we describe or count 
his behaviour as the performing of the action A', We 
need not so describe his behaviour; we could say that he 
failed to perform any action. And this is quite con­
sistent with his having the reason R, provided the thesis 
of contingent reason — action conditionals is true, for 
then "7? occurs" may be true and "A occurs" be false (and 
"A occurs" will, of course, be false if the individual 
has failed to perform any action). These points will be
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referred to again in section 5 and an amplification of 
them will be given then.
Finally, we will distinguish between three types of 
rationality of three senses of "rational". We will speak 
of formal practical rationality, epistemic rationality 
and ends rationality.^ An individual exhibits ends 
rationality when his preferences are consistent, i.e., 
when they are complete and transitive (see Chapter II 
section 2). A person exhibits epistemic rationality 
when his beliefs are consistent and correct by our 
standards (see section 6 of this chapter). A person 
exhibits formal practical rationality when he acts in a 
maximizing fashion relative to his beliefs and prefer­
ences. Notice that for a person to exhibit formal 
practical rationality it is not necessary that he have 
any particular beliefs or any particular values.
Although, of course, as we saw in Chapter II section 2, 
if an individual is to choose in a maximizing fashion 
relative to his beliefs and preferences then his prefer­
ences must at least be consistent. We will call the 
claim that all individuals exhibit formal practical 
rationality the Rationality Principle: our terminology 
here follows that of Popper® and Watkins^. Our primary 
concern in this chapter will be to argue that the 
Rationality Principle has empirical content,for a theory 
of decision is simply an attempt to give a more precise
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specification of that principle, Let us now look at 
the adequacy- of the specification of that principle 
given by orthodox decision theory; in the first instance 
we consider this question from the empirical standpoint.
2. Falsifying Orthodox Theory ;The Tversky-^Kahneman 
Experiment.
As we have already noted (Chapter II section 2) if 
we assume that a person's preferences obey certain 
conditions, i.e., that they are consistent and that they 
obey the Probabtistic Equivalence Postulate and the 
Sure-^thing Principle, then we may deduce the expected 
utility theorem. This theorem says that the utility of 
a lottery is equal to the sum of the products of the 
utility of each of the (mutually exclusive and exhaustive) 
outcomes times its probability. Thus for some lottery L 
consisting of the outcomes 0^ and 0  ^ at probabilities p 
and (1 ~ p^) respectively, we have;
U^.(L) = p^. U^(O^) + (1 p p .  u p o p
This says something very important about a person's 
preferences : it says that the value any person ascribes 
to a lottery will simply be equal to the lottery's math­
ematically expected utility. But, as was remarked in
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Chapter II, orthodox decision theory is not simply a 
theory that characterizes a person's preferences; it also 
says something about how people act. As Donald Davidson 
says, "The second part of the theory relates action to 
preferences"®; it says that a person with a set of 
preferences so characterized always chooses that action 
(alternative) - from among those available to him at the 
moment - such that no other has a higher expected utility. 
That is, orthodox theory claims that an individual acts 
so as to maximize expected utility. Thus orthodox 
decision theory can be seen as providing a more specific 
formulation of the rationality Principle. An individual 
is supposed to have a certain set of beliefs - he believes 
that certain alternatives are available to him at the 
moment with outcomes at certain probabilities; he has a 
certain set of preferences - in particular, they are 
consistent and obey the Probablistic Equivalence Postulate 
and the Sure-thing Principle; and it is claimed that the 
individual will choose in a maximizing fashion relative 
to those beliefs and preferences, i.e., he will choose 
the alternative with the highest expected utility.
But a problem for orthodox decision theory arises 
from the fact that it does not seem to be true that 
individuals act so as to maximize expected utility. 
Consider the following favourite example of Harsanyi's. 
Suppose that an individual is willing to pay $5 for a
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lottery ticket that will give him a 1/1000 chance of 
winning $1,000. Harsanyi then asks, "Row will the theory 
of vNM utility functions explain the fact that he is 
willing to gamble at such highly unfavourable odds?"® 
Harsanyi says, "The explanation will be obviously in 
terms of the retative importance he assigns to the 
possibility of winning $1,000 as against the relative 
importance he assigns to the possibility of losing the 
$5 he will invest." That is, we explain the apparent 
fact that this individual is not maximizing expected 
utility by supposing that this particular individual's 
marginal utility for money sharply increases at or 
about $1,000. This explanation may carry some weight 
with respect to certain cases, for example, when, as 
Harsanyi points out, there are important complementar­
ities among the commodities the individual could buy at 
or about $IpOO. I surmise, however, that there will not 
always be such complementaries and as a consequence an 
appeal to marginal utility will, in these cases, have 
little persuasive force. It would appear more plausible 
to say that the individual likes gambling.
Be that as it may we can put the matter to one side 
for the power and importance of the experiment to which 
I shall now refer resides in the fact that it demonstrates 
that an appeal to decreasing or increasing marginal 
utility will not suffice for a defence of orthodox theory.
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In the Tversky^Kahneman^o experiment subjects were 
asked to choose between A a,nd B, and C and D in the 
following situation;
Choice I ; A = (1,000, 1/2, 0) B = (400)
Choice II : B = (1,000, lAO, O) D = (400, 1/5, 0)
Without going into the details of the experimental design 
we can simply note that a variety of subjects were asked 
in Choice I to choose between receiving $1,000 or $0 with 
probability k or $400 with a probability of 1. A similar 
interpretation applies to Choice II. But apparently nearly 
all subjects chose B over Af and C over D , and analogous 
results were obtained using different payoffs and probab­
ilities. These results seem to falsify orthodox theory.
How so?
Initially suppose that utility is a linear function 
of monetary payoff and let the utility of $0 = 0, i.e., 
u(,0) = 0, Then the expected utility of 4 is;
u (A) = % X u (1,000) t % X u (0) = 500
and
u(B) = 1 X u(400) = 400
On the assumption then that the utility of money is a 
linear function of monetary payoff when the individuals 
choose B over A they do not choose the alternative that
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maximizes expected utility. The obvious response on the 
part of the orthodox theorist is to point out that the 
utility of money is not a linear function of monetary 
payoff, rather it is ' margtnally decreasing. (Notice 
that it is this sort of approach that is taken by 
Harsanyi in the case discussed above). But then if in 
choosing B rather than A the individuals are to choose 
the alternative that maximizes expected utility it will 
have to be the case that u (1,000)<800 for then the 
expected utility of A is less than 400 while that of B 
is equal to 400. However we then have;
u(C) = 1/10 X u (1,000) + 9/10 X u(0)< 80
u(D) = 1/5 X u(400) + 4/5 x u (0) = 80
That is, the expected utility of C is less than the 
expected utility of D , and yet subjects choose C over 
D . In other words, if we say that individuals in 
choosing B over A choose the alternative that maximizes 
expected utility because utility for money is marginally 
decreasing, then this implies that when individuals 
choose C over D they do not choose the alternative that 
maximizes utility. That is, it does not seem that the 
orthodox theorist can claim that in both the choice of 
B over A and in the choice of C over D individuals 
hhoose so as to maximize expected utility. Hence if the
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orthodox theorist puts his theory forward as an empirical 
theory it seems to have been falsified; it is not the 
case that individuals act so as to maximize expected 
utility,
I now want to consider three possible responses 
that the orthodox theorist who still wishes to present 
his theory as an empirical theory could make to the above 
experiment and argument. None of these responses will,
I believe, suffice; the first because it is irrelevant, 
and the second and third because they involve the intro­
duction of seriously ad hoc auxiliary hypotheses. The 
first response involves a device commonly favoured by 
supporters of the expected utility approach that was 
introduced by Milton Friedman and L J Savage; this is the 
idea that marginal utility curves have inflexion points^ 
i.e., that a marginal curve may decrease and increase 
(i.e., be S-shaped). But this device is not sufficient 
here, for the Tversky-Kahneman experiment shows that if 
we stick to the claim that individuals are maximizing 
expected utility in the choice of A over B and C over D 
then we must admit (using the numerical values previously 
mentioned) that $1,000 has a value less than 800 (in 
Choice I) and greater than 800 (in Choice II). But this 
is not even possible for utility curves with inflexion 
points. However, the mention of $1,000 having two 
different values in Choice I and Choice II suggests a
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second response, and this is to introduce the auxiliary 
hypothesis that the subjects’ preferences changed over 
time from Choice I to Choice II, Well this is certainly 
possible but this hypothesis does seem to be purely ad 
hoox it is merely introduced, without further evidence 
to save orthodox theory from strong counter-evidence.
The third response involves the subjects’ beliefs: we 
introduce the hypothesis that we incorrectly assessed 
the subjects beliefs concerning which alternatives were 
available and at what probabilities. But once again, 
for similar reasons, this too seems an ad hoc hypothesis, 
Nonetheless, I do not want to suggest that it is 
always unjustifiable to introduce apparently ad hoc 
hypotheses to protect the central hypotheses of a theory 
from apparently falsifying instances to those central 
hypotheses. I suggested as much in the opening section 
of this chapter. The idea here rests on the distinction 
between the content of a theory or hypothesis and how we 
treat that theory or hypothesis; a theory or hypothesis 
ma.y have empirical content, i.e., it may be falsifiable, 
but we may treat that hypothesis, for good reasons, even 
reasons consistent with a general falsificationist view 
point, as unfalsifiable, Here I follow Watkins in 
claiming that we are sometimes justified, even on 
falsificationist grounds, in clinging to the central 
hypotheses of our theory in the face of conflicting
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e v i d e n c e ^ W a t k i n s  calls such hypotheses principlest 
a principle is a privileged component of a theory that 
is treated as unfalsifiable in the interest of the 
falsifiability of the whole system. As examples of 
principles in science we could cite the conservation 
laws of mass-energy and that space-time is continuous. 
Notice that as a matter of psychological fact such 
principles may be such that we come to say that we 
cannot imagine them to be false, we find it inconceiv­
able that there should be a falsifying instance to them: 
for example, it is surely an empirical (i.e., falsifiable) 
hypothesis that space-time is continuous, and thus that 
it is possible that an object is in one place up until 
time t, and then is just in another place after time t, 
and yet if we came across such a case we would say that 
this just cannot be - or measuring instruments or some­
thing else must have been in error. And to treat such 
principles in this way is quite consistent with a general 
falsificationist approach to science: for to give up 
such a principle would play havoc with our ability to 
explain and, in particular, predict empirical phenomena 
that could falsify our system - our physical theories - 
in any way at all. In effect, to give up such a principle, 
unless we can find another to replace it - and with these 
principles it just is very difficult to imagine what 
could replace them — would be to give up doing science.
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I want to suggest that some formulation of the Rationality 
Principle is just such a principle; it is falsifiable 
but it is treated as unfalsifiable for without it our 
ability to explain and predict human action would be 
seriously diminished. Nonetheless, such principles are 
not sacrosanct; they may be replaced if something better 
comes along. And in my view we have just such a situation 
with respect to orthodox decision theory; its formulation 
of the Rationality Principle cannot accommodate the 
results of the Tversky—Kahneman experiment and its 
formulation is replaceable by another which can accomm­
odate the results.
If we want to say, as I think we should, that the 
Rationality Principle in some formulation is not to be 
abandoned, i.e., we wish to keep the general idea that 
all individuals act in a maximizing way relative to their 
beliefs and preferences, and as it seems clear from the 
Tversky-Kahneman experiment that individuals do not act 
so as to maximize expected utility, then it must be the 
case that the utility they ascribe to an alternative is 
not equal to its expected utility. But as we saw we may 
deduce the expected utility theorem, i.e., the theorem 
that says that the utility of an alternative, in part­
icular, a lottery, is equal to its expected utility, if 
an individuals’ preferences are consistent and obey the 
Probablistic Equivalence Postulate and the Sure-thing
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g^nclple, In which case, by modus toltens f it must be 
that an individual’s preferences do not obey all these 
conditions. Now experimental tests to determine whether 
people’s preferences are actually consistent have been, 
to say the least, inconclusive.^^ And more importantly, 
as we shall see in section 6, there is a strong argument 
to the effect that if we are to be able to ascribe 
preferences to an individual at all we must presuppose 
that his preferences are consistent. Hence, any problem 
with our characterization of the relation of preference 
must reside with The Probablistic Equivalence Postulate 
and/or The Sure-thing Principle, Of these two conditions 
it is interesting to note that Harsanyi says they;
presuppose that the decision maker has no 
specific utility or disutility for gambling 
as such .,, (they) assume that the decision 
maker will take a purely result-orientated 
attitude towards lotteries, and will derive 
all his utility or disutility from the prizes 
he may or may not win through those lotteries, 
rather than from the act of gambling itself.
We can see this when we consider once again what 
is required by these two principles. Recall that the 
Probablistic Equivalence Postulate required, in particular.
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that an individual be indifferent between a one stage 
and a two stage lottery if they were probabilistically 
equivalent. But this condition will not hold for an 
individual who likes gambling; such an individual will 
not be indifferent between a one stage lottery and a 
two stage lottery even if they are probabilistically 
equivalent just because the latter presents him with the 
opportunity of gambling twice whereas with the former 
he can only gamble once, A parallel argument can be 
advanced for an individual who does not like gambling.
The Sure-thing Principle also presupposes that individuals 
do not like or dislike gambling, or rather, more 
accurately, it presupposes that they will take a purely 
Vesult-ovi-entated attitude towards lotteries. In part­
icular, it presupposes that individuals are not risk 
averse, i.e., that they value certaintÿ as such. For, as 
we noted, the Sure-thing Principle requires that if an 
individual prefers a non-risky alternative to a risky 
alternative, then he will not prefer a lottery involving 
the latter to a lottery involving the former if the 
lotteries are otherwise equivalent. But this will not 
hold for an individual who values certainty as such just 
because it may have been the non-risky alternative's 
advantage of certainty that made it attractive relative 
to the risky alternative, and this advantage disappears 
when both alternatives are imbedded in a lottery.
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It is easy enough to demonstrate that there is a 
failure of at least one of the above conditions for the 
individuals in the Tversky-Kahneman experiment, (Tversky 
offers a similar argument but in terms of the Reduction 
Assumption and the Substitution Assumption,which, as we 
noted, also required what the Probablistic Equivalence 
Postulate and the Sure-thing Principle required respect­
ively) . According to the Probabilistic Equivalence 
Postulate the compound lottery {A, 1/5,0) is indifferent 
to the simple lottery C . Similarly, according to that 
condition (B, 1/5,0) is indifferent to D, But now, by 
the Sure-thing Principle, if B is preferred to A,, as seems 
to be the case for the individuals in the Tversky- 
Kahneman experiment, then any probability mixture of A 
with O will not be preferred to the same probability 
mixture of B with 0, In particular, (A, 1/5,0) will not 
be preferred to {B, 1/5,0), But as the subjects choose 
C over D ±tdoes seem that the individuals prefer (A, 1/5, 
O) to (8, 1/5,0).
What is going on here? Tversky suggest that we are 
witnessing what he calls "the certainty effect". That is, 
for the subjects in the Tversky-Kahneman experiment.
the utility of a positive outcome appears 
greater when it is certain than when it is 
embedded in a gamble,^^
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Let us entertain this hypothesis that individuals value 
certainty as such, i.e.,, that they are risk averse. Given 
this hypothesis we explain the choice of B over A not by 
saying that u(400)> h x u (1,000), but by saying that # 
enjoys a certainty advantage over A. In other words, we 
drop the claim that u (1,000)< 300-although we grant that 
the utility of money is marginally decreasing such that 
u(l,000)< 1,000 but reject the idea that the rate of 
decrease is rapid enough to ensure that u (1,000)< 800 - 
and instead simply say that B is chosen over A because B 
has a certainty advantage over A. This implies that in 
choosing C over D the individuals choose that alternative 
which maximizes expected utility, but that, of course, in 
choosing B over A they do not.
Pretty clearly, however, orthodox decision theory 
cannot entertain this hypothesis, for then the orthodox 
theorist must allow that individuals do not always act so 
as to maximize expected utility. Note that we have not, 
however, had to abandon the idea that individuals act in 
a maximizing fashion relative to their beliefs and prefer­
ences. We still subscribe to the view that individuals 
act in a way that maximizes utility relative to their 
preferences (and beliefs), but we now suppose that they 
have a preference for certainty as such, i.e., that they 
place a higher utility on a (positive) outcome when it is 
certain than when it is embedded in gamble. But orthodox
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theory cannot suppose this for, as we already argued, the 
Sure-thing Principle rules out that a (positive) outcome 
should have a higher utility v;hen it is certain than when 
it is embedded in a gamble; The Sure-thing Principle 
precludes an individual from valuing certainty as such. 
Hence, while we have not had to abandon the Rationality 
Principle we have seen that the orthodox theorist's form­
ulation of it is empirically inadequate.^®
Davidson also considers the Tversky-Kahneman exper­
iment but he comes to a conclusion seemingly quite at 
variance with the one reached above: Davidson thinks that 
the Tversky-Kahneman experiment does not falsify decision 
theory, but rather highlights the unfalsifiability of 
decision theory. Davidson a r g u e s t h a t  what is crucial 
is what description we give to the alternatives. We can 
describe the alternatives in such a way that decision 
theory is not necessarily falsified by the results of the 
Tversky-Kahneman experiment. He suggests that:
,,. the reason subjects shy away from A is 
that the zero outcome should be described as 
missing out on the prospect of getting $400 
for certain. Put differently, the lack of 
risk in B had a value of its own. Given 
this assumption, decision theory is not 
necessarily falsified by the results.^®
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1 agree with Davidson that we can describe the alternatives 
in such a way that given the assumption that people 
disvalue risk the results of the Tversky-Kahneman exper­
iment do not falsify decision theory. But such a theory 
would not be orthodox theory, i.e., a theory which main­
tains that individuals maximize expected utility and that 
their preferences obey the Sure-thing Principle, For 
orthodox decision theory such descriptions are irrelevant 
because that theory specifically excludes the possibility 
that individuals value lack of risk; it is just not open 
for the orthodox theorist to assume that "the lack of risk 
on B had a value of its own."
So while the Tversky-Kahneman experiment may not 
have falsified some theory of decision, viz,, some 
unorthodox theory which assumes that individuals value 
certainty as such, it would be mistaken to conclude from 
this that decision theory and, in particular, orthodox 
theory is unfalsifiable, To do so would be to confuse 
two incompatible theories both of which might be properly 
called a theory of decision making. On the one hand we 
have orthodox theory - this theory we've argued is false.
On the other hand we have a theory which claims that 
individuals act so as to maximize utility and that they 
ascribe utility to lack of risk - such a theory has not 
been shown to be false, ft would thus be a mistake to 
confuse these two theories and if we do confuse them then
153
it would not be surprising that we should erroneously 
conclude that decision theory is unfalsifiable.
The point can be put in another way. The Rationality 
Principle has not been falsified by the Tversky-Kahneman 
experiment, i.e,, we have not shown that it is false 
that individuals act in a maximizing way relative to their 
beliefs and preferences, i.e., that they act so as to 
maximize utility, if we allow that individuals value 
certainty as such. 3 iven that individuals value certainty 
as such then the individuals in the Tversky-Kahneman 
experiment can still be said to maximize utility when they 
choose the alternatives they do choose. However, the 
formulation of the Rationality Principle given by Orthodox 
theory has been falsified. But we should obviously not 
conlcude from this that the Rationality Principle is 
unfalsifiable, i.e., that it lacks empiridal content. Of 
course, there may be other reasons for thinking that the 
Rationality Principle lacks empirical content and we shall 
consider these after we have considered whether orthodox 
theory can be regarded as adequate from the normative 
standpoint,
3. Orthodox Theory from the Normative Standpoint.
Many decision theorists would not be greatly con­
cerned that orthodox decision theory has been shown to be 
false, for they regard orthodox theory as a
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normative (or prescriptive) theory. They would grant 
that orthodox theory may well be empirically inadequate 
but this does not show that it is normatively inadequate. 
Hence Howard Raifla has said in response to an experiment 
similar to the Tversky-Kahneman experiment;
But no one claims that most people.do behave 
as they ought to behave. Indeed, the primary 
reason for the adoption of a prescriptive or 
normative theory (that is, an "ought to do" 
theory) for choice behaviour is the observ­
ation that when decision making is left 
solely to unguided judgement, choices are 
often made in an internally inconsistent 
fashion, and this indicates that perhaps the 
decision maker could do better than he is 
doing, if people always behaved as this 
prescriptive theory says they ought to, then 
there would be no reason to make a fuss about 
a prescriptive theory. We could then just tell 
people, "Do what comes naturally",^^
Now I think that we can establish a prima facie case 
against orthodox decision theory conceived of as a norm­
ative theory. That is to sayy we can give some reason 
for thinking that it is inadequate and show that some ways
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which attempt to argue for its adequacy are unsuccessful. 
However, in so doing we have not definitely demonstrated 
that orthodox theory is inadequate as a normative theory.
We have only shown that we have some reason to doubt the 
orthodox theorist's claim that his theory is normatively 
adequate and that some attempts to show that it is 
adequate are unsuccessful; this still leaves open the 
possibility that orthodox theory is normatively adequate 
- that there is some, as yet unexamined, argument which 
can show its adequacy. I will give a reason, however, as 
to why the orthodox theorist should not hold out much 
hope for such an argument.
The basic problem here revolves around the notion 
of formal practical rationality, As we said, an individual 
exhibits formal practical rationality when he acts in a 
maximizing fashion relative to his beliefs and preferences, 
i.e., when he acts so as to maximize utility relative to 
his beliefs and preferences. Now this is a very "thin" 
sense of rationality; it does not require that an indiv­
idual have any particular beliefs or that he value or 
disvalue anything in particular, although, as we noted, 
it does require that an individual's preferences at least 
be consistent (i.e., that they be complete and transitive). 
It is this sense of "rational" which is endemic to the 
contemporary Western characterization of rational man,^°
And it is not difficult to see why this should be so.
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First, this sense is so thin that we feel inclined to 
say that if it isn’t rational to act in a maximizing way, 
relative to one's beliefs and preferences, what is?
Second, this thinner sense is less problematic than any 
thicker sense: it is far less problematic to say how an 
individual, qua rational man, is to act given his prefer­
ences, rather than to say what an individual, qua rational 
man, is to value. (We ignore the problem of what an 
individual, qua rational man, is to believe as this is 
not germane to our present discussion.) Hence decision 
theorists are, as Tversky remarks, "eager to tell people 
how to act, in the tight of their vatues:, but they are 
very reluctant to tell people how to feel, or what 
values they should have,”^^  In other words, decision 
theorists have been keen to tell people how to act if they 
are to act rationally in the formal practical sense.
How does the orthodox theorist tell people to act 
if they are to act rationally? As we have seen he tells 
them to act so as to maximize expected utility. But if in 
so doing an individual is to maximize utility relative kto 
his preferences, i.e., if he is to act in the formal 
practical rational manner at all, then his preferences 
must obey certain conditions, in particular, the Sure- 
thing Principle, which ensure that the utility of an 
alternative (lottery) is equal to its expected utility.
But as we saw the Sure-thing. Principle precluded an 
individual from having certain values, in particular, it
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precluded an individual from valuing certainty as such. 
Hence, when the orthodox theorist tells people how to 
act if they are to act rationally, the sense of "rational" 
here goes well beyond the formal practical sense alluded 
to above.
Suppose the orthodox theorist now advances his 
theory as a normative theory, i.e., he admits that 
individuals are not actually rational, in his sense, but 
nonetheless they ought to be. But as the orthodox 
theorist’s sense of "rational" goes beyond the formal 
practical sense and requires that an individual not have 
certain values, in particular, that he not value certainty 
as such, it is clear that the orthodox theorist is now 
advancing a theory which prescribes certain values on 
the grounds that it is rational to have certain values 
and not others. But what grounds could there be for 
supposing that it is rational to not value certainty as 
such? Clearly, the grounds do not come from a consider­
ation of what it is to be rational in the minimal and 
exceptionally compelling sense of formal practical ration­
ality, for this sense of rationality just does not require 
that an individual not have certain values,
A hint of a justification is given by the 
emphasized part of the quotation from Raiffa given above; 
that if individuals do not value certainty as such then 
they will do better in their choice behaviour than if they
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do value certainty as such. But this will only be true, 
for example in the case of the Tversky-Kahneman experiment, 
if it is true that the utility of an alternative can be 
simply identified with the monetary payoffs. That is, 
individuals will do better in situations like the 
Tversky-Kahneman experiment at least in terms of expected 
monetary gains if they do not allow their choice to be 
affected by their attitude towards certainty. But the 
point demonstrated by the Tversky-Kahneman experiment is 
precisely that individuals do not simply identify utility 
with monetary payoffs. In other words, individuals 
would do better in terms of results if they took a purely 
resuit-orientated approach to choice, but individuals do 
not take such an approach because it is not just the 
results to which they ascribe utility, they also ascribe 
utility to the amount of risk involved in achieving those 
results. So the question still remains, how can we show 
that individuals ought to take a purely result-orientated 
approach to lotteries, i.e., that they ought not to value 
certainty?
Another way that we might attempt to justify the 
view that individuals ought to take a result-orientated 
attitude towards risk taking is suggested by Harsanyi^ 
he appeals to paradigm cases of rational decision makers - 
individuals whom we would regard as the epitome of wise 
and prudent men. Here Harsanyi cites responsible
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business executives using their shareholders money and 
responsible political leaders acting on behalf of their 
constituents. As he says, such individuals are expected 
to achieve the best possible results. But I do not find 
this argument at all convincing just because it is not 
clear that such individuals are simply expected to 
achieve the best possible results. Normally, of course, 
such individuals are judged simply on the results they 
achieve and this because normally shareholders and 
constituents are not aware of the day-to-day decisions 
(and certainly not the details thereof) being made by 
their leaders; all they have to go on is the results 
achieved. But this fact is surely quite incidental. 
Suppose that a business executive was required to make 
a choice like that in the Tversky-Kahneman experiment 
and his shareholders knew the details of the decision 
situation. Would they not regard a choice of A over B 
as irresponsible? For afterall, in his choosing A 
rather than B his shareholders would realize that they 
are missing out on the prospect of getting $400 for 
certain. Would not the shareholders regard such an 
executive as a fellow far too willing to take risks? 
Certainly if the shareholders were anything like the 
ordinary men and women who were the subjects in the 
Tversky-Kahneman experiment they would, .Now my argument 
here, of course, presupposes two things. First, not
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only that shareholders (and constituents) vHtt value 
certainty - a safe enough assumption in virtue of the 
fact that a variety of subjects were chosen for the 
Tversky-Kahneman experiment — but also that it is not 
the case that they ought to take a result-orientated 
approach. About this assumption I remark that it is 
difficult to see, much as before, what argument could be 
offered for the claim that shareholders (or constituents) 
ought to take a result-orientated attitude towards risk- 
taking. Second, I have assumed that by a "responsible 
business executive" we mean an individual who would be so 
regarded by his shareholders if they knew the details of 
his decision making. Now if Harsanyi does not mean by 
the term "responsible" what I mean by that term (in the 
present context) then he at least owes us some account of 
what he does mean by that term. And obviously if his 
examples are going to do the job he has set them, i.e., 
justifying the claim that decision makers ought to take 
a result—orientated approach, then we had better have a 
grip on the notion of responsible decision maker which is 
independent of the notion of a decision maker who takes 
a purely result-orientated approach; we cannot justify 
anything merely by definition.
The reader may grant that no argument has been 
offered as to why rational individuals ought not to 
value certainty, but now ask, "What argument is there
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to show that such a claim is mistaken?" My response is 
to say that I have no conclusive argument and I don’t 
see how there could be, but 1 also don’t see how there 
could be a conclusive argument to the contrary. All I 
can offer is a prima facie case against the claim that 
individuals ought not to value certainty by pointing out 
that individuals whom we intuitively regard as perfectly 
rational - and here I have in mind not only the subjects 
of the Tversky-Kahneman experiment but also decision 
theorists such as Watkins and Maurice Allais who have 
thought that it is perfectly reasonable not to take a 
result-orientated approach to risk-taking - do value 
certainty as such. But I can offer no conclusive 
argument that the claim that individuals ought not to 
value certainty is mistaken. Equally no conclusive 
argument has been offered to the contrary. And the 
reason for this is, as I ’ve said, that it is problematic 
what an individual , qua rational man, ought to value; 
it is difficult to see what argument could be offered 
here. To be sure attempts have been made in the 
Aristotelian and Kantian tradition to determine what ends 
a man simply as a rational man must have. And an 
orthodox theorist might now attempt such an approach 
himself. Now my point is not simply that such approaches 
are notoriously difficult of execution but also that it 
is difficult to see how these approaches are relevant to
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the preference for certainty: is it at all plausible, 
for example, to suppose that not valuing certainty as 
such is necessary if a man is to achieve eudaimonia?
To be sure, we may be able to get much further in spec­
ifying what an individual, qua moral man, ought to value, 
and we will return to this issue in Chapter V, In the 
meantime I suggest that the most fruitful approach to 
decision theory is to regard it as an empirical theory: 
questions of adequacy are, it seems to me, on this 
approach capable of definite answers. But before going 
on to consider some arguments which attempt to show that 
decision theory lacks empirical content, I want to 
briefly consider an argument which asserts that the 
claim that individuals act so as to maximize utility 
relative to their behaviour is obviously false, even 
allowing that individuals' preferences may include a 
preference for certainty as such. A consideration of 
the reply we make to this argument may give some added 
plausibility to the claim of those who maintain that 
the Rationality Principle lacks empirical content.
4, '^Subf eotive^'^ '^Ethicgl^  ^and ’^Overall" Preferences
We start with the observation that it just seems 
to be a fact that there are many cases where a person 
chooses a certain alternative A over another alternative
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B and yet, as far as we can ascertain, he prefers B 
to 4. Here is a simple and hackneyed example. A 
doctor goes to work in a leper colony somewhere in 
Northern Africa, but he prefers the good life to one of 
relative deprivation, he prefers to treat the typical 
middle class diseases to treating leprosy, he prefers a 
cool climate to a hot climate, and so on. Nonetheless, 
he chooses to work among the lepers because he believes 
he ought to do so. As a consequence it seems to be false 
to say that all individuals act in a maximizing fashion 
relative to their beliefs and preference, i.e., the 
Rationality Principle seems to be false.
However, the decision theorist will reply that the 
above argument founders on a too narrow conception of 
preference: decision theory should not be identified with 
the naive and now discredited theory of psychological 
egoism.^® Rather, we should, with Harsanyi, distinguish 
between a person's subjective and ethical preferences.
A person's subjective preferences are basically self- 
interested - they concern his welfare as he conceives it. 
On the other hand, a person's ethical preferences are 
defined by the equiprobality model (see Chapter II section 
3). That is, they "express what this individual prefers 
(or,rather, would prefer) on the basis of impersonal 
social considerations a l o n e " , Harsanyi gives an 
indication of what we are to do with this distinction
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when commenting on a paper by Kurt Baier.^® He asks 
the question of whether people can act contrary to their 
preferences (as is suggested by the example mentioned 
in the first paragraph)? His reply suggests that we 
make the following sort of response to that question.
We distinguish between a person's subjective preferences 
and his truly overall preferences which we define as 
those that govern his actual behaviour. A person's 
truly overall preferences represent a compromise between 
his subjective and ethical preferences. The question 
as to whether people act contrary to their preferences 
can now be answered by saying that of course a person 
may act contrary to his subjective preferences but that 
they cannot act contrary to their truly overall prefer­
ences. (Of course, the force of the "cannot" here is of 
prime importance in our argument concerning the empirical 
status of decision theory, but we put that problem to 
one side for the moment). In other words, the sense of 
"preference" we are after when we say that all individ­
uals act in a maximizing way relative to their prefer­
ences (and beliefs), is more or less the sense of "want" 
alluded-, to by William Alston:
a sense of "want"that extends more widely than 
just the concept of a direction towards goals 
that are inherently attractive. For often ...
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one intentionally brings about a state of 
affairs that is not attractive in itself ... 
we are fishing for something like the notion 
of a disposition to "strive for" S, regard­
less of what the source of this striving is .
I grant that even the distinction between subjective 
preferences and ethical preferences may not give sufficient 
structure to the notion of preference to enable us to 
account for all the behaviour which is counter to subject­
ive preference. As Amartya Sen has pointed out it is 
unclear what Harsanyi would say of those cases where an 
individual "departs from his personal welfare maximiz­
ation ... not through an impartial concern for all, but 
through a sense of commitment to some particular group, 
say to the neighbourhood or to the social class to which 
he b e l o n g s . N o n e t h e l e s s ,  the distinction is suffic­
ient to defuse the sort of counter-example we have 
mentioned above and we will suppose, for ease of argument, 
that in talking of subjective and ethical preferences 
we have exhausted the category of preference. The imp­
ortant point for our purposes is to simply note that the 
notion of preference employed in decision theory is wider 
than that found in ordinary discourse: the utility ascribed 
to an outcome is supposed to represent the value placed 
on that outcome by an individual from all viewpoints -
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the selfish, self-interested, social, ethical and so on.
5. The Firrst Argument for the Empirioal Vacuity of 
Deoj:si,on Theory: Dee'is'ion Theory is ^'Soft'^edged",
The argument I will consider in this section has been 
succinctly put by Philip Pettit in an article where he 
claims that decision theory, or what he calls "Rational 
Man Theory" is "soft-edged". By which he means that any 
time an action occurs which is not in accord with the 
beliefs and(Overall) preferences which we have determined 
independently28 in advance of that action we can always 
amend the ascription of preference and/or belief that we 
originally gave to the individual whose action we are 
attempting to explain. As Pettit says:
... this is to say that we put down what 
seemed like an anomalous observation as being 
merely a mistake; we discount it and cling to 
the theory. The move is always at our disposal 
and, more than this, it is one to which we are a 
always forced. For we cannot begin to imagine 
what it would be like to resort to any of the 
deeper responses in squaring rational man 
theory with observed behaviour.
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Now it completety misses the point to respond to 
Pettit's argument by saying, "Its perfectly easy to 
imagine the sort of case to which Pettit refers - medicine 
is packed with theories about physiological reactions.
It is perfectly possible that a person should have certain 
beliefs and preferences and then act in a non-maximizing 
way relative to those beliefs and preferences". The 
quick and obvious reply to this argument is to say that 
what these physiological theories describe are reactions^ 
mere bodily movements, not actions. It is inconceivable 
that an individual should act in a non-maximizing way 
relative to his beliefs and preferences although, of course, 
it is not inconceivable that he should react in a non­
maximizing way. The distinction here is the common place 
one in the philosophy of action between bodily movements 
on the one hand and actions on the other. It is the 
distinction between my arm rising and my raising my arm.
The distinction is often blurred by the fact that the 
term "action" (and, in particular, the term "behaviour") 
is quite often used to refer to bodily movements and 
genuine action. Roughly the full-blooded sense of 
"action" refers to a bodily movement done for a reason 
(or done intentionally). I will not be concerned in 
this thesis to defend the distinction nor to explicate 
it in any greater detail. We will simply take the 
distinction as given and will rest content with a fairly
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rough and intuitive understanding of it. The important 
point is that given this full-blooded sense of action 
then it certainly does seem impossible that a person 
should act contrary to his reasons, i.e., that he should 
act so as to not maximize utility relative to his beliefs 
and preferences. In which case Pettit’s argument stands 
and it would seem that the Rationality Principle - the 
claim that all individuals act in maximizing way relative 
to their preferences and beliefs - lacks empirical content. 
However, as I will now attempt to show, it does not 
follow from Pettit’s argument that the Rationality 
Principle is empirically vacuous.
Note that Pettit’s argument is basically as follows.
If we describe some individuals bodily movement as the 
performance of an action (or as certain behaviour) then 
it follows that the individual must have had certain 
beliefs and preferences (in particular, beliefs and 
preferences relative to which the action was utility 
maximizing). But if these beliefs and preferences are 
contrary to the ones which we ascribed to the individual 
by independent means in advance of that action then we 
are forced to amend the original ascription of belief 
and/or preference. In other words, Pettit’s argument 
crucially depends on the claim we mentioned in section 1 
that "If A occurs then R occurs" cannot be false. As we 
noted we would allow, that this conditional cannot be
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false. Rut does it follow from the fact that the thesis 
of contingent action-reason conditionals is false that 
the Rationality Principle is unfalsifiable? To see that 
there is no such implication consider what is required for 
there to be a falsifying instance to the Rationality 
Principle. We require that it may be the case that an 
individual has certain beliefs and preferences (determined 
by indepdedent means) and then for it not to be the case 
that he acts in a way that is maximizing relative to those 
beliefs and preferences. In short, we will have a fals­
ifying instance to the Rationality Principle when an 
individual has certain beliefs and preferences and fails 
to act on them. Thus, we can agree with Pettit that if 
we describe some bodily movement as the performance of 
an action then it must have been done for a reason 
relative to which that action was utility maximizing 
(this follows from the putative fact that the thesis of 
contingent action - reason conditionals is false). And 
if that reason is contrary to the reason we originally 
ascribed, i.e., if that reason is such that a certain 
action is utility maximizing relative to it and in 
performing that action the individual cannot perform the 
action which is utility maximizing relative to the origin­
ally ascribed reason, then we must revise our original 
ascription. But note that we have said if we describe 
the bodily movement as the performance of a certain
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action - it is not necessary that we so describe the 
bodily movement. And if we do not describe the bodily 
movement as the performance of an action - we describe 
it merely as a bodily movement - then we are not required 
to revise our original ascription of belief and prefer­
ence. Providing, that it is possible that an individual 
should have certain beliefs and preferences and that he 
should fail to act in a utility maximizing manner relative 
to them, i.e., despite the occurence of this reason all 
that should occur is some bodily movement - no action 
occurs. In other words, provided it is possible the 
conditional "If R occurs then A occurs" is false, i.e., 
that the thesis of contingent reason-action conditionals 
is true.
There are two important points that must be made 
here. First, we must be willing to maintain that the 
individual failed to perform A not simply because he 
performed A ' for which R is the reason and is a 
countervailing reason to R. For if we allowed that the 
only way the conditional "If R occurs then A occurs " 
could be false is that the agent performs some other 
action A ' for which Rf was the reason, then it would 
still be the case that some reason-action conditional 
was true, "If R' occurs then A' occurs", and hence,
in such a case, we would not have a falsifying instance 
to the claim all individuals act in a utility maximizing
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fashion relative to their beliefs and preferences, i.e., 
we would still not have a falsifying instance to the 
Rationality Principle The second point arises from the 
following natural thought. If we establish that a certain 
reason R has occurred, and R occurred in optimal conditions
i.e., we ascertain that the individual is not paralysed 
or that the action A is for some other reason physically 
impossible to perform, and that the individual is not 
suffering a sudden attack of amnesia or that the action 
A is for some other reason mentally impossible to perform, 
then A must (logically) occur. But then surely the 
Rationality Principle lacks empirical content. Note that 
this idea that given R occurs under optimal conditions 
and no countervailing reason occurs then the action A for 
which R is the reason must necessarily occur has some 
added plausibility in virtue of the fact, as noted in 
section 4, that a person's preferences are taken to 
include his subjective and ethical preferences: maybe a 
person can fail to act according to his own self-interest, 
but surely no-one can fail to act according to his overall 
preferences. But if what we have just previously said is 
correct then we are saying that no genuinely falsifying 
instance can be advanced against the Rationality Principle: 
a,ny time we have an apparently falsifying instance this 
will simply be due to a failure of certain background 
conditions (auxiliary hypotheses). Hence, as we remarked
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in section 1, if we are to claim that the Rationality 
Principle has empirical content we require that the 
conditional "If R occurs then A occurs" may be false even 
when no countervailing reason occurs and even when R 
occurs under optimal conditions. We will return to 
argue for this claim in the following Interpolation.
In the meantime I wish to emphasise that we have 
good reasons not to admit of a falsifying instance to the 
rationality principle, i.e., the Rationality Principle is 
just one of the principles mentioned in section 2 which 
we will treat as unfalsifiable. I suggest that whenever 
we are presented with an apparently falsifying instance 
to the Rationality Principle we will respond in either 
of the following two ways. Either we will attempt to 
modify our original ascription of preference and/or 
belief, or we will suppose that the reason has not 
occurred in optimal conditions. Suppose we admit a 
falsifying instance to the Rationality Principle, i.e., 
we admit that an individual has certain beliefs and 
preferences (under optimal conditions) and fails to act 
in a utility maximizing fashion relative to those beliefs 
and preferences. If so, then any individual's behaviour 
becomes inexplicable in terms of .the individual's reasons. 
Of course, behaviour may remain explicable at some "deeper" 
level, say at the physiological level, but whether this is 
so or not we can certainly admit that our ability to
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explain and predict nearly all human behaviour would be 
practically impossible in such terms and until such time 
as an appropriately formulated hypothesis is advanced to 
replace the Rationality Principle we need the Rationality 
Principle too badly to be free to discard it in the face 
of some putatively falsifying instance. In other words, 
we may admit that, for example, physicalism (a term used 
to denote the family of reductionist theories of the mind) 
remains a metaphysical possibility, i.e., that the pre­
diction that empirical inquiry will show that the mind is 
identical to the brain makes sense whether or not the 
prediction turns out to be true^'^, but this does not 
leave us free to abandon the Rationality Principle if we 
are to be actually able to explain and predict behaviour. 
Hence in response to an apparently falsifying instance to 
the Rationality Principle we have good reason to protect 
it from falsification by revising our original ascription 
of belief and/or preference. Hence I agree with Pettit 
that there is a sense in which we are forced in the face 
of any apparently anomalous observation to regard it as 
being merely a mistake and to cling to our theory, in 
particular, its central hypothesis, the Rationality 
Principle, But this is a sense quite consistent with the 
principle having empirical content. We are not forced to 
revise our original ascription of belief and preference 
because there is some "conceptual connection" between a
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person’s beliefs and preferences and his utility maxim­
izing behaviour; we are forced to revise our original 
ascription on strong pragmatic grounds.
The second type of response, namely, where we suppose 
that the reason has not occurred in optimal conditions, 
may be required because, on occasions we are not in a 
position to revise our original ascription of belief 
and/or preference. I will discuss why we may be in such 
a position more fully in the next section. The point 
briefly is that given what we know of an individual (his 
life history) and his situation it is totally implausible 
to suppose that he has a set of beliefs and preferences 
other than those which we originally ascribed to him. In 
which case, if we wish to protect the Rationlity Principle 
from falsification, as I have said we have good reason to 
do, then on occasions we will be forced to say that at 
least one, and we may not be able to specify which one, 
of the background optimal conditions fails to obtain.
That is, we will say things like, "the individual must have 
have been drunk, suffered a sudden attack of amnesia or 
paralysis, or be in some way mentally deranged". In 
other words, we say that there is something wrong with 
the physical or mental make-up of the individual such 
that despite the occurrence of the reason this fails to 
give rise to the normal maximizing behaviour. Now 
normally we will be very loathe to take this sort of
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response to an apparently falsifying instance to the 
Rationality Principle, For although with this response 
we have protected the Rationality Principle from fals­
ification we have bought this protection at a price, for 
we are now not in a position to explain this particular 
individual's behaviour. It is instructive here to look 
at a case study involving Vice-Admiral Tryon which 
Watkins has examined.
In 1893 Admiral Tryon, "a brilliant officer, 
energetic, resourceful, imaginative, and destined for 
the top" ordered a manoeuvre which resulted in the 
drowning of 356 officers and men. Now the beliefs and 
preferences normally ascribed to Tryon on this occassion - 
beliefs and preferences which at least on the face of it 
Tryon must have had given what we know about Tryon and 
his situation - are such that his behaviour was certainly 
not utility maximizing relative them. The response of 
many of his contemporaries was to suppose that Tryon was 
drunk, suffering from fever, or as one naval officer put 
it "Though bodily he was present on the afternoon of 
June 22 the guiding brain that made him so dear to us was 
absent." Such a response may protect the Rationality 
Principle from falsification but only at the expense of 
rendering Tryon's behaviour inexplicable. For the only 
grounds we have, in Tryon^s case, for supposing that some 
background optimal condition fails to obtain, the failure
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of which we are offering as an explanation of his non- 
maximizing behaviour, is just that he failed to act in a 
maximizing way relative to the beliefs and preferences 
we originally ascribed to him. Watkins calls these 
"explanations" offered by Tryon’s contemporaries "pseudo­
explanations" and Carl Hempel has referred to this type 
of "explanation" as being "epistemically circular"^^.
Of course, in relatively rare cases we may have some 
independent evidence for a breakdown in the optimal 
conditions, typically this will be the case, for example, 
with respect to the inmates of psychiatric institutions. 
It is worth remarking that, as Watkins notes, Tryon 
quickly became in the eyes of many a suitable candidate 
for just such an institution, but we wonder, how could 
the brilliant, energetic, imaginative officer suddenly 
become as one with the inmates of asylums?
6. The Second Argument : The Holism of Reasons 3 Actions 
and Rationality.
The second argument I shall consider which attempts 
to establish that the Rationality Principle lacks empir­
ical content makes reference to the holistic nature of 
the ascriptions of belief, action and rationality. This 
argument has been presented by Davidson. He maintains 
that ;
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if we are intelligibly to attribute attitudes 
and beliefs, or usefully to describe motions 
as behaviour, then we are committed to finding, 
in the pattern of behaviour, belief and desire, 
a large degree of rationality ...  ^^
I will not consider here the claim that if we are to 
describe certain motions as behaviour then we must pre­
suppose that the individual had certain beliefs and 
preferences: we've already argued that the denial of this 
claim is not required by our argument. Thus the claims 
that we will examine are those which concern the attrib­
ution of beliefs and preferences.
It is important to note that the idea that the 
ascriptions of beliefs and preferences is holistic does 
not deny the thesis of independent access. That is, it 
does not claim that we are restricted to inferring a 
person’s beliefs and preferences from the action to be 
explained or predicted. For example, one way of determin­
ing a person’s beliefs and preferences independently of 
the action to be explained or predicted is to ask the 
person what his beliefs and preferences are. Holism 
does not deny that we can ascertain a person’s beliefs 
and preferences by such means nor that such means are 
unreliable. Rather it claims that any such verbal 
responses, if we are to take them as indicative of that
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person’s beliefs and preferences, require that we pre­
suppose that the individual is rational. But if so a 
claim that people are rational is not an empirical 
hypothesis, rather it is presupposed in any attempt to 
determine what their beliefs and preferences are. Hence, 
the Rationality Principle, which claims that all people 
are rational, cannot be an empirical hypothesis but is 
rather a necessary presupposition of our even being able 
to determine what people's beliefs and preferences are.
The argument proceeds along the following lines.
In the first instance let us restrict our attention 
to the ascription of belief. And suppose we do so by 
noting a person’s verbal "reports". But Davidson argues 
that "we cannot understand what a man means by what he 
says without knowing a good deal about his beliefs".
The reason is that in order to understand a person’s 
verbal behaviour we must be in a position to know when 
a speaker holds a sentence he uses true. Now a speaker 
will hold a sentence to be true partly in virtue of what 
he believes and partly in virtue of what he means by 
that sentence. So the problem of understanding or 
interpreting a person's verbal behaviour comes down to 
the problem of simultaneously determining the person's 
beliefs and meaning from the sentences to which a speaker 
subscribes. That is, we cannot determine what a person 
means by what he says without at the same time inferring
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that he has certain beliefs. If we are to understand 
or interpret what a person says we cannot do so by 
simply considering an isolated unit (a word or a sentence), 
for it is only within the context of a system (a
language) that we can specify the role of the units.
The obvious strategy then to effect an understanding or 
translation of what a person says will be to assume that 
the system of beliefs underlying, as it were, the system 
of sentences, is consistent and correct according to our 
standards. By so doing we can pair up the sentences the
speaker uses with the sentences we use and hold true in
similar circumstances. This is the familiar thesis of 
the indeterminacy of translation.
Now I do hot propose to deny this argument nor do I 
think it is necessary to do so in order to claim that the 
Rationality Principle has empirical content. Notice 
that the above argument establishes that if we are to 
ascribe beliefs to an individual on the basis of verbal 
behaviour then we must presuppose he is rational in the 
sense that he has a system of consistent and correct 
beliefs (by our standards). But this is not the sense 
or "rational" which is employed by the Rationality 
Principle when it asserts that all individuals are 
rational. And this is not to deny that there is a 
common, everyday sense in which to say that a person is 
rational is to say that they have a consistent and correct
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system of beliefs. But we must make a distinction 
between two senses of "rational", namely, those which 
I called in section 1, epistemio rationality and format 
practical rationality, Davidson's argument establishes 
that we must presuppose that individual's are epistem­
ically rational, i.e., that they have a set of consist­
ent and correct beliefs if we are to ascribe beliefs to 
them on the basis of their behaviour, in particular, their 
verbal behaviour. It does not establish that we must 
presuppose that individuals are rational in the formal 
practical sense, i.e., that we must presuppose that 
relative to a person's beliefs (and preferences) he acts 
in a way so as to maximize utility. But the Rationality 
Principle only asserts that individuals are rational in 
the formal practical sense, and hence Davidson's argument 
does not establish its empirical vacuity.
In point of fact I believe that those who wish to 
maintain that the Rationality Principle has empirical 
content, e.g., the decision theorist who advances his 
theory as an empirical theory, should welcome Davidson's 
argument. For now determining the initial conditions 
upon which we are to base our potentially falsifying 
predictions becomes that must less problematic. Indeed 
the argument allows us to supplement our argument for 
the thesis of independent access. According to Davidson 
when we ask an individual what his beliefs are with
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respect to any decision situation then we must presuppose, 
if we are to understand what he is saying, that he has 
correct and consistent beliefs about that situation by 
our standards and, in particular, that the beliefs about 
what alternatives are available at what probabilities are 
correct and consistent by our standards. In other words, 
we seem to have an argument a priori for reading off a 
person's beliefs from the decision situation:- we must 
presuppose that he has that set of beliefs we would have 
in that situation, i.e., that he has that set of beliefs 
which we would count as correct and consistent for that 
situation.^ ^
It might be objected that Davidson's argument does 
establish that we must presuppose that individuals are 
rational in the formal practical sense, in that we must 
assume that individuals in their verbal behaviour act in 
a way that is maximizing relative to their beliefs and 
their desires to express the belief communicated in the 
verbal utterance. I think this is correct, but the 
point is not damaging for the empirical status of the 
Rationality Principle. For what needs to be established 
to demonstrate that claim is that we must make a global 
assumption as regards the rationality of an individual. 
That is to say, even granting the above point, namely, 
that we must presuppose that the individual acts ration­
ally in the formal practical sense as regards the verbal
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expression of his beliefs, we have not thereby established 
that we must assume that an individual will act ration­
ally relative to the beliefs (and preferences) which we 
have determined that he has on the basis of his verbal 
behaviour. Only if that is established have we shown by 
this argument the Rationality Principle lacks empirical 
content.
My argument also holds for Davidson’s analogous 
argument as regards the attribution of preferences. Here 
we conclude that in order to ascribe preferences on the 
basis of a person's verbal behaviour we must presuppose 
that his preferences are consistent. Consider, for 
example, the presupposition that they are transitive. 
Davidson is no doubt correct when he says :
I do not think we can clearly say what 
should convince us that a man at a given 
time (without change of mind) prefered a 
to b, b to c, and c to a. The reason for 
our difficulty is that we cannot make 
good sense of an attribution of preference 
except against a background of coherent 
attitudes.
Now it is true that the Rationality Principle assumes, 
as we have already noted, that an individual's preference
183
ordering is consistent - in particular, that it obeys 
the transitivity condition. But as I also remarked in 
section 2 experimental tests to determine whether 
people's preferences are transitive have been inconclus­
ive. Given this fact and the .fact that the Rationality 
Principle requires that preferences are transitive, then 
I think the supporter of the Rationality Principle 
should be happy with Davidson's argument to the effect 
that this is not a matter for experimental test, rather 
preferences must be assumed to be transitive if we are 
to ascribe preferences at all. But in welcoming this 
argument the supporter of the Rationality Principle 
need not admit that this hypothesis, the central hypoth­
esis of decision theory, is empirically vacuous for we
have only established that we must assume ends rationality.
* * *
We seem entitled to conclude, then, from the 
arguments examined in this chapter that decision theory 
does have empirical content and that orthodox decision 
theory is inadequate from the empirical viewpoint. Our 
conclusions with respect to orthodox theory from the 
normative standpoint were somewhat less definite although 
we did claim that a prima facie case could be made 
against orthodox theory. But throughout our argument 
for its empirical inadequacy we have had to assume the 
truth of two theses, what I called the thesis of
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independent aoeess and the thesis of contingent reason- 
action conditionals, We must therefore, given the 
crucial role played by these two theses, provided some 
defence of them. This requires that we venture into an 
examination of an argument that has figured prominently 
in the philosophy of action - the so-called Logical 
Connection Argument, The literature associated with this 
argument is vast and I wish to be relatively brief in my 
treatment of it. So I have selected those issues and 
arguments which seem to me to be of the most importance 
for our general argument.
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FOOTNOTES
1. I will ignore the possibility that the hypotheses 
of decision theory are synthetic a priori (see
S J Latsis (1976) pp. 3-7).
2. A similar view was held by Anatol Rapaport at least 
with respect to the extension of decision theory to 
interdependent decision making, i.e., game theory. 
See Rapoport (1970) pp. 49-52.
3. For an exposition of this view and its application 
to the matters discussed in this chapter see Watkins 
(1970) pp. 173-174.
4. For example, see his (19 66) p. 99. And as Hempel 
also says, while it is true that rational explan­
ation (explanation in terms of reasons) conforms 
"essentially to one or the other of our two basic 
types of scientific explanation ... (this) result 
and the arguments that led to it do not in any way 
imply a mechanistic view of man, of society and of 
historical processes ..." p.26.
5. The names for the first two types of rationality 
and their characterization I have taken from G W 
Mortimore ( 197 6) pp. 9 6-97.
6. Karl Popper (1973) p.179.
7. J W N Watkins (1970) especially p. 172.
8. Donald Davidson (19 80a) p. 268.
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9. J C Harsanyi (19.79) p, 299 ,
10. See Amos Tversky (1975) especially pp. 164-168.
11. Milton Friedman and L J Savage (1948) especially 
pp. 293-297.
12. Watkins (1970) pp. 173-174.
13. For example, see and compare Amos Tversky (19 69)
and F Hosteller and P Nogee (19511 See also section 
6.
14. Harsanyi (1978) p. 224, first emphasis mine.
15. Tversky (1975) p. 166,
16. The detailed construction of an alternative un­
orthodox theory of decision is beyond the scope of 
this thesis. It is sufficient for our purposes that 
we indicate where orthodox theory is mistaken and 
what any correct theory must take account of.
17. Davidson (1980a) p. 272. Davidson also quotes
Tversky as being in support of this argument. As 
I read Tversky he argues that orthodox theory has 
been shown to be empirically (or descriptively) 
inadequate. But Tversky also argues that neither 
his experiment nor Allais’ thought experiment 
demonstrate the normative inadequacy of orthodox 
theory. However, neither Davidson nor I are 
concerned at the moment with the adequacy of 
orthodox theory from the normative standpoint,
18. Davidson ( 1980a ) p. 272,
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19. Howard Raiffa (1970) pp. 81-82, my emphasis.
20. See David Garthier (1975) pp. 412-413 and S.I.Benn 
and G W Mortimore (1976) especially pp. 268-282.
21. Tversky (197 5) p. 172, my emphasis.
22. Harsanyi (1978) p. 225. Harsanyi thinks that it is 
"probably a reasonably realistic descriptive pre­
diction" that individuals, at least in "serious" 
decisions, will take a result orientated approach 
to risk-taking. About this we can see Harsanyi is 
mistaken, unless he wants to claim - but on what 
grounds? - that the decisions of the subjects in 
the Tversky-Kahneman experiment were not "serious".
He also thinks it is an "obvious normative ration­
ality requirement" but, as will be seen from the 
text, I think the adjective "obvious" is unwarranted 
here.
23. For a discussion of psychological egoism see Richard 
B Brandt (1959) especially pp. 371-372 and John 
Hospers (1963) especially pp. 141-157. A similar 
comment is also made by Harsanyi (1977a) p.27.
24. Harsanyi (1955) p.315.
25. Harsanyi (1977b) pp. 443-445.
26. William Alston (1974) p.79.
27. Amartya Sen (1979) p. 103. Although Harsanyi's later 
work, I think, indicates that committment is included 
in one’s subjective preferences, see his (1979) p. 292
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28. This independent determination is possible accord­
ing to one of the "rational man postulates"; "Beliefs, 
desires and decision principles can sometimes be 
construed in advance of action from past behaviour - 
assuming personal consistency - and from present 
circumstances - assuming commonness of response.
Other factors, such as emotional expression, may 
also facilitate this sort of interpretation." 1978
p. 45-, I will have something more to say about the 
assumption of commonness of response in section 6.
29. Pettit (1978) p. 51.
30. The distinction is due to Richard Rorty (1965) p. 24.
31. Watkins (1970) pp. 211-216.
32. Carl Hempel (1965) p. 373.
33. Davidson (1980b) p. 237.
34. Davidson (1980b) p. 238.
35. This is the argument I mentioned in section 5 to 
the effect that it may not always be plausible to 
revise our ascriptions of belief and/or preferences 
on the face of some putatively falsifying instance 
to the Rationality Principle. I also remark that
the argument seems extendable to the attribution of
preferences to an individual, i.e., if we are to 
understand what a person says with respect to his 
preferences in some situation then we must presuppose 
that his preferences are more or less the ones we
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would have in that situation given his life history 
In other words, interestly, we seem to have an 
argument for the simitarly postulate mentioned in 
Chapter III section 4.
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INTERPOLATION
Two Theses about Reasons and Actions
As I noted and as we have seen in the previous 
chapter there were two theses that we required if vie were 
to be able to plausibly argue that the Rationality Principle, 
some formulation of which will be the central hypothesis 
in a theory of decision, has empirical content. These 
two theses I referred to as, the thesis of contingent 
reason-action conditionals, and the thesis of independent 
access. To establish the truth of these two theses 
requires that we make an excursion into a minefield area 
in the philosophy of action that involves a venerable 
argument known as the Logical Connection Argument. I do 
not propose to give an exhaustive treatment of this 
argument - I do not propose to examine all the many form­
ulations of it - it will suffice for my purposes if we 
simple examine those formulations that are necessary for 
me to establish the two theses mentioned above. Now the 
Logical Connection Argument is normally addressed against 
the causal theorist of action. Roughly, it goes as 
follows; since the relation between reason and action is 
logical in nature, and the relation between cause and
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effect is contingent f reasons cannot be construed as 
the causes of actions. But, as I have previously 
remarked, we are not concerned to show that reasons are 
causes, hence we may allow that there are other form­
ulations of the Logical Connection Argument not examined 
in this interpolation which establish some sort of 
"logical connection" between reasons and actions which 
is sufficient to show that reasons are not the causes of 
actions. (For example, maybe it can be shown that the 
thesis of contingent action-reason conditionals is false 
and this is sufficient to show that reasons cannot be 
causes.)
I shall consider the thesis of contingent reason- 
action conditionals first. This thesis asserts, it will 
be recalled, that if a reason R occurs then it is 
logically possible that the action A for which R is the 
reason should not occur, even if no countervailing 
reason R ’ occurs and even if R occurs the optimal 
conditions. This thesis we said was required if the 
Rationality Principle was to have empirical content.
For consider, to summarize what I said earlier, if it is 
the case that should R occur under optimal conditions 
and no countervailing reason i? ' occurs entails that A 
occurs, then there would be no possibility of present­
ing a falsifying instance to the Rationality Principle, 
However, the thesis of contingent reason—action
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conditionals has been denied.
The argument against the thesis of contingent reason- 
action conditionals has been nicely presented by Raziel 
Abelson^. He begins by considering the views of people 
like Bruce Goldberg to the effect that the thesis is 
obviously true. Goldberg rightly points out that even 
if (as some have maintained) the description of a reason 
necessarily "includes" a description of the action it 
does not follow that the occurrence of the reason entails 
the occurrence of the action;
If I want to go to the theatre, does it follow 
that I go to the theatre? There are at least 
some qccasions when we don’t do what we want 
to do.^
Abelson grants that Goldberg is right in this, but denies 
that Goldberg has successfully shown thereby that there 
is not some sort of "logical bond" between reason and 
action. To demonstrate this point Abelson asks us to 
consider the following case:
Assume that Jones wants, intends, desires, 
or in some sense has a motive to open the 
window. What does this entail about what 
he will do? Well, it entails that he will
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open the window, but it does not entail 
this tout court. It entails that he will 
open the window provided that no reason 
arises for his not doing so (e.g., a hur­
ricane is blowing outside) and provided 
nothing prevents him (e.g., he is not 
paralyzed, and the window isn't stuck).^
In other words, Abelson claims that if R occurs and no 
countervailing reason R', occurs and R occurs under optimal con 
ditions, then this entails that A occurs (where R is the 
reason for A ). This, of course, is precisely what we 
denied when we asserted that the thesis of contingent 
reason-action conditionals \Was. true. Hence the truth 
of a claim such as Goldberg’s is not sufficient for the 
truth of that thesis and as I've already argued, it is 
the truth of that thesis rather than some such claim as 
Goldberg’s that is required if the Rationality Principle 
is to have empirical content.
However, we must now ask, what argument does Abelson 
offer for his claim? Surely, the hard-nosed causal 
theorist - and we in our defence of the thesis of contin­
gent reason-action conditionals - will simply say that 
Abelson is mistaken: it is logically possible that R 
occur under optimal conditions and R^ not occur, and A 
not occur. That is, we deny, as our thesis asserts,
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that if R occurs under optimal conditions and R^ does 
not occur, then this entails A occurs, As far as I can 
see the only argument Abelson offers for his claim is as 
follows :
To say ’’I want to open the window; nothing 
prevents me, and I have no- reason or motive 
not to, not even the motive of laziness; 
but still, I won't open the window" is 
senseless. What on earth could I mean by 
’want '
Now if by "senseless" Abelson means that such a sentence 
is contradictory (and this seems warranted in virtue of 
thé fact that he talks of the meaning of "want") and if 
in his previous claim he means by "entails" that it would 
be contradictory to assert the antecedent and deny the 
consequent of "If R occurs under optimal conditions and 
R* does not occur, then A occurs", then the passage 
quoted above is not an argument for his original claim 
but is merely a restatement of it.^ To be sure the re­
statement does make more specific in what Abelson thinks 
the entailment relation between "/? occurs, R' does not 
occur, R occurs under optimal conditions" and "A occurs" 
consists; the entailment relation supposedly holds in 
virtue of the very meaning of the word "want" or ’"reason".
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But is Abelson right in this? His rhetorical question 
at the conclusion of the quoted passage seems a bit lame; 
the obvious reply is, "Well, that sense of ’want’ such 
that the sentence ’If I want to open the window,,,’ is 
not contradictory".
But perhaps Abelson has some (unstated) reason for 
supposing that the sense of "want" or "reason" that he 
envisages is the correct of legitimate sense. Notice 
that this reason certainly requires to be spelt out for 
it certainly does not seem to be the case that "i? occurs, 
i? ’ doesrnot occur, R occurs under optimal conditions, and 
A does not occur" is contradictory: at least my linguistic 
intuitions are such that to say this sort of thing is not 
the same as saying, "Joe is a bachelor and (the same)
Joe is married". A natural thought is to suppose that 
evidence for Abelson's view is to be had from the fact 
that we never would admit to the situation where R occurs, 
etc. and A does not occur. But this is no evidence for 
saying that such a situation is logically impossible: 
that requires that we never oould (logically) admit to 
such a situation, which still, of course, needs to be 
established. Similarly, even if we admit that such 
situations are unimaginable - where we understand 
"unimaginable" in some non-question begging sense, i.e., 
as not being equivalent to "contradictory" - this still 
does not establish what is required for Abelson’s argu-
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ment. Our position here is strengthened, I think, by 
the fact that we can explain why we never would admit to 
a situation where i? occurs, etc, and A does not occur, 
and why we have come to find such situations in some 
sense unimaginable. As we noted we have good reason to 
discount any apparently falsifying instance to the 
Rationality Principle; it is also true that the thesis 
of contingent reason-action conditionals is needed if the 
Rationality Principle is to be falsifiable, i.e., if the 
Rationality Principle is to be falsifiable then it must 
at least be logically possible that i? occurs, etc. and 
A does not occur; but if we actually admitted that there 
was a case, not merely that it was logically possible 
that there was a case, where R occurs, etc. and A does 
not occur, then we would have admitted a falsifying 
instance to a principle that lies at the very heart of 
our attempts to explain and predict human behaviour.
Let me now turn to the thesis of independent access. 
This is the thesis, it will be recalled, that said that 
we may know a person’s reason without inferring it from 
the action for which that reason is the reason. That is, 
it asserts that it is not the case that the only way we 
can know a person’s reason is to infer it from the per­
formance of the action. Against those who think other­
wise Alvin Goldman has mounted the following powerful 
objection; it is not the case that our only evidence for
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knowing an agent’s reasons (or wants) is from the per­
formance or occurrence of the action, there are in 
addition
such items as (1) other acts of the agent,
'including verbal avowals in particular;
(2) antecedent events that may be causally 
relevant to wanting to do A, including, for 
example, other wants of the agent; and (3) 
want- manifestations that are not acts - 
e.g., facial expressions,®
(To appreciate Goldman's point about facial expressions 
we must remember that not all bodily movements are actions 
in the full-blown sense of "action".) There, one might 
have thought, was an end to the matter; the thesis of 
independent access is clearly established.
However, consider the following idea. It may be 
granted that of course it is not the case that the only 
way that we may determine a person's reason for action is 
from their action. Nonetheless, the occurrence of the 
action is surely our most reliable guide to their 
reasons - what action they perform is, as of were, the 
final arbiter to their reason. Thus, if someone acts in 
such a way that this is not consistent with the reason 
we have described to him by the means outlined by
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Goldman above then we will, indeed must, revise our 
original ascription. So on this view while we may at 
least provisionally determine an individual’s reason in 
advance of his action, any such ascription is always 
révisable in the light of what action he actually performs. 
This view seems to me quite correct, although somewhat 
misleading, but it in no way requires an abandonment of 
the thesis of independent access, I d'o not want to deny 
that an ascription of a reason to an individual by the 
means outlined by Goldman is only provisional - but then 
this in no, way reflects on the suitability of such ascrip­
tions for the purposes of empirical investigation (see 
the comments on basic statements in Chapter III section 6), 
And I do not want to deny that if we assert that an 
individual has acted in a certain way that is inconsist­
ent with the reason ascribed to him by the means outlined 
by Goldman then we must revise our original reason ascrip­
tion; this will follow from the fact, which we've granted, 
that the thesis of contingent action-reason conditionals 
is false. But this could only prove an embarrassment to 
the thesis of independent access if it is logically necessary 
that we describe the individual's bodily movement as 
behaviour or action. For then it would not be that indep­
endent ascriptions are just révisable, but that they are 
necessarily so. But as I have argued above it is not 
logically necessary that we describe an individual's
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bodily movement as certain behaviour or action even if 
we allow that he had a certain reason for acting, the 
reason occurred in optimal conditions, and no counter­
vailing reason occurred. That is, it is logically 
possible that even so an individual should fail to act - 
his bodily movement is just bodily movement - and in that 
case, even granting that the thesis of contingent action- 
reason conditionals is false, there is no necessity that 
we should revise our original reason ascription. Of 
course, as before, while such situations may be logically 
possible this is not to say that we would actually admit 
of such a case; we have good reason, to protect the 
Rationality Principle from falsification, to revise our 
original reason ascription, and in this sense we are 
forced to revise our original ascription. Moreover, it
will be the most reliable guide to their reasons: they 
will, in fact, be heavily relied upon.
Hence I claim that if the thesis of contingent 
reason-action conditionals is true then the thesis of 
independent access is true. Or rather, more accurately, 
if the thesis of contingent reason-action conditionals 
is true (which I ’ve argued is the case or, at least, 
that the arguments addressed against it are very weak) 
then, if we are to be able to ascribe reasons to an 
individual at all (which we seem able to do by the means
is in this way that we can say that a person's actions I
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outlined by Goldman), then the thesis of independent 
access is true.
The consideration of the above objection enables 
us to more easily present an argument in reply to an 
objection to the thesis of independent access suggested 
by some remarks of James Otten,^ In commenting on 
Goldman’s argument Otten makes the point that the 
occurrence of A is the only oriterion we have for the 
occurrence of E : the items mentioned by Goldman are 
merely symptoms for R, This point rests on the 
Wittgensteinian notion of a criterion which Otten puts 
as follows: if the occurrence of X is a oriterion for 
the occurrence of Y, then it is a conceptual truth that 
the occurrence of X is evidence for the occurrence of Y; 
whereas if the occurrence of X is a symptom for the 
occurrence of Y, then it is a contingent truth that the 
occurrence of X is evidence for the occurrence of Y,
Of the items mentioned by Goldman - other acts of the 
agent, antecendent events involving the agent, want- 
manifestations - Otten says;
In the case of each of these proposed 
behavioural criteria the crucial question 
is whether the fact that they count as 
evidence for the existence of {R) is a 
conceptual truth or a merely contingent
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truth. And. in each case the answer, it will 
be found, is that the fact is merely a con­
tingent truth. There simply is no contra­
diction involved in saying, for instance, 
that salivating or licking one's lips is not 
evidence for wanting to eat; even though in 
fact these are manifestations of the want to 
eat. So, the only behavioural criterion, 
and indeed the only criterion at all, for a 
person's want to perform a certain action is 
the actual performance of that action.®
Now the last sentence of this quotation certainly sounds 
ominous for the thesis of independent access, but this 
is only because in ordinary discourse we do not always 
use the term "criterion" in the Wittgensteinian sense. 
Notice that when Otten says that the occurrence of the 
action A is our only criterion for the occurrence of the 
reason R he merely means (and must only mean this in the 
light of his account of the notion of a criterion) that 
the occurrence of A is the only behaviour which is such 
that it is a conceptual truth that the occurrence A is 
evidence for the occurrence of R , And it seems we should 
agree with Otten on this point in that we have granted 
that the thesis of contingent action-reason conditionals 
is false. For we have granted that if the action occurs
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then this entails that a certain reason occurred, and 
thus it seems that it will be a conceptual truth that 
the occurrence of A is evidence for the occurrence of R,
But this is not to say that the occurrence of A is the 
only evidence for the occurrence of Rx Otten has neither 
claimed nor shown th&t the items mentioned by Goldman 
are not evidence at all for the occurrence of R ‘, they 
may not be criteria (in the Wittgensteinian sense) but 
they are still evidence and quite reliable evidence. In 
general when we cite evidence for such-and-such being 
the case we do not cite criteria, but only, to use the 
terminology at hand, symptoms. (Thus, if I cite my 
evidence for you being in the room next door I say things 
like, "Well his light is on, there are sounds like his 
moving around in there . but of course it's quite 
consistent with that evidence that you should not be in 
your room.) Now the sort of point being made by Otten 
could only cause us to give up the thesis of independent 
access if it could be established not merely that the 
occurrence of A is criterial evidence for the occurrence 
of R, but also that it is the only real evidence we have 
for the occurrence of Rx that our symptomatic evidence must 
must always be révisable in the light of the criterial 
evidence. But as I've argued it is quite possible that R 
should occur and that A not occur, in which case we have 
no criterial evidence for the individual's reason, but
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only symptomatic evidence. And such evidence is
evidence and there is no necessity that we should revise
our reason ascription based on such evidence.
* * *
I trust now that we are in a position where we need 
not merely assume the truth of the thesis of contingent 
reason-action conditionals and the thesis of independent 
access, but that we actually have some good reason to 
believe them to be true. Let us then now return to our 
main argument and see what we can say about moral theory 
in the light of what we now know about decision theory.
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FOOTNOTES
1. Raziel Abelson . (19 69) especially pp. 183-184.
2. Bruce Goldberg (1965) p, 72,
3. Abelson (1969) p, 183.
4. Abelson (1969) p. 183.
5. In so saying, of course, I presuppose a non-essential-
ist interpretation of Abelson's argument. This, as 
I've intimated, seems justified and in any case for a 
discussion and rejection of an essentialist form of 
this sort of argument see William G Dean (1975) 
especially pp, 352-354.
6. Alvin Goldman (1970) p. 111.
7. James Otten (1977) pp. 734-736.
8. Otten (1977) p. 736.
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CHAPTER V
U n o r t h o d o x  D e c i s i o n  T h e o r y  a n d  t h e  D e f e n c e  o f  
C o n t r a c t a r i a n i s m
1. Alternative Conceptions of Justice and Rationality.
2. Unrestricted and Restricted Applications of Maximin: 
Towards an Adequate Version of the Maximin Principle.
3. Maximin and the Original Position.
4. The Special Features of the Original Position.
5. A Reconsideration of the Objections to Maximin.
5, The Nature and Status of Preference Contractarianism.
1 - Alternative Conceptions of Justice and Rationatity
In Chapter II I pointed out that from orthodox 
decision theory together with a minimal characterization 
of what it is to make a moral judgement we can deduce 
utilitarianism. There we said that to make a moral 
judgement was to make a judgement that was impersonal 
and impartial, and this we further defined in terms of 
the equiprobability model. If an individual is to make 
such a judgement and he is to do so in a manner which, 
according to the orthodox theorist, is rational, i.e..
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he chooses so as to maximize expected utility, then he 
will choose as a utilitarian.
In contrast, John Rawls in his derivation of a 
contractarian theory of justice claims that a rational 
individual when making a judgement in a certain sort of 
situation which has certain features among which are 
those that will ensure that his judgement is a moral 
judgement, will not choose so as to maximize expected 
utility, rather he will employ what is known as the 
maximin principle. Not surprisingly Rawls* theory has 
been attacked by the orthodox decision theorists and 
their preference utilitarian brethren. It is the object 
of this chapter to defend Rawls against these attacks.
Now it is important to note the general thrust of 
the criticisms made by the orthodox theorists against 
Rawls. They do not dispute Rawls’ idea that we can gain 
an important insight into what constitutes a just society 
by invoking the notion that it is that arrangement of 
the basic social structure that rational individuals 
would choose in situations like, what Rawls calls, "the 
Original Position"; (A further account of the Original 
Position will be given in sections 3 and 4). As Harsanyi, 
an orthodox theorist and leading critic of Rawls, remarks, 
"In my opinion, the concept of the original position is 
a potentially very powerful analytical tool for clarify­
ing the concept of justice and other aspects of morality/'^
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Indeed, Harsanyi notes that he used essentially the same 
idea himself in his work on the analysis of moral judge­
ments when he employed the equiprobability model to 
determine when a judgement was a moral judgement. That 
is, both Harsanyi and Rawls agree that the hallmark of 
moral judgement is that it be impartial and impersonal, 
and a judgement is impartial and impersonal when it is 
made under the constraints imposed by the equiprobability 
model or the Original Position. Where the orthodox 
theorist disagrees with Rawls is in Rawls' claim that in 
the Original Position rational individuals will choose 
according to the maximin principle. To quote Harsanyi 
again:
... the usefulness of this concept (the 
concept of the Original Position) crucially 
depends on its being combined with a 
satisfactory decision rule. Unfortunately,
Rawls chooses the maximin principle as the 
decision rule for the participants in the 
original position.^
For the orthodox theorist the satisfactory decision rule 
for the individuals in the Original Position is that of 
expected utility maxinjization. This rule combined with 
the notion of the Original Position gives rise to a 
theory quite distinct from Rawl's own theory. Rawls has
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called it "average utilitarianism"® and we have called it 
preference utilitarianism. So we have two theories of 
justice (or morality more generally) divided by their 
differing views on what constitutes a satisfactory 
decision rule for individuals in situations like the 
Original Position; that is, the dispute between them is 
decision theoretic in character. It is this fact which 
determines the nature of my argument in the remainder of 
this chapter.
My defence of Rawls will not, in a number 6.f respects, 
amount to a complete defence of Rawls' theory of justice.
My intention is to provide a limited defence of Rawls 
by focussing upon the decision theoretic problem of what, 
if anything, can be said for Rawls' insistence on the 
maximin principle as the rule for rational choice for the 
individuals in the Original Position. Now in so doing 
there are aspects of Rawls ' theory which by and large I 
will simply take for granted, but as we shall see these are 
not aspects that effect the substance of the dispute 
between Rawls and the orthodox theorist. I should hasten 
to add that my argument is not intended to be a piece of 
Rawlsian exegesis, indeed there are a number of quite 
significant departures from Rawls' theory that I will 
have to make in order to provide my defence. Nonetheless,
I trust that the theory I defend is recognizably Rawlsian 
in spirit. In rough outline my argument will be as follows
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a correct theory of decision has the consequence that 
individuals in a situation with the "qualitative anatomy"^ 
of the Original Position will choose according to the 
maximin principle, i.e., they will choose a society 
organized according to the Difference Principle.
Having briefly stated the two differing conceptions 
of justice let me outline the differing conceptions of 
rationality they presuppose. As we have said (Chapter II 
section 2) it hardly seems problematic that a rational 
individual when choosing under certainty will choose that 
alternative with the outcome that he most prefers. But 
there is less agreement about what account we are to give 
of rational choice in situations of risk or uncertainty. 
The two best known contenders here are that individuals 
will choose that alternative which maximizes expected 
utility and that individuals will choose that alternative 
which maximins,
The mark of the orthodox décision theorist is that 
he claims that rational individuals under conditions of 
risk and uncertainty will choose so as to maximize 
expected utility. In those situations where there are 
no objective probabilities, i.e., the situation is one 
of uncertainty, the individual is assumed to employ 
suhg ectipe probabilities and then to proceed to choose 
as in a situation of risk. On the other hand, as 
intimated above, it is claimed that rational individuals
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under conditions of risk or uncertainty will choose that 
alternative which maximins. That is, they will choose 
that alternative which is such that it has the outcome 
with the maximum minimum utility. Now while sometimes 
that alternative which is maximin will also maximize 
expected utility®, this is not, as we shall soon see, 
always the case. That is, there is only a partial 
extensional equivalence between the maximin principle 
and the maximization of expected utility principle.
There is, then, a significant dispute between those 
decision theorists who champion the former principle and
those who champion the latter. Moreover, up until
recently the dispute has largely gone in favour of the 
orthodox decision theorist. However, the work of 
Tversky and Kahneman which we examined in Chapter IV (and 
also the work of others) has cast serious doubts on the 
adequacy of orthodox theory.
Let me very briefly recap the points I mentioned in 
the discussion of the Tversky-Kahneman experiment. As 
we noted a problem arises for orthodox theory because it
cannot account for a certain attitude towards risk
evident in what Tversky called the certainty effect.
In their experiments Tversky and Kahneman showed that for 
a large number of subjects:
the utility of a positive outcome appears
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greater when it is certain than when it 
is embedded in a gamble.
In other words, the experiments indicate that individuals 
value certainty as such, i.e., that theyaare risk averse. 
More fully, the experimental results suggest the hypoth­
esis that an alternative which offers a surety of a 
particular outcome is valued more highly than some risky 
alternative not because the former has a higher expected 
utility than the latter, but rather because the former 
has a certainty advantage over the latter. Now as I 
argued orthodox theory cannot accommodate the experimental 
results; we can show that the results require the failure 
of at least one of the assumptions from which the expected 
utility theorem is deduced unless some ad hoc hypotheses 
are introduced. Moreover, pretty clearly, orthodox theory 
cannot entertain the hypothesis which does accommodate the 
experimental results, namely, that individuals value 
certainty as such. For in so saying we claim that an 
individual may choose one alternative rather than another not 
because it has a higher expected utility but because it 
has a certainty advantage.
Now the response that the orthodox theorist makes to 
the results of the Tversky-Kahneman experiment will vary 
according to the meta-level stance he takes towards 
decision theory. If he takes an empirical stance
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towards decision theory then his theory has been 
falsified by the Tversky-Kahneman experiment. On the 
other hand, if he takes a normative stance towards 
decision theory then there is no question of a falsif­
ication or, more accurately, no possibility of demonstrat­
ing inadequacy by way of empirical data. However, I did 
argue that we can at least present a prima facie case 
against orthodox theory conceived of as a normative 
theory. And this because individuals whom intuitively 
we regard as perfectly rational do value certainty as 
such and that no argument has been presented - and there 
seems little hope of such an argument being presented - 
which can show that these individuals ought not to value 
certainty as such.
So the existence of the certainty effect gives us 
reason to doubt the adequacy of orthodox decision theory 
whether it is conceived of as a normative or empirical 
theory. However, having given reason to suspect the claim 
that rational individuals under conditions of risk or 
uncertainty choose so as to maximize expected utility it 
should not be thought that this straight-forwardly opens 
the way for maximin. As I shall show below there are 
problems with the maximin principle.
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2. Unrestricted and Restricted Applications of Maximin: 
Towards an Adequate Version of the Maxjmin Principle,
In this section I propose to show the inadequacy of 
maximin if it is deemed to have unrestricted application; 
and then by a consideration of an example where maximin 
appears to be adequate to give a rationale for an a 
characterization of the types of decision situations to 
which maximin is to be restricted. This should also 
enable us to account for the putative counter-examples 
to maximin. The examples which I shall consider are, 
for reasons of clarity, quite simple but the argument is 
not adversely affected thereby.
There are two types of counter-example that I will 
present to demonstrate the inadequacy of the maximin 
principle if it is supposed to have unrestricted applic­
ation. They are both cases of decision under risk, but 
the first is a case where according to maximin two 
alternatives are equivalent and yet where it is clear 
that it is rational to choose one alternative rather 
thatn the other. The second is a case where according 
to maximin it is rational to choose one alternative rather 
than the other and yet where it is obvious that the 
contrary choice is the rational choice.
The first counter-example we may represent by way 
of the following matrix;
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S i
4 1
10 1
Fig, 1
Here which outcome will obtain depends on whether the
agent chooses or a and which of the equiprobable
states of nature s or 3 obtains. The entry in each1 2
cell is the utility entry for each possible outcome.
From the maximin point of view a rational individual
could choose either a or a : they have an identical1 2 -^
maximum minimum utility of 1. And yet clearly if is
rational to choose a and not a ,2 1
It is possible to overcome this difficulty if ,we 
introduce the notion of a dominant alternative.: The 
notion of dominance is familiar in decision theory and we 
can give an informal expression of it as follows. A 
dominant alternative is one which is such that no matter 
which state of nature obtains the decision maker does at 
least as well, and in at least one case does better, with 
that alternative than with any other alternative. Hence, 
in Figure 1 a^ dominates a^. This suggests a restriction 
on maximin by way of a lexical ordering of dominance and 
maximin: for any decision situation, if there is a dom­
inant alternative a rational individual will choose that 
alternative, if not he will choose the maximin alternative
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However, this is not sufficient to fully overcome 
the problem for maximin as can be seen by way of the
s S1 2
4 1
1 1 0
Fig. 2
Here a does not dominate a , nor vice versa. Also the 1 2
alternatives have the same maximum minimum utility of 1.
Hence, even,..given the above modification to the maximin
principle a rational individual could choose either
or a , and yet clearly it is rational to choose a and 2 2
not a1
The second type of counter-example is representable 
as follows :
4 1
0 10
Fig. 3
In this case a is maximin relative to a and hence given 1 2
an unrestricted application of maximin we would require
that individuals choose over a^; and yet it seems clear
that it would be rational to choose a over a ,2 1
The presentation of the above counter-examples may
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prompt the following two thoughts. First, as seems to 
be the case in the above counter-examples, rational 
individuals always choose the alternative that maximizes 
expected utility; and second, if individuals choose the 
maximin alternative that is only when the maximin alter­
native happens to be the alternative that maximizes 
expected utility,^ However, both thoughts will be 
dispelled if we consider the following example.
Imagine a situation - one that is just the same as
one of the situations employed by Tversky and Kahneman
in their experiments and which we looked at in Chapter IV
- where you are offered the choice between a and a1 2
given that the states of nature are equiprobable and the 
entry in each cell is the monetary payoff in dollars:
S1 S2
a 400 4001
a 1000 02
Fig. 4
As we saw most individuals choose, and I conjecture the
reader would choose, a rather than a . Now notice that1 2
in choosing a rather than a one has chosen the maximin 1 2
alternative. But, most importantly, the question for us 
to consider is whether in choosing the maximin alter­
native one has chosen the alternative that maximizes 
expected utility? Well, suppose you are presented with 
the following choice:
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a : a 1/10 chance of $1000 or nothing3
a^: a 1/5 chance of $400 or nothing
and you choose, as the subjects of the Tversky-Kahneman 
experiment choose, a rather than a . As we noted it3 4
cannot be that in both these choices one is choosing to
maximize expected utility. Rather we suggested that in
choosing a over a individuals choose a not because it 
1 2 1
maximizes expected utility,- but because it enjoys a
certainty advantage over a : it offers the certaï-nty2
of receiving $400 as against the possibility of getting
considerably less, $0, Thus, while we granted
that the utility of money is marginally increasing so 
that u(lOOO) < 1000 (where u(O) = 0) we rejected the idea 
that the rate of decrease is rapid enough to ensure that 
u(lOOO)< 800, And this leaves us in a position to account 
for the choice of a over a : a maximizes expected3 4 3
utility relative to a . Notice also that a and a are4 3 4
equivalent from the maximin point of view - they both 
offer the identical maximum minimum utility of 0. This 
point will assume some importance in our later discussion.
So in the example of Figure 4 we seem to have a case 
where choice according to the maximin principle is 
appropriate, i.e., where it is rational to choose the 
maximin alternative, and where the maximin alternative 
is not the alternative that maximizes expected utility.
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But there are other important lessons to be learnt from 
this example.
First, we have claimed that individuals choose the 
maximin alternative in the situation depicted in Figure 4 
because it has a certainty advantage: that is the 
rationale we give for choosing according to the maximin 
principle in the above case. In general, of course, the 
maximin alternative will not offer the certainty of 
receiving the same payoff- no matter which state of nature 
obtains, but only the certainty of receiving at least 
some amount, namely, the minimum possible payoff of the 
maximin alternative. But the rationale for choice 
according to the maximin principle will remain essentially 
the same. An individual chooses according to the maximin 
principle because the maximin alternative has a certainty 
advantage over its rivals: it offers the certainty of 
receiving, at least, a particular payoff as against the 
possibility of receiving less. As a consequence, if two 
alternatives are•such that an individual can be sure that 
he will receive at least the same amount of utility with 
either alternative then neither alternative has a certain­
ty advantage over the other and therefore the very 
rationale for choosing according to the maximin principle, 
in such a case, has disappeared. Tne maximin principle 
can only have plausible application where the certainty 
effect can operate, ex hypothesi this, is not the case in
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Figures 1 and 2; in both cases a and a offer the
1 2
certainty of receiving at least one unit of utility. 
Similarly with respect to the choice between a and a3 4
above; they both offer the certainty of receiving at 
least $0, In these cases where neither alternative has 
a certainty advantage over the other, there seems little 
else that the individuals can do other than choose that 
alternative which has the best prospects, i.e., to 
choose the alternative that maximizes expected utility.
Second, while we have claimed that rational indiv­
iduals would choose the maximin alternative rather than 
the alternative that maximizes expected utility in Figure 
4, we would not expect, and we would not think it 
reasonable in some sense, for individuals to choose a 1
rather than a if the following were the case. Either 2
a offers $1500 should s obtain (and $0 should s obtain)2 1 2
or a offers $200 should s obtain (and $1000 should s 2 2 1
obtain). And this for the reason that we think that
while a^ has the advantage of offering $400 for certain,
this advantage can be nullufied if a has possible gains
2
(relative to the maximin alternative) that are sufficiently
large or possible relative losses that are sufficiently
small. But here we presuppose a normal degree of risk
aversion. It is quite possible that an individual
should be so risk averse that even in the altered
situation he still prefers a to a . Such individuals1 2
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as a matter of fact might be extremely rare, but surely 
they are not inconceivable. And we cannot say that such 
individuals choose irrationally - at least if we are 
using the term "rational" in the formal practical sense. 
Of course, we could go so far as to say of such indiv­
iduals that they have an odd, bizzare or maybe even 
pathological aversion to risk, and hence that their 
choices are unreasonable in some sense. This would 
explain why we would find any choice of over in 
Figure 3 "irrational"; given a normal degree or risk
aversion one would choose a over a - only someone with
2 1
a quite abnormal degree of risk aversion would choose 
otherwise.
A more precise statement of the above idea can be 
had by the introduction of the notion of gamhlev-■indif­
ference maps, I take the notion from Watkins who in 
turn acknowledges G L S Shackle®. A gambler-indifference 
map will be a measure of an individual’s attitude towards 
certainty. Stakes or what an individual has or will 
receive for certain are measured along the #-axis and 
prizes or what an individual will receive at a certain 
probability are measured along the i/-axis. Both stakes 
and prizes are in monetary terms or are representable in 
monetary terms, (This accords well with the idea which 
we will mention later that individuals choose between 
various allotments of the primary goods on the basis of
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an index of the primary goods,) To draw a gambler- 
indif f erence curve we select some probability value, and 
for each point on the x-axis we seek to discover the prize 
such that an individual is indifferent between the gamble, 
i.e., the probability of receiving the prize, and the 
stake, i.e., what he has for certain. So for some given 
probability F we can obtain the monetary value of the 
prize 0^ and the monetary value of the stake 0  ^ such that 
an individual i is indifferent between p. 0 and the staker p
O^f i.e., we can determine:
= u.(P-
We now draw for each probability value the straight-line 
passing through the origin that represents numevioally 
"fair" combinations of stakes and prizes (thus for p ~ h, 
the prize is always twice the stake) . Thus we might have 
something like the following:
or
PRIZES
O
STAKES 
Fig. 5
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The straight-line a represents the numerically "fair" 
combination of stake and prize; the curve b represents the 
curve we would expect given orthodox decision theory combined 
with the doctrine of marginally decreasing utility for 
money; and the curve q represents the curve we would expect 
given our examination of the Tversky-Kahneman experiment.
Thus returning to Figure 4, and using a gambler-indiffer­
ence map like that in Figure 5 we would note that the 
certainty (the stake) of $400 is worth something less 
than, say, a % chance of $1500 or nothing. Hence when the 
prize is increased to $1500 (i.e., the situation is
altered such that a offers $1500 should s obtain and $02 1
should s obtain) then if the individual is to maximize 2
utility he must choose a . When the possible relative loss
is reduced we first obtain from the gambler-indifference
map that value of the stake such that the utility of the
stake for i is equal to -u^ (%. 1000), and then the
value of the stake such that the utility of the stake for
i is equal to u^ {k. 200); we then add these together and
if the value exceeds $400 then the individual, if he is to
choose the alternative that maximizes utility, must choose
a . I should hasten to add that the gambler-indifference 2
map in Figure 5 is a gross simplification: a more realistic 
map would have curves for a range of probability values 
between 0 and 1, and the curves for some probabilities and 
stakes, e.g., those involving very low probabilities and
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very small stakes, may significantly depart from the shape 
of the curve in Figure 5. Nonetheless, for the range of 
values germane to our discussion (we are, for example, 
only concerned with relatively large stakes and maybe, too, 
only relatively large probabilities - see footnote 30) the 
shape of the curve in Figure 5 will suffice as an approx­
imation.
For the remainder of our argument the following three 
points are especially worthy of note. First, the reason 
we suppose that individuals will choose the maximin alter­
native rather than an alternative that maximizes expected 
utility is that the former has a certainty advantage over 
the latter and that individuals value certainty as such. 
Second, that the degree to which individuals are risk 
averse, i.e., how much they value certainty, may vary from 
individual to individual: all we can talk of is a novmal 
degree of risk aversion. And third, assuming a normal 
degree of risk aversion (or, indeed, any degree of risk 
aversion) there will be some limit to the size of the 
relative possible gains and losses of the alternative that 
maximizes expected utility if the maximin alternative is 
to be chosen; in particular, the gains must be sufficiently 
small or the losses sufficiently large.
We have, then, some idea of when and why the maximin 
principle is applicable. Let us now look at its role in 
the Original Position,
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3. Maximin and the Oviginat Position.
The Original Position is a purely hypothetical 
situation that replaces the historical or quasi-historical 
situations of earlier social contract theories wherein 
individuals agree on the arrangement of the basic social 
institutions. The Original Position has certain features 
such that any agreement reached in such a situation would 
satisfy at least the minimal conditions for being fair or 
just. Basically, the Original Position insures that the 
agreement reached is impartial and i m p e r s o n a l .  ^ The 
impartiality and impersonality of the agreement is effected 
by supposing that the individuals in the Original Position 
choose between alternative arrangements behind the "veil 
of ignorance". That is, the individuals are assumed to 
make a choice under certain epistemic restraints. They 
do not know what their place will be in the society agreed 
upon - their class position or social status. They do not 
know particular facts about their own psychology, e.g., 
to what extent they are risk averse? although it is assumed 
that they know certain general facts, e.g., the laws of 
human psychology.^ °
When individuals make a choice between alternative 
arrangements of the basic social institutions they make a 
choice between alternative ways of distributing the 
primary goods, for it is those institutions which deter­
mine that distribution. A primary good is something which
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any man will want (no matter what else he turns out to 
want onoe the veil of ignorance is lifted), The chief 
primary goods are rights and liberties, powers and oppor­
tunities, income and w e a l t h . I t  is assumed that the 
individuals want more rather than less of a primary good 
and that they are rational in the sense that they will 
choose accordingly. That is, it is assumed that the 
individuals in the Original Position are rational in the 
formal practical sense.
Now the important point for us to note at this 
juncture is that the veil of ignorance not only ensures 
that the agreement reached is impartial and impersonal, 
it also ensures that the choice is a decision under 
unoertainty, The veil of ignorance even precludes the 
individuals from knowing the probability of their 
occupying a particular social position in the future 
s o c i e t y . O n  what basis, then, will an individual make 
his decision?
According to Rawls he will choose that arrangement 
of the social institutions which is an instantiation of 
the Difference Principle. That is, he will choose that 
arrangement of the social institutions which is such that 
it is to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged.^^ 
In other words, he chooses that arrangement which ensures 
that any distribution of the primary good maximizes the 
minimum allotment of the primary goods.
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As Rawls notes there are two ways that one might 
proceed to argue for such a pri n c i p l e . F i r s t ,  one 
might attend to what sort of social structure would result 
from the employment of this principle and then compare 
such a structure with our "considered judgements of 
justice". That is to say, we could attempt to justify 
the Difference Principle by that process which gives rise 
to a reflective equilibrium^^ for the principle. Alter­
natively, a "conclusive argument" (Rawls' phrase) could 
be had by noting that in a situation like the Original 
Position rational individuals would choose according to 
the Difference Principle. Says Rawls:
In order to see how this might be done, it is 
a useful heuristic device to think of the 
(Difference Principle) as the maximin solution 
to the problem of social justice. There is an 
analogy between the (Difference Principle) and 
the maximin rule for choice under certainty.
As I understand Rawls the important reason why there is 
only an analogy between the maximin principle and the 
Difference Principle is that the former only applies to 
situations where utilities are known whereas the latter 
is meant only to apply to situations where utilities are 
not known. The Original Position is a situation where
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the utilities are not known; the veil of ignorance 
precludes the individuals from being able to assign a 
utility level to some allotment of a primary good. When 
choosing between alternative arrangements the individuals 
do so by means of an index of the primary goods expressed, 
say, in hundreds of dollars. Rawls regards this as a 
distinct advantage for his theory. If utilities were to 
be employed in choosing between differing institutional 
arrangements these utilities would have to be interperson- 
ally comparable. Says Rawls of these interpersonal 
comparisons.
simply because we do in fact make what we 
call interpersonal comparisons of well-being 
does not mean that we understand the basis of 
these comparisons or that v/e should accept 
them as sound. ... For questions of social 
justice we should try to find some objective 
grounds for these comparisons, ones that men 
can recognize and agree to. At the present 
time, there appears to be no satisfactory 
answer to these difficulties....  ^^
However, Rawls is quick to note that while the 
Difference Principle is framed to circumvent these dif­
ficulties he does not wish to stress its relative merits
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on that score. Primarily because he does not argue and 
he does not want to assume that the difficulties alluded 
to above for interpersonal comparisons of utility cannot 
be o v e r c o m e . This is a significant concession on Rawls' 
part and one that I think he was wise to make especially 
in the light of the comments made in Chapter II section 4. 
There we noted that the philosophical objectives to inter­
personal comparisons of utility essentially involve the 
problem of other minds, and that as a point of strategy 
in philosophical argument we do not want our primary 
objection to a first order ethical theory to depend on 
such a general and apparently intractable problem. Of 
course, there is also the practical problem involved with 
interpersonal utility comparisons, and Rawls does allude 
to this, but I don't think that this is sufficient to 
persuade us that utilitarianism is inadequate as a moral 
theory. In any case Rawls seems to see the real difficulty 
with the use of such utilities residing in the fact that 
the utilities reflect values which "it does not make sense 
to pursue" or which are morally irrelevant. Of a utilit­
arianism which does use such utilities he says: "The 
controversy about interpersonal comparisons tends to 
obscure the real question, namely, whether the total (or 
average) happiness is to be maximized in the first place. 
Now there is surely something right in what Rawls says: 
not every preference which a person has and which defines
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his utility function should enter into a calculus of 
what constitutes a just society. Harsanyi has also rec­
ognised this problem:
Common sense distinguishes between sensible 
preferences (sensible wants) and foolish 
preferences (foolish wants). It would be 
absurd for any ethical theory to disregard 
this distinction: nobody can seriously 
assert that we are just as duty-bound to 
help other people to satisfy their utterly 
foolish preferences as we are duty-bound to 
help them to satisfy their very sensible ones.^°
But an ethical theory which bases itself on individuals' 
preferences seems to be in danger of losing this dist­
inction. Harsanyi, however, argues that this need not 
be the case for:
we may distinguish between a person’s explicit 
preferences, i.e., his preferences as they 
actually are, possibly distorted by factual and 
logical errors - and his 'true' preferences, 
i.e., his preferences as they would be under 
'ideal conditions' and, in particular, after 
careful reflection and in possession of all the
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relevant information.^^
Our ethical theory is then supposed to only take cogniz­
ance of an individual'•s true preferences. Indeed, 
Harsanyi thinks that we will have to make a further 
qualification, for our ethical theory should disregard 
"not only preferences distorted by factual or logical 
errors, but also preferences based on clearly antisocial 
attitudes, such as sadism, resentment, or malice.
Now the distinctions here between explicit, true, and 
antisocial preferences raise a plethora of philosophical 
problems, not least of which is how Harsanyi is to 
justify the exclusion of, say, anti-social preferences: 
will this and can this be done simply on utilitarian 
grounds - if not, how can the theory be classified as 
genuinely utilitarian? Be that as it may I will not 
pursue the point further and instead I will mention the 
following three points which are especially worthy of 
note.
First, Rawls, as we’ve already noted, assumes that 
the individuals in the Original Position are rational in 
the formal practical sense. But he makes a "special 
assumption" about these individuals: they do not suffer 
from envy.^^ This assumption, whatever its merits, seems 
to be on a par with Harsanyi's assumption that the anti­
social attitudes of sadism, resentment, etc., are to be
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disregarded.
Second, while we've had to raise the veil of ignor­
ance to some extent to allow the individuals in the 
Original Position to compute interpersonal utilities 
this does not seem to destroy the impartiality or imper­
sonality of any agreement reached. It is still the case 
that no individual knows what his position will be in any 
future society nor the probability that he will occupy 
any particular position. Moreover, he does not, accord­
ing to Harsanyi (see Chapter II section 3), compute 
utilities by supposing that he is in some social position 
with his preferences: rather, he supposes that he is the 
occupant of some social position with that individual's 
preferences. In more ordinary language, an individual 
ascribes a utility for each person in society for some 
given institutional arrangement by putting himself in the 
other fellow's shoes. Hence any agreement reached by the 
employment of such utilities would still seem to leave us 
with a decision situation whereby no individual could 
choose in a partial and personal manner. The veil of 
ignorance was designed to ensure that no individual 
could choose in a way that favoured his "particular con­
dition". Our slight lifting of the veil of ignorance has 
not jeopardized this "fairness" of the choice in the 
Original Position. And it would seem that we can alter 
the features of the choice situation in any way we like
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provided that fairness is not thereby jeopardized.
Third, having raised the veil of ignorance to give 
the individual's access to the preferences of individuals 
in society we have also given them, in particular, access 
to the preferences for certainty as such. The natural 
question is whether such preferences should be allowed to 
figure in our theory of justice. Let us in the first 
instance look at this question from Harsanyi's viewpoint. 
It would seem that if Harsanyi is to answet this question 
in the negative he would have to show either that such 
preferences were "utterly foolish", i.e., explicit pref­
erences distorted by factual or logical error, or that 
they were antisocial. But where is someone who values 
certainty as such guilty of factual or logical error?
Is such an attitude really to be put on a par with sadism, 
resentment, and malice? I think not. Moreover, we have 
already considered whether we can plausibly say that as 
rational individuals, individuals ought not to value 
certainty (see Chapter IV section 3). Let us now look 
at the question from the standpoint of some of the remarks 
that Rawls has made about the role of risk aversion in 
the Original Position. Rawls does not object to risk 
aversion affecting the choice of the individuals in the 
Original Position. Indeed, he thinks that given the 
nature of decision it is perfectly justified. Given that 
it is a decision where a whole life is at stake, that the
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parties are responsible to later generations, and that 
the situation has other qualitative features (to be 
discussed in the next section) to choose in a risk averse 
manner is absolutely reasonable. This is not to say, of 
course, that the choice of an individual in the Original 
Position is simply to be a function of his own personal 
(and possibly idiosyncratic) attitude towards risk. That 
is why the veil of ignorance is deemed to preclude an 
individual from knowing his own attitude towards risk.^^
Now the approach I shall suggest has certain affinities 
with Rawls' approach such that I think I am justified in 
saying that it captures the essence of his position with 
respect to the role of risk aversion in the choices of 
the Original Position. I will argue that given that the 
Original Position has certain qualitative features, then 
assuming a normal attitude towards risk, the individuals 
will choose in a risk averse manner, and any such choice 
will not depend on each individual's own personal attitude 
towards risk.
To return to our main argument. The idea we want to 
pursue is that we can, apparently, offer a "conclusive 
argument" for the Difference Principle by noting that 
rational individuals will choose according to the maximin 
principle in the Original Position and that there is an 
identity, or at least a strong analogy, between the maximin 
principle and the Difference Principle.
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But, as we've seen in section 2, maximin is not 
universally applicable. However, this is where it is 
crucial to note that Rawls does not maintain that the 
maximin principle is generally applicable, even in 
situations of uncertainty.^^ Rather it is applicable in 
"special circumstances", namely, those circumstances 
which have three features each of which is evident in 
the Original Position. These I call "the special features 
of the Original Position",
4. The Speoial Features of the Original Position.
The first feature of the choice in the Original 
Position which Rawls thinks makes application of the 
maximin principle particularly appropriate is that the 
individuals are not in a position to estimate the prob­
ability of their occupying any particular social position. 
Now I should note that I do not believe that it is 
essential to allude to this feature in order to defend 
Rawls' use of the maximin principle: that can be achieved 
with the remaining two features. Nonetheless, as I shall 
indicate below, I think there is more to be said for this 
feature than I suspect the orthodox theorist would allow.
As we noted, according to orthodox theory in a sit­
uation of uncertainty an individual is assumed to employ 
subjective probabilities. What value should be given to
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these probabilities in such a situation as the Original 
Position? Harsanyi claims that individuals should assign 
an equiprobahility to their occupying any particular 
social position. The basis for this assignment is the 
Laplacean principle of insufficient reason. Rawls thinks 
probabilities arrived at in this way should be discounted 
as a basis for rational decision in the Original Position.
Such probabilities are required for the expected utility 
principle whereas, in contrast, the maximin principle 
does not require any assignment of probabilities: indiv­
iduals simply choose that alternative, irrespective of
the probability of the various outcomes, which maximizes j
Ithe minimum utility, II
This brings to mind the following complex problem in j
probability theory: the assignment of eguiprobability on I
the grounds of insufficient reason seems to be baseless. }
Afterall, because of insufficient reason we seem to have j
no grounds for supposing that the probability of any |
particular outcome has any particular value - including J
that of eguiprobability with every other outcome. We !I
seem to have derived a conclusion upon which we are going !
■1to base a rational decision out of a state of ignorance. j
How is this possible?^® j
i
Rather than get embroiled in this difficult problem ;
I propose to make the following two points. I have |
argued in section 2 - that there is a case to be made }
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for the maximin principle as a rule for choice in
situations of risk. If anything I think this case is
stronger in situations of uncertainty. Consider once
again the situation depicted in Figure 4, only this time
suppose that the situation is one of uncertainty rather
than risk. That is, suppose that the individual does
not know the probability of s obtaining or the probab-1
ility of s obtaining. Here it seems to me an individual2
who was risk averse would have additional reason for
choosing a rather than a . For the only reason he could 
1 2
have for not choosing a was that he had good reason to
believe that the probability of s obtaining was at least
%. But does he have good reason to believe that, when he
does not know the objective probability of s obtaining?
Or, at least, does he have as good a reason to believe
that the probability of obtaining is % in the situation
of uncertainty, as he would if he knew that whether s
obtained would depend on the result of the toss of a fair
coin? If we’re inclined to answer "No" here, on the
grounds that probabilities estimated on the basis of
insufficient reason are at least problematic or in some
way less "firm", then it would seem that an individual
has additional reason to choose a rather than a . He
1 2
seems entitled to ignore these somewhat problematic prob­
ability estimates and simply choose that alternative 
which offers him the surety of $400 as against the risk
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of getting $0 - that seems quite reasonable.
This raises the second point that I wish to discuss 
with respect to the first feature of the Original 
Position. Harsanyi has argued against Rawls by claiming 
that "a rational decision maker simply cannot help using 
subjective probabilities".^^ Hence it would be false to 
suppose that by choosing according to the maximin principles 
individuals are avoiding the use of such probabilities.
His argument proceeds by way of the following example.
X wins X doesn’t win
Bet that X 
wins
Bet that X 
doesn't win
100 0
0 100
Fig. 6
Here one chooses between two bets (that X wins the next 
election and that X doesn't win the next election) such 
that if you bet that X wins and he wins you get $100 and 
nothing if he doesn't, and if you bet that X doesn't win 
and he doesn't you get $100 and nothing if he does. You 
pay nothing for either of these bets, so as Harsanyi 
remarks it would be irrational for you not to accept 
either bet - some chance of getting $100 is better than 
no chance at all. Then Harsanyi argues:
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if you choose the first bet then I can 
infer that (at least implicitly) you are 
assigning a subjective probability of h 
or higher to Mr X's winning the next 
election.
(A similar argument can be adduced if you choose the 
second bet.) But this seems to me to be an unwarranted 
conclusion. Suppose I know nothing about Mr X or his 
electorate, in short, I have no way of estimating that he 
will or will not win. Further, suppose I choose the first 
alternative (I bet that X will win) - does it follow that 
I have assigned a subjective probability of h or higher 
to his winning? Of course not. Maybe I chose the first 
alternative because it was the first alternative or, more 
realistically, because I liked the sound of Mr X's name. 
Certainly we could then say that the abstraction of the 
decision situation in Figure 6 does not adequately capture 
that decision situation as I perceive it: the bet that X 
will win has some additional utility for me that is not 
simply a matter of its monetary payoff. That can be 
granted but it does not effect the point that I choose 
the first alternative without assigning a subjective 
probability of h or higher to Mr X's winning. By betting 
that Mr X wins, then whether he wins or not, at least I 
have the satisfaction that I bet that he will win.
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Harsanyi might object to this argument by sdying, "But 
surely you wouldn't have chosen the first alternative on 
such trivial grounds unless you thought that the probab­
ility of his winning was at least h-" However, this 
misses the point: I do not assign any probability value 
to Mr X's winning? as I have no idea of the probability 
of whether Mr X will win or not 1 ignore all probability 
estimates? but I have to choose (a chance of $100 is 
better than no chance at all) and I have to choose on 
some basis? so I decide to choose on the basis that I 
1ike Mr X's name.
Orthodox theory, with its insistence that an individual 
will employ subjective probabilities in situations of 
uncertainty is in danger of being rendered a trivial theory 
whether it is conceived of as an empirical or normative 
theory. This is particularly apparent in Harsanyi's 
later remarks:
if a decision maker follows the maximin principle, 
he is not really avoiding a choice of subjective 
probabilities, at least implicitly. Of course, 
he may not think explicitly in terms of probabil­
ities at all* But, whether he likes it or not, 
his behaviour will really amount to assigning 
probability one (or nearly one) to the worst 
possibility in any given case, (My emphasis).
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But now what appeared to be a substantive claim seems to 
be no more than a trivial truth. Whatever an individual 
may think, his behaviour will be taken to show that he 
employs subjective probabilities, and, moreover, subject­
ive probabilities of a certain value. There is no way 
that his choice behaviour can be inconsistent with the 
claim that he employs subjective probabilities of a 
certain value, and theoretical objections and reports by 
the agent of his own decision processes are simply swept 
aside by fiat* I don’t think that Rawls, or anyone else 
who objects to the use of subjective probabilities in 
situations of uncertainty, will be very impressed by this 
argument.
However, let us now turn to the remaining two features 
which, as I ’ve said, will bear the burden of our defence 
of the maximin principle in the Original Position. I call 
these two features the "maxima and minima conditions".
The maxima condition is put by Rawls as follows: an 
individual in the Original Position,
cares very little, if anything, for what he 
might gain above the minimum stipend that he 
can, in fact, be sure of by following the 
maximin rule.  ^®
The minima condition states that the individuals strongly
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disvalue what they might loose relative to what they can 
be sure of by following the maximin rule:
the rejected alternatives have outcomes that
one can hardly accept.
Now these features are the features we mentioned in
section 2 when discussing the applicability of the maximin
principle to the decision situation in Figure 4. We said
there that the maximin alternative (i.e., a ) would be
chosen provided the relative possible gains of a were2
not large or that the relative possible losses were not 
small. As we noted, however, whether the possible gains 
weve sufficiently large or whether the possible losses 
weve sufficiently small would very much depend on how 
much the individual valued certainty as such: in our 
example we presupposed that individuals had a normat 
attitude towards risk. The question, then, is what is 
the degree of risk aversion of the individuals in the 
Original Position? Rawls has said, "From the standpoint 
of the original position, the parties will surely be very 
considerably risk-averse; if we ask how risk averse, we 
might say not less than that of most any normal person". 
Let us proceed with something like this idea, i.e., we 
suppose that there is a certain value for certainty as 
such which the vast majority of individuals in the
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Original Position place on certainty (the results of the 
Tversky-Kahneman experiment certainly indicate that there 
is such a value).
We now imagine an individual choosing between two 
alternative social arrangements; one is the maximin alter­
native and the other maximizes expected utility (we assume 
that the individuals assign equiprobability to their 
occupying any particular social position and hence our 
argument does not require that the individuals do not use 
subjective probabilities). We further assume that the 
maxima and minima conditions obtain. So we have the 
following situation;
1 2^1 ^1
1 2^2 ^2
Si
U-
u;
n
u.n
u.n
Fig. 7
Here the states of nature are the social positions in
society and as there are n individuals in society (or,
following Rawls, n. "representative men" ^ ° ) there are n.
such positions. The alternatives are a and a with1 2
utility entries as indicated. The sign "u^^'" represents 
the utility for individual i (i.e., the utility for the 
individual in the s . position) of the alternative a . ^ I
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That is,it denotes the utility of some allotment of a
primary good for the individual in the s position under
the social arrangement a , Suppose that the minimum
utility entry in a is greater than the minimum utility
entry in a , i.e., a is the maximin alternative, and 
2 1
also suppose that maximizes expected utility. Now an
individual choosing between a and a does not knov; which1 2
of the {1  ^ ...j n} individuals he will be, although he 
does know - as we mentioned in section 3- what each indiv­
idual's attitude towards risk is. More importantly, 
supposing the maxima and minima conditions obtain, he 
knows that it is most likely he prefers to For
to say that the maxima and minima conditions obtain is 
just to say that given a. normal attitude towards risk 
(i.e., the attitude most people have) the relative 
possible gains/losses are not sufficiently large/small 
to overcome the advantage of certainty offered by the 
maximin alternative. Therefore, in choosing as if he had 
a normal attitude towards risk and thus choosing a 
rather than he is more likely to choose the alternative 
he actually prefers. The situation is somewhat like the 
following; you are offered a choice between A and B but 
you don't know whether you prefer 4 to S or vice versa. 
However, you are reliably informed that the pvobabitity 
that you prefer 4 to 5 is very much greater than the 
probability that you prefer 4 to B. Hence, you choose 4.
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Of course, we would have to presuppose that how much 
utility might accrue to you, given you choose B, is not 
that much greater than the utility that might accrue to 
you, given you choose A, That is, we would have to pre­
suppose that how much you might prefer B to 4 is not so 
large as for you to be willing to accept a considerably 
low probability of you preferring B to 4. This presup­
position is guaranteed in the case of the decision in the 
Original Position; for we assume that only a normal degree 
of risk aversion is required to find a\ attractive relat­
ive to a and, as we saw in the case of Figure 4, a 
normal degree of risk aversion will only suffice to out­
weigh a relatively marginal gain in expected utility 
offered by some more risky alternative. In other words, 
an individual will not choose the maximin alternative as 
the relative possible gains of the alternative that max­
imizes expected utility increase and/or as the relative 
possible losses decrease, i.e., as the expected utility 
of the alternative that maximizes expected utility 
increases to a value which exceeds the value of the 
advantage of certainty offered by the maximin alternative 
for most people, i.e., those with a normal attitude 
towards risk, the value of the advantage of certainty 
offered by the maximin alternative is only sufficient to 
outweigh a marginal gain in expected utility. Hence, 
even if an individual does not value certainty as such.
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a will only offer him a marginal gain in (expected) 
utility relative to a^.
There are two important questions raised by the above 
sort of approach.
First, it might be objected that as the individual
in the Original Position making the choice between a ^
and a in Figure 7 does not know whether he values cert- 2
ainty as such at the time of making his decision, and 
that by the time he does know (i.e., by the time the veil 
of ignorance is lifted) he will occupy one of the social 
positions, why does he not simply choose between the 
alternatives on the basis of which offers the highest 
expected utility? That is, given that the decision 
maker is ignorant of his attitude towards risk, why not 
take a purely result orientated approach to the choice 
between a^ and a in Figure 7? This is a serious object­
ion, but not one that is decisive, although it does high­
light certain issues that ought to be mentioned.
One thing we should note immediately. In saying that 
the individuals in the Original Position choose between 
alternatives without knowing their own personal attitude 
towards risk is not to say that they do not have an
attitude towards certainty as such (even at the time of 
making the choice). If we have some difficulty in making 
sense of unknown but actual preferences we cah
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always give a less titevat reading of the Original 
Position which nonetheless preserves its essential 
character. We can require of the individuals that even 
though they know their own personal attitude towards risk 
they should choose as if they did not (see Chapter II 
section 3). Moreover, we do want the actual preferences 
of the individuals in society for certainty as such to 
figure in the determination of which alternative arrange­
ment ought to be chosen from the viewpoint of justice.
The reason for this is that any theory, including that 
being proposed here, which attempts to determine what 
constitutes a just society for some group of individuals 
by making reference to the preferences of those individuals 
should take account of any preferences those individuals 
may have unless,using Harsanyi's terminology, they are 
not true or social preferences. So, as the preference 
for certainty is neither "false" nor anti-social, we seem 
perfectly justified in making a modification to the 
description of the Original Position to ensure that this 
attitude figures in the choice of the individuals in the 
Original Position. The only thing we must observe when 
making such a modification is that we do not thereby 
disturb the impartially and impersonality of the decision 
reached. Both objectives - that the attitude towards 
certainty should figure in the choice and that the choice 
should be impartial - can be achieved in the following way
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We suppose that the individuals choose between the alter­
natives without knowing their personal attitude towards 
certainty, but knowing that having made the choice and 
before occupying a social position the veil of ignorance 
will be lifted to such an extent as to allow the individ­
uals to know their personal attitude towards certainty. 
This implies that an individual choosing between and 
in Figure 7 knows that it is most likely that should
he choose a he will, when the partial lifting of the 2
veil of ignorance occurs, regret not having chosen a
for he will discover that the latter actually has a higher
utility for him; it enjoys a certainty advantage over a .
The second important question is this; what reason 
have we to suppose that the maxima and minima conditions 
obtain? That is, supposing that an individual in the 
Original Position will choose as if he had a normal 
attitude towards risk, how can we be sure that the maximin 
alternative will be such that any other alternative (in 
particular, that which maximizes expected utility) will 
have outcomes which represent relative gains for which 
he "cares very little" and relative losses which he "can 
hardly accept"? To come up with some sort of answer to 
this question we would have to look more closely at the 
notion of a primary good, how much of them is available 
for distribution, what distributions of them are possible, 
and what we would expect individuals' utility functions
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for those primary goods to look like. Fortunately, 
however, these are problems that we can ignore for the 
purposes of this t h e s i s . F o r  the orthodox theorist, 
and in particular the preference utilitarian, claims that 
the individuals in the Original Position should choose 
that alternative which maximizes expected utility and 
not the maximin alternative whether or not the maxima 
and minima conditions obtain. In other words, it may be 
that in the final analysis the sort of theory being put 
forward here - a theory which claims that individuals 
will choose the maximin alternative in a situation like 
the Original Position - fails because there is no good 
argument for the claim that in the Original Position the 
maxima and minima conditions obtain. But the orthodox 
theorist does not and cannot object to this sort of theory 
on those grounds; his is a theory which claims that 
individuals will not choose the maximin alternative even 
if the maxima and minima conditions obtain. The primary 
object of this thesis, and especially this chapter, has 
been to show that the orthodox theorist is mistaken in 
this claim. Whether the maxima and minima conditions 
obtain in the Original Position has not been and could 
not be the object of the dispute between the orthodox 
theorist and Rawls: rather theirs is the decision theor­
etic dispute that centres on whether the maximin principle 
is ever an appropriate selection rule for rational choice.
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Having argued that under certain conditions the maximin 
principle is an appropriate selection rule and that it 
has been claimed by Rawls that the Original Position is 
a situation that satisfies those conditions let us now 
go on to consider the objections that have been raised 
by the orthodox theorist against the maximin principle.
5, A EeQonsideration of the ObQ eotions to Maximin.
Here I propose to concentrate on the objections that 
Harsanyi has brought against the maximin principle.
His argument proceeds by way of counter-example and these 
may be divided into two types. First, there are those 
counter-examples which attempt to show that the maximin 
principle is inadequate as a selection rule for decision 
situations in everyday life - it leads to decisions which 
are clearly irrational. Second, there are those counter­
examples which attempt to show that it is inadequate in 
the Original Position - it leads to decisions which are 
clearly morally unacceptable.
Consider Harsanyi's most well-developed counter-example 
of the first type. Suppose you live in New York and are 
offered two jobs at the same time. The first is a boring, 
low paid job in New York; the second is an exciting, well- 
paid 'job in Chicago. But to get to Chicago to take up 
the job there you must take a plane trip for which there
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is a very small but positive probability that you will 
be killed in a plane crash. The situation can be sum­
marised as follows;
Plane
accident
No plane 
accident
Choose N.Y. poor job, but poor job, but
job stay alive stay alive
Choose death good job, and
Chicago job stay alive
Fig. 8
As Harsanyi notes the worst you can do choosing the New 
York job is better than the worst you can do choosing the 
Chicago job. So, concludes Harsanyi, if you are to choose 
according to the maximin principle you must choose the 
New York job, and yet that choice seems to be clearly 
irrational.
There are two points that Harsanyi makes about the 
situation depicted in Figure 8 to which I would like to 
draw attention. First he says, "I am assuming that your 
chances of dying in the near future for reasons other 
than a plane accident can be taken to be zero"; and 
second, he says that if you are to follow the maximin 
principle "you must choose the Chicago job under any 
conditions - however unlikely you might think a plane 
accident would be, and however strong your preferences
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might be for the excellent Chicago job".
It is obvious enough why Harsanyi must assume that 
the probability you will die for reasons other than a 
plane accident is zero, for otherwise it might not be 
that the maximin principle clearly recommended that you 
choose the New York job. Now it might just be a fact 
that this assumption holds - there might really be no 
possibility that you will die by any other means than a 
plane crash. But this hardly sounds like a decision 
situation of "everyday life": there would be in reality 
a very small but positive probability that you would 
die, say, from being struck by lightning or being run 
over by a bus if you stayed in New York. In which case 
we might ask why Harsanyi has picked on the way out 
possibility that you will die in a plane crash from the 
miriade way out possibilities associated with your 
choice, in particular, those associated with your staying 
in New York? To make a point similar to that made by 
Hare in another connection (see Chapter III section 6), 
can we be sure that our commonsense judgements - our 
judgements about what it is clearly rational to do in 
everyday situations are applicable to the comyletely un­
common situation envisaged by Harsanyi? Moreover, if we 
do side with Harsanyi that it is clearly irrational to 
not choose the Chicago job, may be this is because we have 
(unconsciously) tempered our judgement by associating
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with staying in New York the very possibility that we will 
die by means other than a plane crash which would be 
implicit in any normal choice between staying in New York 
and moving to Chicago.
But the more serious problem for Harsanyi's putative 
counter-example is this; it mignt be a counter-example 
to an unrestricted version of maximin, but it is not a 
counter-example to the restricted version of maximin 
being put forward by Rawls and myself. Neither Rawls nor 
I would claim that you must choose the New York job "under 
any conditions" - no matter how unlikely you might think 
a plane accident would be, and no matter how much you 
valued the Chicago job. The certainty advantage enjoyed 
by choosing the New York job is not sufficient to overcome 
the advantages of choosing the Chicago job, viz., the very 
good prospects of an excellent job with only a minute 
possibility of a catastrophe. That is, the relative 
possible gains of the alternative that maximizes expected 
utility are sufficiently large and the relative possible 
losses are sufficiently small to outweigh the advantage 
of certainty offered by the maximin alternative. Of course, 
in saying this we assume a normal degree of risk aversion: 
it is at least conceivable that there is a person who 
would find the choice of the Chicago job too risky.
Let us now turn to the second type of counter-example 
I mentioned. Consider a society consisting of two indiv-
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iduals, both of them critically ill, and suppose there 
is an antibiotic for which there is enough to cure one 
of the individuals. Individual 4 is a basically healthy 
person (apart from the present illness which can be cured 
by the antibiotic) but individual B is suffering from a 
terminal disease in addition to the present illness - 
nonetheless, the antibiotic will prolong the life of B 
for another couple of months. To whom ought the anti­
biotic be given? As Harsanyi notes, Rawls seems committed 
to the view that the antibiotic ought to be given to B 
on the grounds that this is to the greatest benefit 
of the least advantaged member of society, i.e., giving 
the antibiotic to B is recommended by the Difference 
Principle. But, as Harsanyi notes;
In contrast, utilitarian ethics - as well as 
ordinary common sense - would make the 
opposite suggestion. The antibiotics should 
be given to 4 because it would do "much more 
good" by bringing him back to normal health 
than it would do by slightly prolonging the 
life of a hopelessly sick individual.
Now we will ignore the sorts of replies that might 
be prompted by a consideration of certain remarks by 
Rawls. For example, Rawls says that when judging the
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principles of justice we should not suppose that they 
apply "to distributions of particular goods to particular 
individuals who may be identified by their proper names.
... They are meant to regulate basic institutional arrange­
ments. ... Oùi'r common sense intuitions for the former may 
be a poor guide to the l a t t e r . I n s t e a d  we will tackle 
this putative counter-example head on and in much the 
same way as with the previous counter-example depicted in 
Figure 8. The point can be made as follows. A just 
society is one organised according to the Difference 
Principle because that is the sort of society that rational 
individuals would choose in the Original Principle. We 
know this because it is rational to choose according to 
the maximin principle in a situation with the qualitative 
anatomy of the Original Position. But in so saying we 
presuppose that the maxima and minima conditions obtain. 
Clearly in the sort of situation envisaged by Harsanyi 
they do notx there is an alternative arrangement to that 
recommended by the maximin principle where an individual 
(viz., 4) can do much better. Now it might be thought 
that Harsanyi has a ready reply to this objection. After- 
all, Harsanyi has come up with an example - and one that 
seems quite possible - where it is not the case that the 
maxima and minima conditions obtain. Surely, if a counter­
example can be so readily and easily constructed against 
Rawls' theory this demonstrates the inadequacy of Rawls'
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theory. But this is not right. In the first place we 
allow that it is logically possible that in some situation 
the maxima and minima conditions do not obtain: this is 
obviously correct. But the important point is whether in 
the Original "Position the maxima and minima conditions 
obtain. It may be that it is only a contingent fact 
about ourselves and our world that they do obtain in the 
Original Position and in which case this says something 
important about our theory of justice which I will discuss 
in the next section. Be that as it may, with the mere 
presentation of the above example Harsanyi has not given 
us reason to suppose that the maxima and minima conditions 
do not obtain in the Original Position which is what is 
required if we are to demonstrate the inadequacy of Rawls' 
theory along these lines. In the second place, it cannot 
be that Harsanyi's objection to Rawls' theory is along 
these lines. For, as we remarked at the conclusion of 
section 4, Harsanyi, as an orthodox theorist, must argue 
that even if the maxima and minima conditions obtained it 
would not be rational for individuals to choose according 
to the maximin principle in the Original Position.
I conclude therefore that neither type of counter­
example presented by Harsanyi is successful in demonstrat­
ing the inadequacy of the maximin principle either from 
the rational or moral point of view. Our argument for the 
adequacy of the maximin principle, in particular, for its
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proper place In a theory of justice, still stands.
6, The Nature and Status of Pveferenoe Contraotar-Canism.
In this concluding section I wish to make a few brief 
clarificatory remarks concerning the nature and status of 
the sort of theory advanced and defended in this chapter.
There is at least one important respect in which the 
theory I have attempted to defend is similar to the theory 
advanced by Harsanyi and which we have referred to as 
"preference utilitarianism"; they are similar in that they 
both make reference to the preferences of the individuals 
in society in order to determine what constitutes the just 
society. Hence I call the sort of theory I have defended, 
preference contractarianism. There are also other respects 
in which our theories are similar. We would both agree 
that we can determine what constitutes the just society 
by noting that it is that sort of society that would be 
chosen by rational individuals in a situation like the 
Original Position which ensured the impartiality and 
impersonality of the choice made. Where we disagree is 
over what is the rational selection rule for the individ­
uals in the Original Position. I maintain that provided 
the maxima and minima conditions obtain individuals will 
choose according to the maximin principle, whereas 
Harsanyi maintains that whether or not the maxima and
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minima conditions obtain individuals will choose accord­
ing to the maximization of expected utility principle.
It is here that preference contractarianism and preference 
utilitarianism essentially differ. And it is here that 
preference contractarianism is essentially similar to 
Rawlsian contractarianism: we both agree that the individ­
uals in the Original Position will choose according to 
the maximin principle and hence that a just society will 
be one that is organised according to the Difference 
Principle. It is this principle, rather than the average 
utility principle, which is the principle of justice. |
But now notice that our argument for the Difference j
iPrinciple involved us in saying, inter alia, that(most) !iindividuals in the Original Position value certainty as j
such and that the maxima and minima conditions obtain. j
!Consider the idea that the individuals value certainty as |Isuch. Now it might be said, and quite rightly, that it |
is only a cantingent fact that the individuals value 
certainty: surely it is logically possible for some 
society of individuals that they not value certainty as 
such. As we noted in our argument for the correctness of 
unorthodox decision theory we could only definitely say 
that it was adequate as an empirical theory of actual 
human behaviour, and from the normative viewpoint that 
there was no good argument to show that individuals ought 
not to value certainty, which is not to say that we have
258
a good argument to show that they ought to value certainty. 
But if so, it seems that it is possible and rationally 
permissible that there should be a society - not our own 
- for which the Difference Principle is not the principle 
of justice. Thus it may be that in a society where the 
individuals are not risk averse they should choose in a 
situation like the Original Position not according to the 
maximin principle but according to the expected utility 
principle; and for these individuals the Difference 
Principle would most certainly not be the principle of 
justice. One may be tempted to see this "relativization" 
of justice inherent in the sort of approach we have taken 
as a weakness in that approach. But I side with Rawls 
in rejecting the idea put by some philosophers
that ethical first principles should be 
independent of all contingent assumptions ...
(and that) moral concepts should hold for 
all possible worlds.
Rather
the fundamental principles of justice quite 
properly depend upon the natural facts about 
men in society.
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It is required of those who think otherwise to advance 
a coherent theory - in that sense of "coherent" made 
explicit in Chapter II section 1 - which is such that it 
makes clear how we come by or how we come to an under­
standing of these immutable ethical first principles. 
Preference contractarianism is a coherent theory and it 
does make abundantly clear how we come to an understanding 
of first principles. And recall that we listed coherency 
and understanding as among the advantages of utilitarian­
ism: in advancing a theory quite at variance with utilit­
arianism we do not want, if possible, to loose these 
advantages. Of course, if ethical first principles were 
necessary and self-evident this would give us immutable 
first principles that were known; but this is just the 
a priorism which we discarded in Chapter III section 6,
None of this amounts to saying, however, that the approach 
we have taken is not completely general in that it may be 
used to determine what constitutes a just society for any 
possible society of individuals, at least, for any possible 
possible society where the individuals can be properly 
regarded as subjects of a theory of rational decision 
(whether this is conceived of as a normative or empirical 
theory). The just society, i.e., a society organized 
according to principles which are properly called just, 
for any group of individuals will be simply that which 
would have been rationally chosen by those individuals in
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a situation which ensured that their choice was impartial 
and impersonal. With respect to us in our world we have 
reason to believe that the just society is one organized 
according to the Difference Principle.
So it would seem that by looking at the foundation 
of first order ethical theories, in particular, their 
foundation in a theory of rational decision making, we 
can reach some important conclusions with respect to the 
inadequacy of those ethical theories: namely, we have 
seen that we have good reason to reject utilitarianism 
and good reason to embrace its most viable rival, 
contractarianism.
261
FOOTNOTES :
1. Harsanyi (1975), pp.594-595.
2. Harsanyi (1975), p. 595, And as Harsanyi goes on to
say, "By the very nature of the maximin principle, 
this choice cannot fail to have highly paradoxical 
implications."
3. See especially Rawls (1972) sections 27 & 28.
4. The phrase is Rawls', see his (1972), p. 157.
5. See also footnote 7. Here is an example (for an
interpretation of the matrix the reader is referred 
to section 2);
5 3
2 1
I have taken the example from Tisdell (1968), pp. 
34-35. Tisdell also mentions the idea of Milnor 
(1954), pp. 49-59 that this sort of counter-example 
can be overcome by introducing the notion of dominance 
The thought is Harsanyi's; "Of course, Rawls is right 
when he argues that in some situations the maximin 
principle will lead to reasonable decisions ... But 
closer inspection will show that this will happen 
only in those situations where the maximin principle 
is essentially equivalent to the expected-utility
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maximization principle (in the sense that the 
policies suggested by the former will yield expected- 
utility levels as high, or almost as high, as the 
policies suggested by the latter would yield)."
(1975), p. 595, last emphasis mine. The phrase I 
have emphasised is interesting in the light of my 
later arguments. Harsanyi appears to be suggesting 
that on occasions it would be reasonable (rational?) 
to choose the maximin alternative even when it offers 
marginally less expected utility. Why would it be 
reasonable to choose thus, and how is that consistent 
with his claim that the expected utility maximization 
principle is the rational selection rule? On the 
other hand, as I shall argue, assuming a normal degree 
or risk aversion and a theory which takes cognizance 
of such an attitude we can easily account for such 
choices.
8. Watkins (1970) , p.188.
9. See Rawls (1972), p. 12.
10. Rawls 1972), especially, pp. 136-137.
11. Rawls 1972), p. 62.
12. Rawls 1972) , p. 155.
13. Rawls 1972 (, p. 83.
14. Ralls ■1972), p.152.
15. Rawls 1972) , p. 20.
16. Rawls 1972), p. 152.
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17. Rawls (1972), pp. 90-91.
18. Rawls (1972), p. 91^ .
19. Rawls (1972), p. 91.
20./ Harsanyi (1977), pp. 29-30.
21. Harsanyi (1977), p. 29.
22. Harsanyi (1977), p. 30.
23. Rawls (1972), p. 143.
24. Rawls (1972), p. 137.
25. Rawls (1972), p. 155.
26. For a discussion of the issues raised here see, for
example, Lucas (1970), pp. 109-125.
27. Harsanyi (1975), p. 599.
28. Rawls (1972), p. 154.
29. Rawls (1974), p. 143.
30. For this notion which has not played a role in our 
argument see Rawls (1972), p. 64. It is worth noting 
that there are certain advantages for our theory in 
employing this notion depending, of course, on how 
its defined. But suppose we identify representative 
men with representative individuals from social 
classes then this will render any calculation of 
whether or a^ is to be adopted that much easier 
and it will also have the effect that the probability 
values involved in any calculation are quite large 
rather than very small.
31. For a discussion of the sorts of issues mentioned
254
here see James Fishkin (1975) especially pp. 616- 
620. Of course, it would be desirable that the 
maxima and minima conditions at least have some 
initial plausibility. Consider the primary good of 
income: it at least seems plausible that there 
should be some income such that people's utility 
curves for income should from a low plateau rapidly 
increase at that point (say, a point that represents 
a"decent standard of living") and that the curve 
should flatten out very considerably past that point.
We suppose that the amount of income available is
1
not infinite or, at least, is not such that it does j
j
not matter how we distribute the income (there is j
hardly a problem for justice with respect to income if j
no matter how we distribute the income everyone is II
assured of an income of at least $10^° per year) and |
we suppose that the maximin alternative ensures that I
Ieach individual will get at least that amount which j
represents a "decent standard of living". Any other I
distribution, in particular, that which maximizes expected |
Iutility, will then have outcomes that represent gains ;
ifor which everyone cares very little and losses that I
everyone can hardly accept. |
32. See Harsanyi (1975), especially pp. 595-597. I
33. Rawls (1972), p. 64. I
34. Rawls (1972), p. 159, !
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